EXAMINING LAF PERFORMANCE AND NEEDS, POST NAHAR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001035 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2027 TAGS: PREL PARM LE SUBJECT: EXAMINING LAF PERFORMANCE AND NEEDS, POST NAHAR AL-BARID Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) During their 6/26 meeting in Paris, Prime Minister Siniora and Secretary Rice discussed the possibility of a further U.S. military assessment team to examine the training, equipment, and ammunition needs of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). We have been working with our Lebanese contacts, including Prime Minister Siniora, to define what would be most useful in terms of the role we could play. As described below, we propose two activities: first, an After Action Review in Lebanon, focusing on lessons learned from Nahr al-Barid (NAB); second, an examination of our security assistance delivery mechanisms, in hopes of reducing the need for the type of emergency requests we have relied upon in recent weeks to get ammunition to the LAF. End summary. MARTZ REPORT -- STILL THE RIGHT GUIDE -------------- ¶2. (S) The LAF leadership agrees with us that the superb CENTCOM assessment carried out in autumn 2006 (the Martz report) should remain our primary guide to LAF needs. The LAF's fight against Fatah al-Islam in NAB has confirmed the continued relevance and importance of the Martz report findings. These findings have been incorporated into the LAF's own three-year development plan. Thanks to the Martz report, we have a very good blueprint to the LAF's needs and how we can contribute to meeting them. AFTER ACTION REVIEW: SHAPING LAF'S THINKING -------------- ¶3. (S) In our view and that of the Lebanese, there is no need to duplicate or reaffirm the Martz report. But the NAB fight has been a watershed event for Lebanon in general and specifically for the LAF. We believe that it would be extremely useful for CENTCOM to conduct with LAF officers an After Action Review (AAR) of the NAB battle. We propose hosting an AAR in Lebanon sometime in the aftermath of the Nahr al-Barid fight. ¶4. (S) An AAR, led or facilitated by U.S. military experts, could serve as a primary building block in the learning process for the LAF. It would be an excellent way for us to shape LAF thinking. We recommend focusing on how the LAF conducted its war-fighting functions of intelligence, maneuver, fire support, force protection, sustainment, and Command and Control. ¶5. (S) The Embassy understands that there are some organizations that specialize in these types of activities, such as the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). Given the high percentage of LAF officers who have attended U.S. army schools in the United States, there is already a familiarity here with the AAR process, making it easy to implement and its lessons learned more readily absorbed. The LAF's battle against Islamic extremists in a densely built area may even offer us some lessons learned applicable to broader GWOT efforts. POLICY REVIEW OF ASSISTANCE MECHANISMS -------------- ¶6. (S) We also propose a senior-level review in Washington, involving all USG parties involved in military assistance and using Lebanon as an example, of the security assistance process. As everyone is aware, working collectively, the USG has responded to the LAF's immediate needs with remarkable speed and creativity. Yet everything we delivered was already identified in last year's Martz report as a critical need and top priority for the LAF. While the USG accelerated delivery because of the LAF's NAB battle, no office should be expected to sustain an "emergency mode" indefinitely. We should be able to come up with ways to be responsive even in "normal mode." ¶7. (S) We note, for example, that, with the LAF having consumed the U.S.-delivered ammunition at a very rapid rate, BEIRUT 00001035 002 OF 002 we are once again working in emergency mode to help replenish stocks, even though funding sources are identified. A review in Washington might help find ways to adjust our bureaucratic procedures in ways that would accelerate deliveries and thus reduce the need to rely on urgent requests. FELTMAN