FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON LEBANESE DIALOGUE AT LA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001082 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2027 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER LE SY FR SUBJECT: FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON LEBANESE DIALOGUE AT LA CELLE-ST. CLOUD Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a 7/19 meeting with the Ambassador, French Ambassador Bernard Emie noted that France's "extremely modest expectations" for the La Celle-St. Cloud talks "were not exceeded." But, in Emie's calculation, the "chemistry worked," breaking the ice between Lebanese participants who in some cases had not spoken directly in months. Reading from the notes he took at the dialogue session, Emie provided glimpses of both the atmosphere and the substance. Clearly, there were no breakthroughs. Emie thought that one of the constructive byproducts of the dialogue was the education it provided to French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and a new team of French Lebanon-watchers. With in Emie's view March 14 participants offering to build some bridges, it became clear to all French officials that, behind Hizballah and Amal's polite interventions, it was the pro-Syrians, not the March 14 participants, who were blocking progress. Emie insisted that the suspension of the dialogue session a day earlier than anticipated was due to the heat and exhaustion, not to any problem. As for follow-up, Emie noted that Special Envoy Jean-Claude Cousseran will arrive in Beirut on Monday (7/23) for talks, with Kouchner tentatively scheduled to be in town July 28-29. When asked what Kouchner hoped to do, Emie responded, "good question." But Emie argued that maintaining a French process would contribute to lowered tensions in Lebanon and continue to encourage the Lebanese to "postpone bad decisions." Emie also touched briefly on Cousseran's trip to Damascus and French thinking regarding Iran's role. (We are reporting separately the Lebanese participants' read-out of the La Celle-St. Cloud sessions.) End summary. LEBANESE ELITE DISCOVER ANOTHER SIDE OF FRENCH LIFE -------------- ¶2. (C) On 7/19, French Ambassador Bernard Emie briefed Ambassador Feltman on the French-sponsored talks among Lebanese, held 7/14-15 at La Celle-St. Cloud outside Paris. Emie, who participated, described an often surreal atmosphere. The talks almost broke down before they began, Emie said, when the French (who picked up the tab for everything) checked status-conscious Lebanese into "what barely passed for a two-star hotel," with no air conditioning and, most alarming for the non-Hizballah participants, no bar. Oh, the outrage, Emie mimicked, when the Lebanese discovered that "real" France is not the boutiques, restaurants, and fancy hotels familiar to the Lebanese. Myrna Murr, representing her father Michel and claiming certain prerogatives as the only female in the group, looked at her Spartan room and quickly decamped for a papa-subsidized suite at the Meurice. After a day, the French, fatigued by the incessant Lebanese whining, moved everyone to more acceptable accommodations. But Paris was "extremely hot," and, "as we haven't yet discovered the magic of air conditioning," the Lebanese political elite had to discover, "some for probably the first time," that people sweat. EVALUATING THE PARTICIPANTS -------------- ¶3. (C) As for the participants, Emie highlighted Minister Marwan Hamadeh (representing Walid Jumblatt) and Mohamad Chatah (representing PM Siniora) as "outstanding," making many constructive interventions. Aoun-bloc MP Ibrahim Kanaan, after a first day of reading verbatim hard-line prepared information from the General, showed creativity and flexibility. Hizballah (resigned) Minister Mohammed Fneish was also active and superficially good, Emie said: Fneish was invariably courteous, respectful and reasonable-sounding, while offering -- politely -- nothing. These four tended to dominate the discussions, Emie said, although Minister Ahmad Fatfat (representing Saad Hariri) was also constructive. Mahmoud Berri, representing his brother Nabih, "said a lot," but nothing of particular depth. ¶4. (C) Everyone was particularly grateful to Myrna Murr, Emie laughed, because she didn't say a word and thus took up no time; she conveyed her father's wisdom by distributing a BEIRUT 00001082 002 OF 004 paper that everyone forgot to pick up and read. Emie expressed disgust with Minister Michel Pharoan, Siniora's second representative, who didn't show up until the second day, because he couldn't miss the birthday party he was hosting for his surgically enhanced wife Mona in the Faqra ski resort above Beirut. "We missed Michel's wisdom for an entire day," Emie said cynically, questioning why Siniora would pick as his second representative someone widely considered to be pleasant enough but quite dim-witted. (Comment: We suspect Chatah, who does have a good head on his shoulders, enjoyed not being upstaged. End comment.) ¶5. (C) Emie also praised the five civil society representatives, saying that they had all performed an excellent service. Whenever the discussions got over heated polemically, the civil society representatives rephrased the points that were being and summarized the points of view in a calming fashion. While the civil society representatives were included only because French Foreign Minister Kouchner had an impulsive demand to add some of his old Lebanese friends to the mix, it was actually a brilliant move, Emie said. At several points in the discussions, the civil society representatives would "re-format" the discussions and "review where we were." THE SESSIONS "FUNCTIONED QUITE WELL" -------------- ¶6. (C) With the lack of air conditioning forcing everyone to abandon jackets and ties early, Emie said that, in fact, "the chemistry worked." The sessions "functioned quite well," despite what Emie described as the "preliminary psychodrama" in trying to get Hizballah to participate in the aftermath of French President Nicolas Sarkozy's comments implying that he considers Hizballah a terrorist organization. Emie said that he would describe the general tenor as "civil rather than friendly." But civility, in the Lebanese context, is significant, he argued. DAY ONE: REPEAT COMMON POSITIONS -------------- ¶7. (C) The first formal session began after a group lunch on Saturday (7/14). Emie, reading from his notes, said that Kouchner opened by meeting by telling the Lebanese that they were in a "dreadful situation. If you aren't careful, your country will slip into civil war. This is unacceptable to the international community, but we have no recipes for success. We are here to help, but you have to find solutions." The participants (with the exception of Myrna Murr, as noted above) then gave "familiar exposes" about their blocs' positions. As part of his opening presentation, Ibrahim Kanaan gave an "implicit threat," Emie said. Kanaan said, "using slightly ominous language," that if the group fails to find solutions, there will be consequences. Marwan Hamadeh, the informal senior spokesman for the entire March 14 coalition, talked about linking the formation of a national unity cabinet with a deal on the presidency. Hizballah's Mohammed Fneish gave a presentation that was "smooth and nice" but "completely negative on substance." ¶8. (C) Emie said to the Ambassador that "you would have learned nothing new" from these recitations. He added that, nonetheless, it was an extremely useful education for Kouchner (who chaired all sessions) and the new team of French Lebanon-watchers. "They got an intensive course in Lebanese politics and personalities," Emie noted. SUNDAY: DEBATE BUT NO CONCLUSIONS (BUT USEFUL LESSONS FOR KOUCHNER) -------------- ¶9. (C) The second day, Sunday, was more interesting, Emie said, with more give-and-take and less tension. At one point, Kouchner, having listened for two days to the constant back and forth (including the most violent exchange of the conference, between Jumblatt MP Akram Cheheyab and Hizballah MP Nawaf Musawi, on the first day),interjected that Syria wants chaos and civil war in Lebanon, while Iran does not. The March 8 representatives fell silent, stone-faced. Kouchner stunned Mahmoud Berri by commenting that "the problem isn't you, it's your brother." Throughout what Emie described as "Kouchner's education by fire," the March 14 representatives were "throwing out bridges" to the other side BEIRUT 00001082 003 OF 004 that were not reciprocated. Kouchner, Emie said, "is not naive." He understood clearly that one side was trying to find some common ground, while the other side was trying equally hard to give nothing away while appearing to be constructive. Aoun's two MPs were somewhat in between. ¶10. (C) Kouchner's "personal charisma is strong," and he tried to employ that to promote a serious discussion about linkages between the cabinet and the presidency. Fneish was "extremely negative," saying that the only way to move forward was a national unity government now, as a "parachute" to save Lebanon if there were no presidential elections. As Hamadeh joked that sometimes parachutes fail to open, Kouchner understood that Fneish would not be able to discuss the presidency. Hamadeh, speaking for March 14, readily agreed to a new legislative election law ("if you would allow parliament to function"),thus disarming some of the Aoun bloc criticisms. In general March 14 representatives aimed at a package deal, which appealed to Kouchner, while March 8 representatives focused primarily on the need for a new cabinet now. Discussions of mutual guarantees for each side took time but ultimately led nowhere. ¶11. (C) With the discussions becoming increasingly pointless and the heat rising in the conference facility, Kouchner, to the relief of the participants, impulsively invited everyone to watch the Tour de France on television as the concluding event of the conference. The Sunday night dinner at the Quai d'Orsay and the Monday morning sessions were canceled, by mutually understood agreement, Emie said. The rumors in Beirut that the discussions had become so overheated as to require early suspension were simply not true. Emie confirmed the other Beirut rumors, that no presidential candidates were discussed in the open discussions, "although surely on the sides people talked about names." ACHIEVEMENTS: MODEST BUT BETTER THAN NOTHING -------------- ¶12. (C) While Kouchner summed up the proceedings -- participants recommitted themselves to the "foundations of the Lebanese state," including the Taif-amended constitution -- there were no real conclusions, Emie admitted. The French had "extremely modest expectations" for the discussions, and the talks "did not exceed them." Still, Emie judged the overall efforts on balance to be positive. If any Lebanese factions were intending to take unhelpful steps, La Celle-St. Cloud "postponed bad decisions." Tensions in Lebanon were lowered (however briefly) as a result of the discussions, Emie claimed hopefully. NEXT STEPS: KEEP THE PROCESS ALIVE -------------- ¶13. (C) Emie said that all of the participants wanted some kind of follow-up, "some kind of Day After." Jean-Claude Cousseran's trip to Beirut starting Monday is the next stage; Cousseran plans to see all of the leaders, with the possible exception of Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, who sent representatives to Paris. Supposedly, the participants from La Celle-St. Cloud were supposed to keep working among themselves once they got back to Lebanon, so in theory "they should have something to say to Cousseran." "It is more difficult to make trouble when there is a process," Emie said. ¶14. (C) Then, on/about July 28-29, Kouchner plans to come to Lebanon, although the trip and timing are both still tentative, Emie reported. When the Ambassador asked Emie what Kouchner was going to accomplish, he responded, "good question," and laughed. The main thing is to keep the process alive, to continue to prevent bad decisions from being taken and in an attempt to keep tensions in check. In terms of tangible goals, Emie said that he, Cousseran, and Kouchner would continue to explore whether a package deal was possible, along the lines of the idea floated by Hamadeh in La Celle-St. Cloud. Perhaps the package could be made more attractive for the opposition if, for example, early parliamentary elections (for sometime before 2009) were thrown in. But Emie admitted to being pessimistic about the possibility of achieving a breakthrough, particularly before his early August rotation from Beirut to Ankara. BEIRUT 00001082 004 OF 004 SYRIA AND IRAN: NOT THE SAME -------------- ¶15. (C) Asked about Cousseran's trip to Damascus, Emie joked about French press guidance that described Cousseran as "not a high-level official. I wonder how Jean-Claude feels about that!" Emie said that Cousseran had two messages for Damascus. First, he offered, as Kouchner had promised, a read-out of the La Celle-St. Cloud discussions, noting that France expected Syria to play a constructive role vis-a-vis influence on Syria's allies in Lebanon. Second, Cousseran had a "harsh message," telling the Syrians "we know perfectly well the unhelpful role you are playing in Lebanon." If Syria expects to improve its relations with France, it is necessary for Syria to change its behavior. French policy is just as tough as in the past. While the Syrians were "full of positive things to say about France," the Syrians were clearly unhappy with the linkage between improvement of bilateral relations with improved behavior toward Lebanon. Answering the Ambassador's question, Emie said that France was still considering a high-level envoy to Syria, but only if Syria gave some kind of "down payment" in terms of improved behavior regarding Lebanon. ¶16. (C) As for Iran, Emie reported that the French were, indeed, flirting with the idea of outflanking the Syrians by playing on the alleged Iranian desire for stability in Lebanon. Iran wants a rapprochement with France, and the Iranians know "how dear Lebanon is to us." Therefore, the French hope that Iran will be willing to exert influence on Hizballah to allow presidential elections to take place. The French realize, however, that Iran will probably try to extract some concessions regarding Iran's nuclear ambitions, something Emie vowed France would not accept. Describing Cousseran's trips to Teheran, Emie marveled at the coordination between Iran and Hizballah on Lebanon. In La Celle-St. Cloud, Hizballah representatives used exactly the same language regarding Lebanon as the Iranians had used with Cousseran, including the concept of a national unity cabinet serving as a "parachute." ¶17. (U) We are reporting by septel some reactions by Lebanese participants to the La Celle-St. Cloud talks. FELTMAN