CHINA'S LABOR MARKET: SURPLUS OR SHORTAGE?

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BEIJING 000800 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPT PASS USTR FOR KARESH, ROSENBERG, CELICO, STRATFORD, BLISS LABOR FOR ILAB TREAS FOR OASIA/ISA-CUSHMAN USDOC FOR 4420/ITA/MAC/MCQUEEN AND DAS KASOFF GENEVA FOR CHAMBERLIN USDA/FAS/ITP FOR SHEPPARD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ELAB ECON EINV PGOV PHUM SOCI CH SUBJECT: CHINA'S LABOR MARKET: SURPLUS OR SHORTAGE? ¶1. (SBU) Summary. China simultaneously faces both a large labor surplus and shortages of labor in certain segments of its labor market. Workers with skills have ample employment opportunities, and some industrialized regions are experiencing shortages of even marginally skilled workers, whose wages are rising. However, China still faces a challenge creating employment opportunities for a largely unproductive, surplus agricultural labor force, and young new entrants to the labor force, especially those with little education, make up the majority of China's unemployed. Overall, the under- and unemployed outnumber job vacancies, but structural problems prevent the labor market from balancing out. Chinese experts and other observers see poor workers' rights protection, the restrictive hukou (household registry) system, and an outdated education system that does not supply students with the skills they need as three main factors behind China's labor market imbalances. Reforms are under way in each of these areas, and China's economy continues to evolve in market-oriented directions. But as the Government continues to seek Socialist- style control over labor organization, migration and the education system, labor market imbalances are likely to persist. End summary. A Changing Labor Market -------------- ¶2. (U) Depending on whom you ask, China is either facing a growing labor surplus or a widening labor shortage. Frequent press reports, academic papers and statements of public officials comment on China's labor market conditions, some citing the slow pace of job creation and warning about risks to social stability, while others maintain that labor shortages threaten the continued growth and competitiveness of China's export industries. The truth is that both views are valid, but apply to different segments of China's complex and changing labor market. This message is intended to summarize what is happening in China's labor market, and current thinking about its implications for economic development. The supply of labor: ¶3. (SBU) According to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOLSS),China's labor force reached 758 million at the end of 2005, and grew by about 1 percent per year for the previous five years. MOLSS divides the labor force into 267 million urban and 491 million rural workers, but many workers classified as rural are engaged in part-time, seasonal or informal sector work in urban areas. According to Dr. Zhang Libin, an economist at the MOLSS Institute of Labor Studies, government labor surveys count workers as "urban" workers if they have urban hukou (household registration) status, or if they have rural hukou status but spend more than 6 months living and working in cities. Rural-urban migrants who spend less than 6 months in cities are counted as part of the rural labor force. Political and economic reforms over the past two decades have allowed workers to migrate freely between rural and urban areas, and work outside their registered home districts, but it is still very difficult to change one's hukou status. Beijing, for example, has an estimated population of 15 million, but only 11.5 million have a Beijing hukou. Without urban hukou status, migrant workers in China's cities generally do not enjoy access to public education, social welfare insurance and other public services on an equal basis as registered urban residents. ¶4. (SBU) Wang Dewen, an associate professor of Population and Labor Economics at the China Academy of Social Science (CASS) provided Laboff with a more meaningful estimated breakdown of the Chinese labor market than available from Government statistics. According to survey results, Wang said, the labor force breaks down (roughly) as follows: Urban residents with urban hukou status 250 million Rural residents working in urban areas 100 million (migrant workers) Rural residents working in non-agricultural 130 million rural enterprises BEIJING 00000800 002 OF 006 Rural residents engaged in agriculture 320 million (of which, rural residents needed for agricultural production) (170-270 m) TOTAL 800 million ¶5. (U) Labor supply growth comes primarily from rural areas, where small land holdings, inefficient agricultural practices and low incomes encourage underemployed farmers to migrate to cities or take up non-agricultural employment in township and village enterprises. Many rural workers do not fall neatly into one category, but tend to spend part of their time on the farm, and part of their time in wage labor. The National Bureau of Statistics reports that for the first 3 quarters of 2006, 34% of the average farmer's income came from non-farm wages. ¶6. (U) According to MOLSS, migrant workers now constitute 40% of the urban workforce, and predominate in low-skill jobs. Migrants make up 68% of China's workforce in manufacturing, 80% in construction and 52% in the restaurant and retail industries. Despite the de facto status of migrant workers as second-class urban residents,an NBS survey on migrant worker living conditions published in October 2006 found that 55 percent hoped to remain permanently in cities. It is common for migrants to return to thei home districts once a year, usually at harvest times or during Chinese New Year. ¶7. (SBU) MOLSS statistics indicate that the (formal sector) labor force has increased by 6-7 million per year since 2000. However, Zhang Libin estimates that job growth has been higher: the working age population, she said, rose by about 14 million per year between 2001 and 2006, but this rate of growth will drop to about 8 million per year in 2006-2011. Good statistics on how many rural workers migrate to take up wage employment every year are not available, as a large proportion of these workers end up what MOLSS terms "flexible employment" (informal or irregular employment relationships). Since 2000, Chinese government figures for rural net out-migration have fluctuated between 6.1 and 10.2 million per year. Estimates of workers engaged in flexible employment range from 40-80 million. ¶8. (SBU) The rural labor force represents an enormous pool of underutilized labor. Wang Dewen and Zhang Libin told Laboff that various economic surveys indicate that the agricultural sector could shed another 50-150 million workers over time without harming production. It is for this reason that most Chinese economists maintain that China has a very large labor surplus. CASS Economist Qi Jianguo told Laboff that he did not believe China's industrial and service sectors were sufficiently developed yet to absorb all these surplus workers, and that it would take about 25 more years for the urban and rural labor markets to balance out. The number of under- or unemployed rural laborers surely exceeds the number of job vacancies in the economy at any time, but structural problems prevent the labor market from balancing out quickly. Demand for Labor: ¶9. (SBU) Reliable statistics on labor force growth and job creation are not available, given the blurry status of rural- urban labor migrants and the growing incidence of informal sector employment, but wage trends suggest that overall unemployment is dropping. Wang Dewen told Laboff that CASS surveys have found wages to be rising faster and in more regions than official statistics suggest. Wages in China's industrialized coastal regions have risen steadily since 1998, and labor shortages there do not yet appear to be abating. Shortages of even marginally skilled industrial and service workers are also starting to appear in central and western China. Labor shortages and wage increases are most intense at the highly-skilled end of the labor market, as the early 2006 statistics below from Guangzhou suggest. The severe shortage of highly-skilled labor in Guangzhou track with reports from human resource consultants that turnover among skilled employees is high and rising. Wages for the most skilled employees in the Pearl River Delta region are approaching Hong Kong wages, and government data suggests that even unskilled jobs are increasingly hard to fill if they are dangerous or unpleasant. BEIJING 00000800 003 OF 006 Wang Dewen describes the supply of unskilled labor in China's cities as ample, but no longer unlimited. Statistics from Guangzhou Labor and Social Security Bureau (reprinted in "CSR-Asia," 22 February 2006) Skill Level Ratio of Jobs to Job Applicants -------------- -------------- no skills 0.78 basic skills 1.87 high skills 3.20 ¶10. (SBU) A commonly cited anomaly in the Chinese labor market is the high unemployment rate for recent college graduates. According to Zhang Libin, 30 percent of recent college and vocational school graduates face difficulty finding work. This problem has received considerable attention in the press, but Zhang does not consider it a long-term economic problem. Although the education system is part of the problem, Zhang and other labor experts Laboff interviewed believe that many recent college and vocational school graduates also have over-inflated expectations about the degree of responsibility for which they are prepared, or are reluctant to look outside China's major cities for work. Zhang Libin is more concerned about employment prospects for high school graduates. Young people now constitute 60 percent of the unemployed, and in some urban areas, the unemployment rate for youth is higher than for migrant workers. Young workers without education often end up in informal sector employment, where their legal rights are poorly protected. ¶11. (U) The profile of employers is also changing, with the private sector creating an ever greater proportion of new jobs. According to MOLSS statistics, State-owned enterprises (SOEs), which once dominated China's urban economy, are declining in importance, while the number of workers in private enterprises has risen sharply. Breakdown of Registered Urban Employees, 1999 and 2005 (Source: Ministry of Labor and Social Security) Type of enterprise: 1999 2005 -------------- -------------- -------------- Urban SOE 90.6 million 64.8 million Collective 19.6 million 8.0 million Domestic Private 32.3 million 62.4 million Other (foreign-invested) 16.9 million 41.1 million ¶12. (SBU) In line with this economic transition, the problem of re-employment for laid-off former SOE workers has significantly diminished in recent years, according to Zhang Libin and Qi Jianguo. Zhang told Laboff there have been no new entrants to government programs for laid-off SOE workers since ¶2005. Of the 28 million workers laid off since 1998, 20 million have found new work or have qualified for retirement benefits. According to Zhang, Government programs are currently only providing specialized assistance to 600,000 particularly difficult to employ laid-off former SOE workers. Zhang added that another 6.6 million SOE workers may be laid off between now and 2008 as a result of ongoing SOE bankruptcy proceedings. These workers will be eligible for unemployment benefits, but will receive no other special assistance from the Government. Why (part of) the labor market is tightening -------------- ¶13. (U) Demographics appears to be a major factor behind China's labor shortages. According to a CASS study, the population ages 15-65 grew y an average of 12.5 million per year etween 2000 and 2005, but the rate of growth peaked in 2003 and is now declining. The study also projects that China's labor force will peak in 2015 at about 1 billion. Young female workers who predominate in the manufacturing sector, are in especially short supply, reflecting the one-child family planning policies adopted in late 1970s. Rural areas can no longer supply ever-increasing numbers of young workers. Demand for labor continues to grow, but employers are facing a downward spike in supply. Employers can no longer rely on the informal BEIJING 00000800 004 OF 006 networks they used in the past to recruit workers. According to anecdotal reports, the manufacturing sector is responding by proactively recruiting workers from ever more distant rural areas, paying bonuses to workers who can introduce friends or, and accepting older workers than they have in the past. Employers are also increasing wages. ¶14. (U) The most severe labor shortages, as well as the fastest wage increases, are occurring in the Pearl River Delta (PRD),and investors are responding by looking elsewhere to set up shop. In a study called "Globalization and the Shortage of Rural Workers: a Macroeconomic Perspective," Wang Dewen and two co-authors demonstrated that the concentration in fixed asset investment in China moved decisively away from the PRD and toward the Yangtze River region and the northern coastal region between 2000 and 2004. Some Chinese experts have also observed that the PRD is declining in popularity as a destination for migrants compared to the Yangtze River region. ¶15. (SBU) Conventional wisdom also attributes labor shortages to Central Government policies designed to increase rural incomes, such as tax breaks and subsidies, which have diminished the push factor. Labor experts interviewed by Laboff said they believe such policies have had some effect in some areas on the availability of migrants, and further government initiatives such as improvements to rural health and education systems may encourage more surplus agricultural workers to stay put. However, the experts also agreed that the effect of these policies on the labor market appears to be overstated. According to Government statistics and other surveys, the outflow of rural migrants continues. A labor market imbalance -------------- ¶16. (SBU) The persistence of labor shortages in China's fastest growing regions suggests that economic, social or political impediments limit the labor market's ability to adjust. China Labor Bulletin (CLB),a Hong Kong NGO, attributes the imbalance to a "one-sided" labor market. Since workers cannot freely organize and negotiate with employers, CLB argues, and the government is ineffective in setting and enforcing wage and working conditions standards, workers must "take it or leave it." Many labor market observers have described Chinese employers as reluctant to raise wages, especially in export- oriented industries which, due to intense competition, cannot set the export price of their final products. Labor is the only input cost some employers can control, and employers fear that due to other impediments to labor mobility, raising wages will increase their expenses without attracting more workers. As a result, employers often try alternatives, such as increasing hours worked (sometimes in violation of overtime regulations), changing labor supply contractors, or expanding production to lower-cost inland cities, before raising wages. In the PRD, the lag between the emergence of labor shortages and significant wage increases was about two years. Wang Dewen and other scholars have called for China to improve labor law legislation and enforcement, and reform the trade union and wage determination mechanisms, and a survey report on Labor Law enforcement published by the National People's Congress in December 2005 made the same recommendation. ¶17. (SBU) Reluctance to raise wages, however, does not explain all the rigidity in China's labor markets. Several political and social factors also contribute to labor market imbalances. A CASS study prepared for China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) attributes the mismatch between the rural labor surplus and urban labor demand mostly to the hukou system. While there are still too many surplus workers in rural areas, the report states, migrants are not sufficient to meet the needs of non-agricultural production and urbanization because the hukou system restricts the flow of labor. Migration only occurs when non-agricultural employment opportunities are substantially more attractive than staying in rural areas. The deterrent power of the hukou system is strongest for lower- skilled workers, whose wages are not high enough for them to forgo publicly funded housing, health care or education benefits, however meager. A "hukou-neutral" labor market in which workers could freely relocate and enjoy the same access to jobs and BEIJING 00000800 005 OF 006 benefits as established residents would be able to respond far more nimbly to changing conditions than Chinese workers can today. ¶18. (SBU) Qi Jianguo told Laboff that he believed unrealistically high minimum-wage standards and social benefits for urban residents also contribute to labor shortages. In his view, industrial and service sector employers turn to migrants to avoid the relatively high wages and benefits urban employees have grown accustomed to (pension, medical and other social insurance program contributions can add 30 percent to the wage bill),but are finally having trouble recruiting migrants as well. Qi observed that wages move upwards each year after the Chinese New Year holiday, depending on how many migrant workers return to their jobs in the cities. ¶19. (SBU) The inflexibility of China's education system is another factor behind China's skill-based labor supply imbalances. Zhang, Wang and Qi all told Laboff that China's higher education system is outdated, oriented toward producing academics rather than skilled workers. Despite the high level of unemployment among recent university and vocational school graduates, a recent survey of 80 foreign-invested enterprises in the PRD revealed that lack of skilled personnel is their top human resources concern. The Chinese Government is also concerned about the growing mismatch between supply and demand for skilled labor. Qi said the Government should also reduce the red tape associated with setting up a business and encourage more graduates to create more employment opportunities for themselves. The impact on China's future competitiveness -------------- ¶20. (SBU) While most Chinese labor market experts believe China will have a labor surplus for years to come, some experts believe the shortage of skilled workers poses a serious threat to China's competitiveness and economic development. In their paper on "Globalization and the Shortage of Rural Workers," Wang Dewen and his co-authors conclude that labor costs will rise in China, and that the rise will make China's manufacturing industries less competitive. Wang told Laboff that the Government is very mindful of the competitive threat from Vietnam, India and others whose wage levels are already lower than China's, but he noted that the Government is already looking beyond labor-intensive, export-oriented industries to sustain China's economic development. China has an underdeveloped services sector, a huge internal market, and lots of room to improve the skills and productivity of its workers, Wang said. Wang and his co-authors conclude that China can also mitigate the threat to its competitiveness by deepening reform of the hukou and education systems, and by taking other measures to improve labor mobility and labor market efficiency. Comment -------------- ¶21. (SBU) Most of the reforms necessary to reduce China's labor market imbalances are already underway, but they will not be politically easy. The Government is slowly making progress on its legislative agenda to improve labor laws and better protect workers' rights, which will contribute to correcting the problem of the "one-sided" labor market. However, improving enforcement of even existing laws and regulations and bringing more accountability to often well-connected employers will likely prove a great challenge, as it has in such areas of intellectual property rights and environmental enforcement. Reforms implemented at the local level continue to chip away at the hukou system. Many small cities have made it easier for migrants to obtain urban residency status. Large cities, however, continue to take a piecemeal approach, allowing migrant workers who pay into social welfare insurance programs, for example, to receive benefits, but appear reluctant to undertake obligations to provide migrants with such costly public services as free public education. MOLSS and the Ministry of Education are seeking ways to provide more vocational and skills training, improve the quality of existing education curricula, and developing mechanisms to help the education system become more responsive to the laQr market, but to date, this has produced BEIJING 00000800 006 OF 006 few meaningful changes. Although China's economy continues to evolve toward more market-driven allocation of inputs, the Government continues to seek Socialist-style control over labor organization, migration and education. As a result, labor market imbalances are likely to persist. End comment. ¶22. (U) Amcongen Guangzhou and Amcongen Shanghai cleared this message. RANDT