CHINESE SCHOLARS COMMENT ON ANTI-SATELLITE TEST

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 000752 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2032 TAGS: PREL PARM MARR PGOV CH SUBJECT: CHINESE SCHOLARS COMMENT ON ANTI-SATELLITE TEST REF: A. SECSTATE 4837 (NOTAL) ¶B. BEIJING 331 (NOTAL) ¶C. USDAO BEIJING CH 300125Z JAN 07 (NOTAL) Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David S. Sedney. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Conversations with several Beijing scholars revealed that none were aware of China's January 11 anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test beforehand and were only able to speculate after the fact about its significance. President Hu Jintao would have known about the test in advance, though the Foreign Ministry may have been kept in the dark, several scholars surmised. One scholar said the test was a "normal" thing for a great power like China to do and hoped other countries would not "overreact." Another speculated that the Chinese leadership badly underestimated the strong international reaction the test would provoke. A third scholar said it is possible that the test was part of PLA military preparations for a Taiwan contingency in the context of Beijing's strong concerns that Chen Shui-bian might pursue Taiwan independence this year. Finally, a self-described "pro-U.S." scholar said he fears the test is proof that China's leadership was not sufficiently cognizant of the importance of the U.S. relationship for China and how much damage a test like this could do to undermine forward bilateral momentum. End Summary. ¶2. (S) President Hu Jintao "undoubtedly" knew about China's anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test in advance, Professor Qin Zhilai (protect) of the Central Party School's Institute of International Strategy told poloff on January 26. There is "absolutely no way" the test could have been conducted without Hu's advance knowledge and approval, Qin emphasized. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),however, was almost surely kept in the dark. MFA "was not lying" when it at first appeared to be unaware of the test and then later claimed that China's position opposing the weaponization of space remains unchanged, Qin said. In response to poloff's question regarding how to square China's position with its having carried out the test, Professor Qin repeatedly asserted that the test was a "normal" thing for a great power like China to do, arguing that the test should not be viewed as a threat and expressing his hope that other countries would not "overreact." ¶3. (S) Professor Dong Lisheng (protect) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS),in a separate conversation on January 25, echoed Qin's comments by saying it was "unthinkable" that President Hu would not have known about the ASAT test in advance. Dong agreed that MFA "almost certainly" would have been unaware of the test, noting that communication among ministries in China, especially on military matters, is "extremely poor." Commenting on China's motivation for the test, Dong could only speculate that China's civilian and military leadership had "badly underestimated" the strong international reaction that the ASAT test would provoke. ¶4. (S) CASS Nonproliferation Center Director Gu Guoliang (protect) told Polmincouns in a separate conversation on January 29 that it is possible that the test was part of PLA military preparations for a Taiwan contingency in the context of Beijing's strong concerns that Chen Shui-bian might pursue Taiwan independence this year. Polmincouns reaffirmed the U.S. one China policy based on the three joint communiqus and the Taiwan Relations Act. He cautioned that Beijing should not let its concern about possible Taiwan independence moves this year drive actions that could harm international confidence in the strength of Beijing's commitment to peaceful development and opposition to militarization of space. ¶5. (S) Gu said he remains puzzled by the test, but the idea that the test was driven by essentially military considerations is much more plausible to him than the alternative theory that the test was part of a Chinese diplomatic strategy intended to persuade the United States to enter negotiations on a treaty to prevent militarization of outer space. The test made it less likely that the United States would enter into such negotiations. In any event, the test could not have taken place without Chinese leadership approval, although it is possible that the PLA presented the test to the leadership in a highly technical way that did not BEIJING 00000752 002 OF 002 highlight the broader international implications, Gu said. ¶6. (S) Dean of Renmin University's Sociology Department Zhou Xiaozheng (protect) on January 27 told poloff he feared that China's going forward with the anti-satellite test was proof that the leadership was not sufficiently cognizant of the importance of the U.S. relationship for China and how much damage a test like this could do to undermine forward bilateral momentum. The response of Zhou, a self-described "pro-American" scholar, is perhaps predictable but nevertheless represents the thinking of at least some pro-U.S. intellectuals. RANDT