LEBANON: BERRI ADMITS SCUTTLING THE ARAB LEAGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001000 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SY LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: BERRI ADMITS SCUTTLING THE ARAB LEAGUE INITIATIVE; STILL PUSHING UNITY GOVERNMENT Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b) . SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a 7/5 meeting, Speaker Berri gave his version of the demise of the Arab league initiative that collapsed in late June. While he tried to lay the blame on March 14th, it was clear that Berri had received instructions from Damascus to focus strictly on the "national unity government" -- and avoid discussion of facilitating upcoming presidential election. But even the unity government, as envisioned by Berri, would be seriously flawed in the eyes of March 14th, because Berri now refuses to give the "guarantees" that would prevent a forced collapse of the government. Concerning the now-receding "second government" scenario, Berri tried to claim credit for preventing pro-Syrian President Lahoud from pursuing that action now because "it would divide Lebanon, which is something I have opposed my entire career." While it was evident that Berri is trying (but failing) to cope with severe pressure from Syria, he continued to show flashes of his renowned instinct for self-survival by inquiring how the U.S. was selecting names for its recently enacted visa ban. Finally, the Speaker essentially punted when asked about the new proposal floated by Syrian-leaning former minister Michel Murr that would result in the selection of LAF Commander Michel Sleiman as Lebanon's next president, but only for a two-year term. Berri simply smiled and remarked, "Let's see what Michel Aoun has to say about that." End summary. ¶2. (C) Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri met with the Ambassador and Special Assistant on July 5 at his offices in Ain el-Tine in West Beirut. Amal MP Ali Bazzi and senior aide Ali Hamdan, who will be one of the Amal representatives in the upcoming meetings in Paris, also attended the meeting. Berri had met two days earlier with French envoy Jean-Claude Cousseran to discuss the July 14-16 meetings in Paris that intends to bring together second-tier representatives of Lebanon's political parties in an effort to resolve the now eight-month old political impasse. THE NOBLE SPEAKER -------------- ¶3. (C) As he has many times before, Speaker Berri played the role of the injured party in explaining the demise of Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa's attempt last month to create an acceptable compromise between the pro-reform March 14 and pro-Syrian March 8 alliances. He acknowledged that Moussa had asked both parties to enter into dialogue to reach agreement on three core issues: national unity government, presidential election, and how best to support the LAF. According to Berri, the main elements of the opposition (Michel Aoun's FPM, Hizballah, and a smattering of pro-Syrian political parties) had given him permission to negotiate the broad outlines of an agreement. But instead of following Moussa's three-point agenda, Berri said he tried to "simplify" the process by offering to unilaterally agree to points two and three before the dialogue even began -- and concentrate solely on the unity government, which he insisted, "they could finish up in two days.". ¶4. (C) Again, according to Berri, March 14's leadership balked despite Berri's magnanimous gesture. (Note: In reality, Berri position never actually promised that Lebanon's critical presidential election would be held on time and in accordance with the constitution. In several meetings, March 14's leadership has informed the embassy that without a commitment on the presidential election, simply meeting to select a unity government was a Syrian-engineered trap designed to topple the pro-reform government Bashar al-Asad had tried so long to remove. End note.) THE VEIL SLIPS? -------------- ¶5. (C) With typical Berrian theatrics, the Speaker insisted that his version of the Arab League initiative would have solved the crisis and led to national accord and stability. But then Berri curiously remarked that "his" new government would have validated "at least 90 percent" of the decisions of the Siniora cabinet that had been passed since the BEIRUT 00001000 002 OF 004 Shia/Amal walkout of November 11, 2006. When the Ambassador asked Berri whether the intent of his version of the initiative was to create a government under the explicit control of the Hizballah/Amal/Aoun opposition, Berri stammered that Moussa had never returned with an answer to his proposal, so it was really not worth discussing. ¶6. (C) Regarding the current state of affairs, Speaker Berri said he supported the French initiative to meet in Paris as a "useful" endeavor, but that it would probably not be decisive. Quoting a Arab proverb that the discussions probably wouldn't help, but neither would they hurt, Berri maintained that if the March 14 coalition was serious about resolving the crisis, it would include all of Lebanon's political factions in a true unity government without reservations. When asked what guarantees would be offered that new members of an expanded cabinet would not attempt to bring down the government, Berri argued that such guarantees were no longer needed since Berri and his ministers-designate would have no reason to bring down a government they had fought so long to enter. The Ambassador noted that, if he had no reason to bring down the government, then those guarantees should be easy to offer. ¶7. (C) Berri also used the circular reasoning that since March 14 had long argued an expanded cabinet would endanger the establishment of the Special Tribunal, now that the tribunal would soon exist, they had, in effect, forfeited their requirement for any guarantees. He attempted to characterize as baseless the pro-reform movement's overriding concern that Berri's national unity government was simply another in a long line of Syrian stratagems designed to rid themselves of the nettlesome Siniora government, by new means. Berri would not budge from his position even when a litany of opposition deceptions was recalled. In his (Syrian-directed) opinion, the time for guarantees had past. Once again, Berri may have said too much when he caustically remarked, "March 14 wants to give us a government for three months in exchange for a president for six years!" BERRI THE PROTECTOR -------------- ¶8. (C) Discussing the apparently receding -- for now -- specter of a Lahoud-appointed second government, Berri claimed that it was chiefly through his intercession that Lebanon's opposition forces are now reluctantly retreating from the idea. He declared that he was not obligated to tell us how he did it, but it was plain he wanted credit for standing up to "considerable (Syrian) pressure." In his idiosyncratic rendering of history, the Speaker recalled how his Amal movement had "always fought for the unity of Lebanon" and he would never agree to a strategy that would lead to a breakup of the country. ¶9. (C) Berri then re-emphasized that he intended to call parliament into session in late September, but said he was also warning the March 14 movement that it would be far better to enter the electoral session with an inclusive unity government than with the present state of affairs. Berri described himself as the faithful protector of Lebanon's constitution and declared he would enforce what he insisted was that document's clear requirement for a two-thirds quorum to select a president. (In fact, the constitution is vague on that point.) He maintained that the drafters of the Taif Agreement had also deliberately included this requirement because it "forced" the various political factions in Lebanon to work together; because if they did not, an unbreakable impasse would result. Despite the gulf between them, Berri said he was still hopeful that March 14 and March 8 would agree to share power before the critical election arrived. THE MURR GAMBIT -------------- ¶10. (C) Speaker Berri was asked about the latest scheme to resolve Lebanon's impasse. Former minister (and Syrian-leaning kingmaker) Michel Murr had recently proposed that a two-year "transitional" presidency would allow the country to recover both economically and politically. It would allow time to draft a new electoral law that would pave the way for more widely-accepted parliamentary elections in 2009, but most importantly, would end the now two-year old BEIRUT 00001000 003 OF 004 pattern of debilitating crises. It would also conveniently give Michel Aoun one more realistic shot at the presidency, a goal that even the arrogant Aoun realizes will not likely be his under the present Hariri-controlled parliament. ¶11. (C) Berri admitted he found the proposal interesting and noted that, according to Murr, it has been generally accepted by almost every political faction. Despite his interest, Berri refused to tip his hand, preferring to wait for the results of a purported meeting between Murr and Aoun. It was evident that Berri found highly amusing the thought of Aoun agreeing to forego the crown, even if only for another 24 months. INQUIRES ABOUT ORIGIN OF THE VISA BAN -------------- ¶12. (C) Finally, Berri asked how the much-discussed U.S. visa ban came about and how had the names been selected. He specifically inquired if the leadership of March 14 had played a role in determining which names had been included. When informed that that it was a USG initiative both in concept and execution, the Speaker paused and surprisingly remarked, "Well, then it is good." But he also commented that he found it curious that all the individuals contained in the first list were persons "clearly hated by March 14." COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) Berri still claims to desire a national unity cabinet, with sufficient weight in the hands of the pro-Syrian March 8-Aoun forces to block decisions requiring two-thirds' cabinet approval. Dismissing the fears of a "toppling minority," he also claims that it is not in his interest to have his ministers resign: if presidential elections do not take place, then the cabinet will be the temporary inheritor of the presidential powers, until such time as presidential elections take place. Berri insists that he would want to be part of that national unity cabinet that would be exercising the president's role temporarily. But if he is really so committed to having his ministers not resign, then it should be easier than it apparently is to extract from him the types of guarantees that would make March 14 forces start to take the idea seriously. ¶14. (C) That Berri refuses to give assurances against resignation -- assurances that he was prepared to offer only a few months ago -- makes us question his sincerity. His attitude also heightens our suspicions that the national unity cabinet as envisioned by March 8-Aoun forces is (as March 14 leaders believe) a trick, the latest in a long list of efforts to collapse Siniora's cabinet. After all, another scenario, if presidential elections do not occur (or do not go the way the March 8-Aoun people want),would have the March 8-Aoun ministers topple the cabinet constitutionally, throwing Siniora's government into caretaker status. That would strip an additional layer of legitimacy from the cabinet and pave the way for Lahoud to appoint a second cabinet -- a step he would implement later than first threatened but one that will be at least as dangerous and destabilizing later as now. If Lahoud appoints that second cabinet in the period after the parliament has converted to its electoral college status on September 25 (and now we have an idea why Berri may have announced a date so far in advance of the expiration of Lahoud's term on November 24),he will no doubt argue he does not need parliament's blessing to form a second cabinet. ¶15. (C) We see only one way for March 8-Aoun leaders to signal to us that a national unity cabinet is a solution to Lebanon's crisis rather than simply another step in the long list of tricks to overthrow Siniora's government: a sufficiently strong and public commitment by Berri or Aoun not to resign or break cabinet quorum until a new president has taken office. Linking the commitment to November 24 (Lahoud's last day in office) is not sufficient, since there is a chance that the presidency could remain vacant or that Lahoud would find a way to stay in Baabda Palace. The commitment not to resign, which March 14 ministers could also adhere to, must be until a new president takes office, at which point a new cabinet would be formed anyway. If we would have that kind of guarantee from either Berri or Aoun, we believe that we could get March 14 leaders to consider the BEIRUT 00001000 004 OF 004 idea seriously. But, now, we are empty-handed when we talk with the March 14 leaders about a national unity cabinet. They see only a trick to give the pro-Syrian March 8-Aoun bloc the legal means to do what they've thus far failed to do via the street. FELTMAN