LEBANON: NAHR AL-BARID: BIG STEP FOR LEBANESE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 001056 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: NAHR AL-BARID: BIG STEP FOR LEBANESE ARMY, EVEN BIGGER STEP FOR LEBANON Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) As the Lebanese Armed Forces' eight week old confrontation with Fatah al-Islam nears its end, one thing is certain: after years of Syrian domination and internal passivity, the LAF has surprised most observers by showing that it can stand on its own two feet. Despite suffering what for Lebanon is a high number of casualties, the LAF has remained determined to fight Fatah al-Islam to the end. But Nahr al-Barid is much more than an isolated military victory against a nascent group of Islamic extremists; in many ways, it also represents a battle for the hearts and minds of the Lebanese people and for the sovereignty of PM Siniora's beleaguered government. Granted, Nahr al-Barid is but one GOL success story in an otherwise uncertain political and security landscape. ¶2. (C) Nonetheless, several conclusions can be drawn in terms of increased LAF assertiveness, national sovereignty, confessional reconciliation, Lebanon's fight against extremists, and Syrian influence that suggest the LAF's anticipated victory -- if used properly -- can represent a watershed in Lebanon's ongoing quest for political stability. While there is a danger that the LAF will revert back to its previous pattern of inaction (particularly if LAF Commander Michel Sleiman feels his now enhanced presidential prospects will be placed at risk with further action),there is also the possibility that the LAF's proven success can strengthen support for Lebanon's state institutions and undermine some of the arguments Hizballah uses to justify its arms. End summary. FIRST TIME LEBANESE ARMY DEFENDS ENTIRE COUNTRY -------------- ¶3. (C) Our Lebanese contacts marvel that Nahr al-Barid is the first time in Lebanon's history that an independent national army fought, under GOL orders, on behalf of the entire country against a foreign threat to its domestic security. The Sunni extremists who make up Fatah al-Islam (FAI) are primarily non-Lebanese citizens using the refuge of Palestinian camps as a recruiting ground for al-Qaeda-like terrorist cells. The Lebanese Armed Forces' (LAF) decision to confront these extremists was based on one goal: to eradicate the FAI and prevent terrorist activities on Lebanese soil. The LAF's success at Nahr al-Barid greatly degraded the capacity of at least one extremist group whose agenda, like neighboring Syria's, was to destabilize Lebanon. This is in sharp contrast to the LAF's usual pattern of mimicking the Lebanese political class in looking the other way as terrorist groups take root on Lebanese soil. BOLSTERING THE LEBANESE STATE -------------- ¶4. (C) At a time when the Lebanese cabinet, parliament, judiciary, and presidency are in a virtual deadlock due to the ongoing political crisis sparked by the November 2006 resignation of six pro-Syrian cabinet members, the LAF is the only national institution that is fully functioning, fulfilling its assigned role and enjoying widespread support from all sectors in Lebanon. By acting solely on behalf of the GOL and Lebanese people -- and not answering to outside forces -- the LAF has boosted its own credibility. In the process, it has disproved at least one of the grounds for Lebanon's failed state status -- the GOL's inability to provide for the physical security of its territory. (Note. Lebanon was ranked 28th worldwide in the third annual "Failed States" index. End note.) ¶5. (C) The LAF's summer 2006 deployment to southern Lebanon as part of UNSCR 1701 implementation was a major step in extending the GOL's authority over all of the Lebanese territory. Nahr al-Barid is an equally important step toward consolidating Lebanon's sovereignty by demonstrating the GOL's ability to root out fundamentalist groups and prevent the expansion of new breeding grounds in Lebanon for BEIRUT 00001056 002 OF 005 extremists. While the most difficult steps are yet to come (overcoming Syrian influence by deploying the LAF to control the porous Lebanese-Syrian border and disarming Hizballah), as the LAF successfully overcomes new challenges such as Nahr al-Barid, the GOL's credibility also increases. BOOST TO LAF CAPABILITIES AND MORALE -------------- ¶6. (C) After years of Syrian domination and enforced passivity, the LAF finally is learning to walk on its own, and Nahr al-Barid was a key test and learning experience. Victory was by no means a foregone conclusion. The LAF's initial response to the FAI threat was tepid; LAF Commander Michel Sleiman, mindful of Syrian wishes and colored by his presidential ambitions, was reluctant to send troops into an armed Palestinian camp. The brutal slaying of 23 soldiers, most of them Sunni, on the first day of fighting undoubtedly helped unify LAF troops to avenge the death of their comrades, as well as rally public opinion in support of the LAF against the extremists. However, early successes after entering the camp were followed by a period of uncertainty when it was unclear whether the LAF had the appetite or the ability to continue the fight. ¶7. (C) Two key factors helped turn the situation around. First, from GOL leadership to the man on the street, the LAF leadership was pressured from both above and below to confront the FAI. Rank-and-file LAF soldiers pressured their commanders to allow them to avenge their comrades' murder. Second, the ability of the US to mobilize supplies quickly to help replace depleted inventories at a key juncture helped ensure the LAF had the ammunition it needed to get the job done. Moreover, Nahr al-Barid has helped promote LAF cooperation with regional military forces. Traditionally reluctant to engage with foreign counterparts without political cover, LAF senior staff, with US guidance, are learning to interact directly with Egyptian, Jordanian, and other military officials to secure urgently needed military assistance. This increased self-reliance will reduce the need for our hand-holding in future crises. ¶8. (C) Nahr al-Barid also boosted the morale and allegiance of LAF troops. We have heard accounts of wounded soldiers chomping at the bits to rejoin their colleagues on the front line. Defense Minister Murr told the Ambassador July 3 about a memo he sent to all of the LAF brigades seeking volunteers for Nahr al-Barid -- a test of troop morale, Murr explained. General Sleiman reportedly thought it was risky -- what if no one volunteered? His concern appeared to be misplaced, however; according to Murr, 27,000 soldiers and 1,400 officers responded positively; over half of the LAF responded to the call to arms. Mindful of the value of shared battle experiences, Murr ordered the LAF to move part of a brigade every 72 hours through Nahr al-Barid to promote training and unity among the troops. ADHERING TO THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE -------------- ¶9. (U) The LAF's adherence to the Law of Land Warfare during the Nahr al-Barid operations also bears mentioning. Despite the brutal May 20 attack and mutilation of several of its soldiers, the LAF did not respond with the same type of savagery. Instead, the LAF has provided medical attention to captured FAI militants and transferred them to the courts for prosecution within seven days of capture. While retaliation for the murder of their comrades could have been expected, the LAF -- despite the lack of real combat experience before now -- has maintained discipline and demonstrated, through respect for the four Geneva conventions that relate to the use of force and the Law of Land Warfare, the hallmark of a modern, professional army. ¶10. (C) This adherence to the Rule of Law has not been confined to the treatment of prisoners. The LAF has made every effort to protect civilians on the battlefield by facilitating their departure from the conflict zone. Additionally, the LAF has employed its weapons in accordance with all relevant Geneva conventions with regard to the employment of conventional munitions. Embassy officers are not aware of any instance in which the LAF has used munitions BEIRUT 00001056 003 OF 005 outside of their accepted tactical use. While the professionalism of a modern army may be judged by its success on the battlefield, it is the Lebanese Army's respect for the Rule of Law and the Law of Land Warfare that separates it from criminal elements like Fatah al-Islam that use violence indiscriminately. INCREASED CONFESSIONAL SOLIDARITY -------------- ¶11. (C) Unlike nearly all other Lebanese institutions, the LAF is truly cross-sectarian in its composition. Its success at Nahr al-Barid has rallied Sunni and Shia troops alike, reducing the prospects of a Sunni-Shia split. Remarkably, not only did the Shia troops disregard Hizballah's red line against entering the camp, they remained an integral part of the forces fighting FAI. (Walid Jumblatt has raised his eyebrows at the relatively low casualty numbers of Shia soldiers compared to Sunnis and Christians. Giving examples of Shia officers and soldiers fighting and suffering casualties, Murr explains the discrepancies by noting that the LAF's commando units bearing the brunt of the fighting have a lower Shia ratio than the Lebanese population as a whole.) ¶12. (C) Furthermore, Nahr al-Barid demonstrates the Lebanese can overcome confessional differences when it comes to defending their country against outside aggression: the Sunni dominated government ordered the Christian-led military to battle Sunni extremists who were targeting Shia. Indeed, the LAF may be the only Lebanese institution that enjoys support from across Lebanon's entire confessional spectrum. BLOW TO SUNNI EXTREMISM -------------- ¶13. (C) Nahr al-Barid discredited the theory that Sunnis in northern Lebanon are all extremists, since many openly supported the LAF's battle against FAI, defanging the myth that Sunnis won't take on Sunnis. It also boosted Sunni leader Saad Hariri's standing in the north because of March 14's willingness to take on FAI, quashing the widely held perception that Saad was in bed with the extremists. Furthermore, overwhelming public support for the LAF's battle against FAI indicates Lebanese intolerance toward allowing their country to become an even larger breeding ground for extremists groups. HIZBALLAH DISCREDITED -------------- ¶14. (C) Hizballah was widely criticized for Hassan Nasrallah's assertion that the LAF was not allowed to enter the Palestinian camps. Nasrallah's "red line" statement drew both popular and political protests. Having misjudged public reaction to its red line, Hizballah was forced to walk back the statement, losing face, and ultimately had no choice but to accept public support for the LAF's actions. Hizballah politicians had to scramble to show support for the LAF. ¶15. (C) Furthermore, Nahr al-Barid also erodes Hizballah's argument that the Lebanese military is too weak to protect Lebanon against outside forces, a principle pretext for Hizballah's militia. While Hizballah will continue to cite Sheba'a farms and the need to resist Israeli aggression as the other raison d'etre for its arms; the LAF's success in Nahr al-Barid will boost its credibility in southern Lebanon as well, further undermining Hizballah's claims. AOUN DISTANCES HIMSELF FROM MARCH 8 -------------- ¶16. (C) Aoun's rejection of Hizballah's redline against entering the camp was viewed by many as a sign of his willingness to distance himself from his March 8 coalition partners, Amal and Hizballah. Aoun has repeatedly stressed to us that his Free Patriotic Movement is an independent bloc forced to side with the opposition because of March 14's refusal to grant it cabinet seats (and accommodate his personal quest for the presidency). As such, his uneasy alliance with Amal and Hizballah showed signs of strain when BEIRUT 00001056 004 OF 005 he was forced to choose between supporting the Christian-led army (which Aoun views as a natural constituency for his presidential ambitions) and his March 8 allies. The fact that LAF Commander General Michel Sleiman, also a presidential contender and one of Aoun's key rivals for the Christian vote, has seen his presidential prospects increase, particularly among his troops, with the LAF's success in Nahr al-Barid, has also forced Aoun's hand in siding with the army in an attempt to minimize his losses. ¶17. (C) Nahr al-Barid brought Aoun closer to the March 14 government, if only on security issues. Although he has not yet fully distanced himself from March 8, there are indications that, given the right incentives (especially anything that would support his presidential goals),he could be weaned away his unholy alliance with Amal and Hizballah. WARNING TO SYRIA -------------- ¶18. (C) The LAF's unexpected victory in Nahr al-Barid will also, we hope, cause Syria to think twice about inciting similar conflicts in any of Lebanon's 11 other Palestinian camps, though it would be naive to conclude Syria will cease its efforts to destabilize Lebanon. Recent flare-ups in other Palestinian camps, the June 17 rocket attacks against Israeli, the June 24 killing of six UNIFIL peacekeepers, and the ongoing bombing campaign are all likely to have Syrian links. We cannot rule out the possibility that Syria will stage an all-out offensive on several fronts simultaneously to keep the LAF off-balance and roll back the GOL's political gains from Nahr al-Barid. But Syria must have found the LAF's willingness to go all the way against Fatah al-Islam as an unpleasant surprise. COMMENT: THE FINAL CHAPTER ISN'T WRITTEN YET -------------- ¶19. (C) For the moment -- and despite LAF casualties now approaching 100 dead soldiers and officers, a shocking number for Lebanon -- Nahr al-Barid is a good news story in a country, fatigued from political infighting and continuing violence, that desperately needs one. However, it is much too soon to declare victory: Fatah al-Islam is not wiped out -- a handful of members are still in the southern part of the camp, while others are believed to have left the camp entirely and may join forces with extremists in other camps. Moreover, the June 13 assassination of MP Walid Eido and other sporadic bombings will keep the country on edge, despite the LAF's success in the north. As the June incidents in southern Lebanon too painfully demonstrate, the forces that are determined to destabilize Lebanon are not likely to give up easily. Having lost their gamble in the north, they will now take their battle to the south and elsewhere. ¶20. (C) There is a danger, however, that, once finished with Nahr al-Barid, the LAF will revert to its previous pattern of inactivity. LAF Commander Sleiman, once considered a colorless anachronism from the days of the Syrian occupation, is now discussed seriously as a presidential candidate because of Nahr al-Barid. (Some conspiracy theorists, pointing to the suspicious number of pro-LAF billboards around the country, go so far as to speculate that the Fatah al-Islam fight was a tailor-made, Syrian-inspired presidential campaign for Sleiman.) But we suspect that his heightened presidential ambitions will now cause him to think twice before ordering additional LAF action elsewhere in the country. ¶21. (C) Sleiman, like others, will listen to the inevitable second-guessing that will start once the guns fall silent: Syria's Lebanese allies will surely start a vicious campaign that the US and others did not provide the LAF the right kind of precision weaponry, that what supplies that did come were too costly and too slow, that LAF casualties were too high, that the Nahr al-Barid camp did not need to be destroyed. Pro-Syrian elements within the Palestinian refugee population will likely seize upon the massive camp destruction to protest against the Siniora cabinet. All of this will contribute to public perceptions that the LAF command and the BEIRUT 00001056 005 OF 005 politicians will monitor carefully. ¶22. (C) The good news is the LAF has demonstrated its ability to punch above its weight. The bad news is that it may not be able to sustain this level if it encounters new challenges on numerous fronts. We are at a watershed in Lebanon, one which offers the prospects of increasing GOL ability to counter threats to Lebanon's stability. However, the GOL will continue to need strong international support to avoid falling back into the abyss of a hotbed for terrorists and other forces determined to destabilize this fragile democracy. We hope we can use our FY07 FMF and Section 1206 assistance to help maintain the positive momentum generated by the LAF's success at Nahr al-Barid. FELTMAN