DESPITE MARCH 14 CONCESSIONS, HIZBALLAH REFUSES TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001100

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER SY LE
SUBJECT: DESPITE MARCH 14 CONCESSIONS, HIZBALLAH REFUSES TO
DISCUSS COUSSERAN'S PACKAGE

REF: BEIRUT 1094

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Despite what sound to be far-reaching concessions on
the part of March 14 and GOL leaders, Hizballah rejected
French Special Envoy Jean-Claude Cousseran's pitch to focus
feuding Lebanese politicians on a package of initiatives.
Hizballah also rejected renewal of the high-level National
Dialogue as the intended result of the upcoming visit of
French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, a proposal which
March 14 leaders had accepted. Cousseran holds faint hope
that Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, whom he meets today,
will be more flexible than Hizballah. At present, Hizballah
representatives insist that they will only talk about a
National Unity Government, with all other issues to be
postponed for discussions within the NUG. Druse leader Walid
Jumblatt told the Ambassador late on 7/24 that Hizballah's
intention is clear: "No war, but no state." Hizballah does
not, in Jumblatt's view, intend to provoke civil war (unless
March 14 provides the excuse),but, under Syrian orders, it
will work to prevent the institutions of the state from
functioning. LAF Commander Michel Sleiman's threat to resign
at the constitutional end of Emile Lahoud's presidency is
part of this pattern of crippling all functioning
institutions. Hizballah, Jumblatt insists, "can stay like it
is for two or three years," while the state weakens to the
point where it falls into the hands of Hizballah and Syria,
in what Marwan Hamadeh called a "bloodless coup d'etat." End
summary.

MARCH 14/GOL LEADERS OFFER
CONCESSIONS TO COUSSERAN
--------------


2. (C) Subsequent to our meeting with French Special Envoy
Jean-Claude Cousseran and French Ambassador Bernard Emie
(reftel),Cousseran had intensive talks with Lebanese
political leaders. In an attempt to bridge the differences
between the March 14 position (favoring a package deal to
solve Lebanon's crisis, including the presidency, a National
Unity Government, and the program for that post-election
government) and the March 8 view (demanding that the only
issue to be discussed is a National Unity Government),
Cousseran prodded March 14 and GOL leaders to make the
package more enticing for Syria's Lebanese allies.


3. (C) Late on 7/24, Druse leader Walid Jumblatt and
Minister of Communications Marwan Hamadeh briefed the
Ambassador separately on the concessions March 14 and GOL
leaders offered Cousseran:

-- Acceptance of the March 8 view that the president can
only be elected with a two-thirds parliamentary quorum.
This, Jumblatt emphasized, essentially gives the pro-Syrians
(working with Michel Aoun) a veto over the presidency, making
a compromise president the likely outcome, "unless they want
to block the presidency altogether," which this also makes
possible.

-- Acceptance of accelerating legislative elections, moving
them forward from 2009 to 2008, thus risking the March 14
majority a year earlier than necessary.

-- Acceptance of using the draft legislative election law,
prepared by the Fouad Boutros commission, as the basis for
the early legislative elections, despite that both Saad
Hariri and Walid Jumblatt are likely to lose seats from their
blocs in the proposed system.

-- Acceptance of the concept, post-presidential elections,
of a National Unity Government (NUG),even though that ties
the hands of the next president (who has unusual powers in
forming a new government, since there is no ability to
overrule his refusal to sign a cabinet formation decree).

-- Acceptance of a government program for the NUG that is an
amalgam of UNSCRs 1559, 1701, and 1757, as well as Siniora's
seven-point plan, but that would also include some of the
"ambiguous language" from the existing July 2005 cabinet
statement that has been used to justify Hizballah's retention

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of its arms despite UNSCR 1559 (and, now, 1701).


4. (C) Hamadeh reported that March 14 and GOL leaders also
accepted Cousseran's request that the National Dialogue
leaders reconvene their roundtable to discuss implementation
of this package. The French proposed that, upon the
conclusion of French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner's July
27-29 visit to Beirut, Kouchner announce that the National
Dialogue leaders would return to the National Dialogue. The
March 14 and GOL leaders readily accepted.

BUT HIZBALLAH SAYS NO
--------------


5. (C) Cousseran then took the March 14/GOL concessions and
agreements to Hizballah representatives Mohammed Fneish and
Nawaf Musawi, both of whom had attended La Celle-St. Cloud
talks. Jumblatt reported that Hizballah had rejected all of
the concessions (an assertion confirmed to the Ambassador
later by Bernard Emie, on the margins of a 450-person dinner
that managed to be simultaneously extravagant and tedious,
hosted by Saad Hariri as a farewell for Emie). Fneish and
Musawi also said that Hizballah refused to return to the
National Dialogue roundtable format. There is only one topic
to be agreed upon, they argued: the National Unity
Government now. Once the NUG is formed, then the NUG itself,
not the National Dialogue, will discuss all of the other
issues. There is no reason to rush into discussions on the
other issues now or reconvene the National Dialogue, as the
NUG will bring together the appropriate leaders in an
appropriate forum.

JUMBLATT SAYS HIZBALLAH WILL ACCEPT
"NO WAR, NO STATE" INDEFINITELY
--------------


6. (C) Incensed in his briefing with the Ambassador,
Jumblatt interpreted the Hizballah position as "no war, no
state." Knowing that the French were moving the parties
toward a compromise, Hizballah, acting under Syrian
instructions, does not want a solution. Jumblatt noted that
the March 14/GOL bloc had already made "too many concessions"
and would be unable to go further. What Hizballah insisted
upon only weeks earlier (such as early parliamentary
elections) are no longer sufficient. March 14 is willing to
compromise, but Hizballah and Syria "want total victory,
total capitulation by our side."


7. (C) In Jumblatt's view (echoed in the subsequent
briefing Hamadeh gave the Ambassador),Hizballah is
calculating that it can "stay like it is" for two or three
years. In the meantime, Hizballah will block all state
institutions. The parliament will not function as a
parliament (with the previously announced September 25
session being an electoral college session that will be
aborted for lack of quorum). The cabinet will remain
boycotted. The economy will decline. The debt will reach
crisis proportions. Security will worsen and terrorism
increase.

LAF COMMANDER ESTABLISHING
SCENARIO FOR SPLITTING ARMY
--------------


8. (C) And, now, Jumblatt continued, Commander Michel
Sleiman has indicated that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),
too, will return to a state of inactivity. That is the
reason behind Sleiman's announcement that he will resign on
November 24, at the end of Emile Lahoud's presidency, unless
there is a solution to the presidency: he knows that there
will not be, and he is setting up a scenario by which the
army, like the other institutions of the state, is crippled
and divided. If Sleiman resigns, there is no ability to
replace him, as there will be no president and no cabinet
accepted by all LAF officers. LAF Chief of Staff Shawkib
al-Masri will become Acting LAF Commander, but he will not be
able to maintain LAF unity. Masri does not have strong
leadership qualities, Jumblatt noted, "and he is a Druse,
connected to me" -- meaning that Shia and Aounist officers
and soldiers will refuse to follow him. (Comment: A more
charitable interpretation of Sleiman's controversial comments
is that he is trying to shock the Lebanese into finding a
solution before the army dissolves under lack of recognized
leadership. But we suspect Jumblatt is probably closer to

BEIRUT 00001100 003 OF 004


the truth. End comment.)

NASRALLAH'S SPEECH FURTHER EVIDENCE
OF HIZBALLAH'S REFUSAL TO COMPROMISE
--------------


9. (C) Hamadeh cited the incendiary language of Hassan
Nasrallah's television interview as another example of
Hizballah's refusal to compromise and evidence of
Syria-backed efforts to paralyze the state. Nasrallah is
agitating his people against any kind of compromise with
March 14 and GOL leaders, Hamadeh argued. He also saw Syrian
hands behind the reported failure of Maronite Bishop of
Beirut Boulos Mattar's diplomacy: Mattar, under the auspices
of Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, had tried to urge a
reconciliation between former President Amine Gemayel and MP
Michel Aoun, with the goal of having Aoun withdraw Camille
Khoury from the Metn parliamentary by-election on August 5 in
favor of unified Christian backing of Gemayel.

HIZBALLAH WILLING FOR VIOLENCE
ONLY OF MARCH 14 FORTUNES REVIVE
--------------


10. (C) At some point, Hamadeh said, Hizballah and Syria's
other allies will be able to impose what could very well be a
bloodless coup d'etat on Lebanon. Jumblatt argued that the
state might be so weak that it simply falls into the hands of
Nasrallah and Syria. Or the March 14 movement will be so
discredited by the inability to govern in this atmosphere
that legislative elections, even if not held until 2009, will
return the parliamentary majority to the pro-Syrians out of
disgust at the paralysis making March 14 ineffective.


11. (C) If, on the other hand, March 14 leaders succeed in
political initiatives that seem to be reviving the state and
reviving March 14 fortunes, then Hizballah and Syria might
consider physical moves against the state. Jumblatt said
that he believed the rumors in Beirut that Hizballah already
had a Syrian-hatched plan in place on how to occupy Beirut
and control the rest of the country, to be implemented when
ordered by Syria and Iran to do so. But as long as Hizballah
can simply paralyze and cripple the state institutions,
promoting a climate in which the state gradually disappears,
then Hizballah, probably under Iranian orders, will probably
avoid provoking outright civil war and wait. This is the
best way to avoid a Sunni-Shia clash that Iran fears might
have regional spill-over. At the same time, Hizballah will
prepare itself for civil war, to seize the opportunity if the
other side provides a sufficient pretext.
BERRI: LAST FRENCH HOPE
--------------


12. (C) Emie confirmed to us that French Foreign Minister
Bernard Kouchner, despite the slap to Cousseran from
Hizballah, is still planning to arrive in Beirut on Friday.
Emie said that Cousseran had faint hopes that Parliament
Speaker Nabih Berri will be "embarrassed" by Hizballah's
hard-line stance and attempt to throw a lifeline to the
French initiative and to the Lebanese state. Jumblatt, in
his sky-is-falling mood, was pessimistic that Berri could
offer anything meaningful to Cousseran. "They (the Syrians
and Hizballah) don't want a state," he concluded, "unless
it's a state they control."

COMMENT
--------------


13. (C) According to Jumblatt (and confirmed in general
terms by Emie),March 14 has offered to the French
far-reaching concessions that in some cases are beyond what
we would find advisable, such as keeping some of what can
only charitably be called "ambiguous" language of the current
cabinet statement regarding Hizballah's arms. March 14
essentially opened the door via the French for a compromise
presidential candidate rather than a more credible figure
from March 14 ranks. Nevertheless, these important,
substantive moves were not sufficient to bring Hizballah on
board for a comprehensive solution to Lebanon's political
crisis.


14. (C) Jumblatt and Hamadeh made a very persuasive case
that, unless provoked by a sudden (and uncharacteristic)
surge of March 14 effectiveness, Hizballah, its Lebanese

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allies, and its Syrian and Iranian backers will be content to
move slowly in crippling what remains of the Lebanese state,
in the certainty that, within a couple of years, Syrian
hegemony will be restored one way or another. This
conveniently avoids a Sunni-Shia clash that would be bad for
Hizballah and arguably bad for Iran. This approach might
also promote a natural evaporation of March 14 political
backing, under the paralysis imposed by Hizballah and its
allies. If, on the other hand, the March 14 leaders, backed
by the international community, would find a way despite the
pro-Syrians veto out of the current stalemate, then Hizballah
would seek a pretext for street action.


15. (C) Key to the success of Hizballah's strategy, if
Jumblatt's analysis is on the mark, will be the prevention of
presidential elections this autumn. We suggested to Jumblatt
and Hamadeh that they immediately send credible Christian
figures from March 14 to see Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, to
sound the alarm bells with Sfeir about the very real danger
that the Christian presidency will be vacant and Christian
political powers eroded. Maybe this will finally spark Sfeir
into making a clear statement that presidential elections are
a Christian and Lebanese obligation, with parliamentary
attendance incumbent upon all Christian MPs. We will see
Emie at yet another dinner in his honor tonight, this time
hosted by PM Siniora, and we will seek his read-out of
Cousseran's Berri meeting.
FELTMAN