Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BEIRUT1083
2007-07-20 15:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

AOUN SURVEYS POLITICAL LANDSCAPE, HIS ROLE AFTER

Tags:  PGOV PREL LE 
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PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #1083/01 2011516
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201516Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8814
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1336
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001083 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL LE
SUBJECT: AOUN SURVEYS POLITICAL LANDSCAPE, HIS ROLE AFTER
PARIS TALKS


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001083

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL LE
SUBJECT: AOUN SURVEYS POLITICAL LANDSCAPE, HIS ROLE AFTER
PARIS TALKS


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a July 19 meeting with the Ambassador, Free
Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader Michel Aoun was mildly
positive about the recent Paris talks, noting that his "team"
had played a constructive role. He expressed his willingness
to be a facilitator in any future efforts to solve Lebanon's
political crisis, including meeting with March 14 leader Saad
al-Hariri. Aoun was open to U.S. help in arranging such a
meeting.


2. (C) In response to concerns that Hizballah was effectively
undermining the Taif Agreement and UNSCR 1701, Aoun merely
reiterated he was encouraging Hizballah to implement 1701
fully, and that he and the FPM are in no way obligated to
accept Hizballah's position. Aoun personally does not
believe that Hizballah SYG Nasrallah is controlled by Syria
and/or Iran, and seemed unconcerned by the suggestion that
Hizballah might be using him.


3. (C) While Aoun has not budged from his implacable
opposition to the Siniora government, he was vague when
pressed to specify which of its policies were harming
Lebanon. Aoun stressed more than once that a national unity
government was the sine qua non for reaching solutions and he
continues to be adamant about his right to the presidency,
asserting that he would easily win. As for the upcoming
by-elections, Aoun said if the Supreme Court does not stop
them, the FPM would participate with Camille Khoury as its
candidate. End summary.

TOO EARLY TO JUDGE USEFULNESS OF PARIS
--------------


4. (C) In a July 19 meeting with the Ambassador at his
residence in Rabieh, Aoun, accompanied by his advisor and
son-in-law Gebran Bassil, said his envoys to the talks, MP
Ibrahim Kenaan and Simon Abi Ramia, had played a constructive
role in bringing the sides closer. NOW we had to wait and
see what the "attitude of the first-class leaders" would be.
He said he did not know what the French planned to do next.

DOWNPLAYS HIZBALLAH'S UNDERMINING OF UNSCR 1701, NATIONAL
UNITY
--------------


5. (C) In response to the Ambassador's concern that
Hizballah continues to flaunt UNSCR 1701's ban on arms
smuggling, thus exposing Lebanon to a repeat of the 2006 war,
Aoun merely said that the FPM, which was not obliged to
accept Hizballah's position on any issue, was encouraging
Hizballah to fully implement UNSCR 1701. Aoun also seemed
unaware that Hizballah may be undermining the Taif Agreement,

and seeking an eventual sectarian partitioning of Lebanon.
Aoun made the astonishing assertion that he did not think
Hizballah was under Syrian and/or Iranian control, and
characterized Hizballah SYG Nasrallah as an "independent
thinker" in what concerns Lebanon. He seemed unconcerned by
the possibility that Hizballah may be playing games with him,
as the Ambassador suggested.

VAGUE ON REJECTION OF SINIORA; STEADFAST ON PRESIDENCY
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Aoun would not admit that his rejection of PM Siniora
and the current government was at least in part, a way to
curry favor with opposition forces. Yet, he was hard-pressed
to come up with specific examples of Siniora policies he
believed were harming Lebanon. Advisor Bassil intervened,
mentioning recruitment for public jobs. The Ambassador
countered that the Siniora government's action at Nahr
al-Bared was the first time the Sunni political class was
taking tough action against Sunni extremists (a reference to
Fatah al-Islam). Aoun finally offered that corruption was
becoming worse, without giving more detail. He repeated that
only a national unity government could ensure against
sectarian clashes and a political vacuum.


7. (C) Furthermore, Aoun believes the problem of the
presidency (and apparently all others) can be solved by
electing him and, almost childishly, asked "Why don't they
want me as president?" He is confident he would win the

BEIRUT 00001083 002 OF 002


majority of Christian votes and a good part of the Sunni
vote. As for the general consensus on the necessity of a
two-thirds quorum in parliament in order to elect a new
president, Aoun would only say the his bloc expects to
engage, "but it depends on the situation then." As for the
by-elections scheduled for August 5, Aoun was still hopeful
that the Supreme Court would stop the elections, but said the
FPM would participate if it did not. He acknowledged that it
would be tough for FPM candidate Camille Khoury if Amine
Gemayel ran for the vacant seat, which his late son Pierre
Gemayel used to occupy before he was assassinated.

OPEN TO U.S. FACILITATION OF A MEETING WITH HARIRI
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Aoun noted that Saad al-Hariri had not followed up on
his initial phone call, in which he expressed his desire to
meet in order to iron out differences (Hariri has been out of
country for some time). Aoun said he was willing to engage
with Hariri if it could facilitate a solution, adding that
Hariri had mentioned some family issues he had to resolve
before returning to Lebanon. Aoun reacted positively to the
Ambassador's offer to facilitate a meeting with Saad
al-Hariri by arranging a preparatory meeting between an Aoun
and a Hariri representative. He noted that his advisor
Bassil often engaged with PM Siniora's advisor Mohamed
Chatah, who is also close to Hariri.




FELTMAN

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