DESPITE MARCH 14 CONCESSIONS, HIZBALLAH REFUSES TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001100 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2027 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER SY LE SUBJECT: DESPITE MARCH 14 CONCESSIONS, HIZBALLAH REFUSES TO DISCUSS COUSSERAN'S PACKAGE REF: BEIRUT 1094 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Despite what sound to be far-reaching concessions on the part of March 14 and GOL leaders, Hizballah rejected French Special Envoy Jean-Claude Cousseran's pitch to focus feuding Lebanese politicians on a package of initiatives. Hizballah also rejected renewal of the high-level National Dialogue as the intended result of the upcoming visit of French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, a proposal which March 14 leaders had accepted. Cousseran holds faint hope that Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, whom he meets today, will be more flexible than Hizballah. At present, Hizballah representatives insist that they will only talk about a National Unity Government, with all other issues to be postponed for discussions within the NUG. Druse leader Walid Jumblatt told the Ambassador late on 7/24 that Hizballah's intention is clear: "No war, but no state." Hizballah does not, in Jumblatt's view, intend to provoke civil war (unless March 14 provides the excuse),but, under Syrian orders, it will work to prevent the institutions of the state from functioning. LAF Commander Michel Sleiman's threat to resign at the constitutional end of Emile Lahoud's presidency is part of this pattern of crippling all functioning institutions. Hizballah, Jumblatt insists, "can stay like it is for two or three years," while the state weakens to the point where it falls into the hands of Hizballah and Syria, in what Marwan Hamadeh called a "bloodless coup d'etat." End summary. MARCH 14/GOL LEADERS OFFER CONCESSIONS TO COUSSERAN -------------- ¶2. (C) Subsequent to our meeting with French Special Envoy Jean-Claude Cousseran and French Ambassador Bernard Emie (reftel),Cousseran had intensive talks with Lebanese political leaders. In an attempt to bridge the differences between the March 14 position (favoring a package deal to solve Lebanon's crisis, including the presidency, a National Unity Government, and the program for that post-election government) and the March 8 view (demanding that the only issue to be discussed is a National Unity Government), Cousseran prodded March 14 and GOL leaders to make the package more enticing for Syria's Lebanese allies. ¶3. (C) Late on 7/24, Druse leader Walid Jumblatt and Minister of Communications Marwan Hamadeh briefed the Ambassador separately on the concessions March 14 and GOL leaders offered Cousseran: -- Acceptance of the March 8 view that the president can only be elected with a two-thirds parliamentary quorum. This, Jumblatt emphasized, essentially gives the pro-Syrians (working with Michel Aoun) a veto over the presidency, making a compromise president the likely outcome, "unless they want to block the presidency altogether," which this also makes possible. -- Acceptance of accelerating legislative elections, moving them forward from 2009 to 2008, thus risking the March 14 majority a year earlier than necessary. -- Acceptance of using the draft legislative election law, prepared by the Fouad Boutros commission, as the basis for the early legislative elections, despite that both Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt are likely to lose seats from their blocs in the proposed system. -- Acceptance of the concept, post-presidential elections, of a National Unity Government (NUG),even though that ties the hands of the next president (who has unusual powers in forming a new government, since there is no ability to overrule his refusal to sign a cabinet formation decree). -- Acceptance of a government program for the NUG that is an amalgam of UNSCRs 1559, 1701, and 1757, as well as Siniora's seven-point plan, but that would also include some of the "ambiguous language" from the existing July 2005 cabinet statement that has been used to justify Hizballah's retention BEIRUT 00001100 002 OF 004 of its arms despite UNSCR 1559 (and, now, 1701). ¶4. (C) Hamadeh reported that March 14 and GOL leaders also accepted Cousseran's request that the National Dialogue leaders reconvene their roundtable to discuss implementation of this package. The French proposed that, upon the conclusion of French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner's July 27-29 visit to Beirut, Kouchner announce that the National Dialogue leaders would return to the National Dialogue. The March 14 and GOL leaders readily accepted. BUT HIZBALLAH SAYS NO -------------- ¶5. (C) Cousseran then took the March 14/GOL concessions and agreements to Hizballah representatives Mohammed Fneish and Nawaf Musawi, both of whom had attended La Celle-St. Cloud talks. Jumblatt reported that Hizballah had rejected all of the concessions (an assertion confirmed to the Ambassador later by Bernard Emie, on the margins of a 450-person dinner that managed to be simultaneously extravagant and tedious, hosted by Saad Hariri as a farewell for Emie). Fneish and Musawi also said that Hizballah refused to return to the National Dialogue roundtable format. There is only one topic to be agreed upon, they argued: the National Unity Government now. Once the NUG is formed, then the NUG itself, not the National Dialogue, will discuss all of the other issues. There is no reason to rush into discussions on the other issues now or reconvene the National Dialogue, as the NUG will bring together the appropriate leaders in an appropriate forum. JUMBLATT SAYS HIZBALLAH WILL ACCEPT "NO WAR, NO STATE" INDEFINITELY -------------- ¶6. (C) Incensed in his briefing with the Ambassador, Jumblatt interpreted the Hizballah position as "no war, no state." Knowing that the French were moving the parties toward a compromise, Hizballah, acting under Syrian instructions, does not want a solution. Jumblatt noted that the March 14/GOL bloc had already made "too many concessions" and would be unable to go further. What Hizballah insisted upon only weeks earlier (such as early parliamentary elections) are no longer sufficient. March 14 is willing to compromise, but Hizballah and Syria "want total victory, total capitulation by our side." ¶7. (C) In Jumblatt's view (echoed in the subsequent briefing Hamadeh gave the Ambassador),Hizballah is calculating that it can "stay like it is" for two or three years. In the meantime, Hizballah will block all state institutions. The parliament will not function as a parliament (with the previously announced September 25 session being an electoral college session that will be aborted for lack of quorum). The cabinet will remain boycotted. The economy will decline. The debt will reach crisis proportions. Security will worsen and terrorism increase. LAF COMMANDER ESTABLISHING SCENARIO FOR SPLITTING ARMY -------------- ¶8. (C) And, now, Jumblatt continued, Commander Michel Sleiman has indicated that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), too, will return to a state of inactivity. That is the reason behind Sleiman's announcement that he will resign on November 24, at the end of Emile Lahoud's presidency, unless there is a solution to the presidency: he knows that there will not be, and he is setting up a scenario by which the army, like the other institutions of the state, is crippled and divided. If Sleiman resigns, there is no ability to replace him, as there will be no president and no cabinet accepted by all LAF officers. LAF Chief of Staff Shawkib al-Masri will become Acting LAF Commander, but he will not be able to maintain LAF unity. Masri does not have strong leadership qualities, Jumblatt noted, "and he is a Druse, connected to me" -- meaning that Shia and Aounist officers and soldiers will refuse to follow him. (Comment: A more charitable interpretation of Sleiman's controversial comments is that he is trying to shock the Lebanese into finding a solution before the army dissolves under lack of recognized leadership. But we suspect Jumblatt is probably closer to BEIRUT 00001100 003 OF 004 the truth. End comment.) NASRALLAH'S SPEECH FURTHER EVIDENCE OF HIZBALLAH'S REFUSAL TO COMPROMISE -------------- ¶9. (C) Hamadeh cited the incendiary language of Hassan Nasrallah's television interview as another example of Hizballah's refusal to compromise and evidence of Syria-backed efforts to paralyze the state. Nasrallah is agitating his people against any kind of compromise with March 14 and GOL leaders, Hamadeh argued. He also saw Syrian hands behind the reported failure of Maronite Bishop of Beirut Boulos Mattar's diplomacy: Mattar, under the auspices of Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, had tried to urge a reconciliation between former President Amine Gemayel and MP Michel Aoun, with the goal of having Aoun withdraw Camille Khoury from the Metn parliamentary by-election on August 5 in favor of unified Christian backing of Gemayel. HIZBALLAH WILLING FOR VIOLENCE ONLY OF MARCH 14 FORTUNES REVIVE -------------- ¶10. (C) At some point, Hamadeh said, Hizballah and Syria's other allies will be able to impose what could very well be a bloodless coup d'etat on Lebanon. Jumblatt argued that the state might be so weak that it simply falls into the hands of Nasrallah and Syria. Or the March 14 movement will be so discredited by the inability to govern in this atmosphere that legislative elections, even if not held until 2009, will return the parliamentary majority to the pro-Syrians out of disgust at the paralysis making March 14 ineffective. ¶11. (C) If, on the other hand, March 14 leaders succeed in political initiatives that seem to be reviving the state and reviving March 14 fortunes, then Hizballah and Syria might consider physical moves against the state. Jumblatt said that he believed the rumors in Beirut that Hizballah already had a Syrian-hatched plan in place on how to occupy Beirut and control the rest of the country, to be implemented when ordered by Syria and Iran to do so. But as long as Hizballah can simply paralyze and cripple the state institutions, promoting a climate in which the state gradually disappears, then Hizballah, probably under Iranian orders, will probably avoid provoking outright civil war and wait. This is the best way to avoid a Sunni-Shia clash that Iran fears might have regional spill-over. At the same time, Hizballah will prepare itself for civil war, to seize the opportunity if the other side provides a sufficient pretext. BERRI: LAST FRENCH HOPE -------------- ¶12. (C) Emie confirmed to us that French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, despite the slap to Cousseran from Hizballah, is still planning to arrive in Beirut on Friday. Emie said that Cousseran had faint hopes that Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri will be "embarrassed" by Hizballah's hard-line stance and attempt to throw a lifeline to the French initiative and to the Lebanese state. Jumblatt, in his sky-is-falling mood, was pessimistic that Berri could offer anything meaningful to Cousseran. "They (the Syrians and Hizballah) don't want a state," he concluded, "unless it's a state they control." COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) According to Jumblatt (and confirmed in general terms by Emie),March 14 has offered to the French far-reaching concessions that in some cases are beyond what we would find advisable, such as keeping some of what can only charitably be called "ambiguous" language of the current cabinet statement regarding Hizballah's arms. March 14 essentially opened the door via the French for a compromise presidential candidate rather than a more credible figure from March 14 ranks. Nevertheless, these important, substantive moves were not sufficient to bring Hizballah on board for a comprehensive solution to Lebanon's political crisis. ¶14. (C) Jumblatt and Hamadeh made a very persuasive case that, unless provoked by a sudden (and uncharacteristic) surge of March 14 effectiveness, Hizballah, its Lebanese BEIRUT 00001100 004 OF 004 allies, and its Syrian and Iranian backers will be content to move slowly in crippling what remains of the Lebanese state, in the certainty that, within a couple of years, Syrian hegemony will be restored one way or another. This conveniently avoids a Sunni-Shia clash that would be bad for Hizballah and arguably bad for Iran. This approach might also promote a natural evaporation of March 14 political backing, under the paralysis imposed by Hizballah and its allies. If, on the other hand, the March 14 leaders, backed by the international community, would find a way despite the pro-Syrians veto out of the current stalemate, then Hizballah would seek a pretext for street action. ¶15. (C) Key to the success of Hizballah's strategy, if Jumblatt's analysis is on the mark, will be the prevention of presidential elections this autumn. We suggested to Jumblatt and Hamadeh that they immediately send credible Christian figures from March 14 to see Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, to sound the alarm bells with Sfeir about the very real danger that the Christian presidency will be vacant and Christian political powers eroded. Maybe this will finally spark Sfeir into making a clear statement that presidential elections are a Christian and Lebanese obligation, with parliamentary attendance incumbent upon all Christian MPs. We will see Emie at yet another dinner in his honor tonight, this time hosted by PM Siniora, and we will seek his read-out of Cousseran's Berri meeting. FELTMAN