PRC-IRAN: AMBASSADOR BRIEFS MFA ON NATIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIJING 007388 SIPDIS SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (GARBLED TEXT) E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2027 TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP MNUC ETRD CH IR SUBJECT: PRC-IRAN: AMBASSADOR BRIEFS MFA ON NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM REF: SECSTATE 162558 Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Clark T. Randt, Jr. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador told Assistant Foreign Minister (AFM) He Yafei December 6 that the recently released National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran's nuclear program indicates the continued need for IAEA and Security Council action on Iran's nuclear program. AFM He said China is studying the report to understand its implications for how the Iranian nuclear issue should be handled. He sought U.S. views on how to take into account the conclusion by some in the international community that the NIE weakens the argument for further sanctions. Regarding the current draft third UN Security Council resolution, AFM He expressed disappointment at the inclusion of some, but not all, Chinese comments in the latest draft, adding that China had shown "maximum flexibility" in recent discussions on a draft resolution. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Using reftel talking points in their entirety, Ambassador Randt briefed AFM He Yafei December 6 on the recently released National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear program and the implications thereof. The Ambassador left copies of reftel nonpaper and of Key Judgments with AFM He. (Discussions in this meeting of conventional arms transfer to Iran, Burma and two AmCit cases are reported separately.) Need for Action on Iran Remains - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) The Ambassador told AFM He that in the new NIE the intelligence community concluded that Iran had a secret nuclear weapons program, and in fall 2003, it is assessed to have halted that program as a result of international scrutiny and pressure. He called this a hopeful sign that the international community can be effective in pressuring the regime to behave responsibly and urged China to continue to work with the United States through the P5-plus-1 process to agree on language for a third UNSC sanctions resolution. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador said that the NIE reported that since 2003 it is likely that Iran has been conducting research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applications, some of which would also be of limited use for nuclear weapons. He told AFM He that the United States remains concerned that the nuclear weapons program could be restarted, noting that even after the regime's apparent decision to halt the program, it pursued uranium enrichment activities in defiance of the international community. Iran's continued pursuit of enrichment in the face of UN Security Council obligations is deeply troubling and remains a serious threat to international peace and security. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador highlighted IAEA concerns over Iran's nuclear activities and continuing work on ballistic missiles, stressing that the international community must have confirmation that Iran has stepped away from its nuclear weapons program. He stated that Iran must finally reveal all of its programs and activities to the IAEA by the end of the year, as IAEA Director General ElBaradei has called upon Iran to do, and allow the IAEA to verify that past nuclear weapons development has stopped. The Ambassador stressed that Iran must meet its UN Security Council obligation to suspend uranium enrichment, and that the basis and the need for IAEA and Security Council action thus remain unchanged. NIE May Have Implications for Action on Iran - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) AFM He replied that there is great interest in the NIE and that China is studying the report very closely, because it could have implications for how the Iranian nuclear issue should be handled. The Chinese general impression at present is that the NIE provides three primary "messages." First, in 2003, Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in response to international presure. Second, "for some time to come," as noted in the NIE, Iran will be unable to acquire the capability to produce enough fissile material to produce nuclear weapons, but will probbly continue to push forward with its uraniumenrichment pogram. Third, under internationl pressure, and with an opportunity for Iran to pursue its nuclear roadmap goals peacefully, Ian could be convinced to extend the halt in its nuclear weapons program. ¶7. (C) "Some in the international community," AFM He added, have concluded that the NIE weakens arguments for continuing further UNSC deliberations on sanctions, and that expanded diplomatic contact should be pursued instead, including direct talks between the United States and Iran. AFM He sought USG views on the best option for moving forward in light of the NIE. He stressed that U.S.-China cooperation on the issue has been strong. Such coordination is a "testament to the cooperative and constructive U.S.-China relationship." ¶8. (C) AFM He said the NIE and the international reaction to it raised the larger concern as to whether the UNSC would continue to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue in light of the changed circumstances and sought U.S. views on this issue. "We must consider the reaction of the international community." He said that while China attaches great importance to U.S. concerns on the issue, the general view of the international community is that the report casts doubt on the need for an additional UNSC resolution. He suggested China and the United States work together to deal with this reality. ¶9. (C) The Ambassador replied that it is "just as important as ever" to continue down the current path. A key finding of the NIE, he stressed, is that Iran had a nuclear weapons program before 2003; the most difficult part of developing a nuclear weapon, the collection of sufficient fissile material, is continuing and the rest of the program could be restarted in a relatively short time. "We need to remain vigilant," he added, especially because international pressure has now been shown to be effective in persuading Iran to act responsibly. He stressed that the goal of the sanctions is to convince Iran to stop its uranium enrichment activities and assuage the concerns of the international community. AFM Seeks Clarification on NIE Conclusion - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (C) AFM He replied that he noted that in the Ambassador's explanation of the NIE, the pre-2003 nuclear program was halted, after which Iran continued with commercial nuclear research that could have military applications. This, however, is not the conclusion of the NIE as he understood it, AFM He said. He pressed the Ambassador to explain the difference, saying that understanding if all or some of the commercial research can be used for military purposes is central to China's making a judgment of the situation. The Ambassador noted that there in fact is no significant difference: Iran had a military nuclear program before 2003, and continued with nuclear research after 2003 that could be used in some ways in a military program. He added that the United States remains concerned that the on-going research program could facilitate the restarting of the military nuclear program should Iran choose to go down that path again. Current P5-Plus-1 Framework for Talks with Iran? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (C) AFM He also sought clarification on the Ambassador's point that if Iran met its UNSC obligation of suspension, the United States would be willing to enter into negotiations under the P5-plus-1 offer, which includes the prospect for direct U.S.-Iran talks. AFM He asked if this meant that Iran would be included in talks with the P5-plus-1 as currently formulated (i.e., including Germany),or whether P5-plus-1 meant P5 plus Iran. The Ambassador replied that P5-plus-1 means the P5 plus Germany. China Still Unsatisfied with Draft Elements - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶12. (C) AFM said China has participated in negotiations on the UNSC resolution elements draft and showed "maximum flexibility" at the December 1 P5-plus-1 meeting, with a view to supporting the dual-track strategy and the overall U.S.-China relationship. China has informed the United States on several occasions of its proposed changes to the text, yet the latest draft China received from France, it appears preliminarily, contains some, but not all, of China's proposed changes. AFM He expressed hope that the United States and other participants would further take into account Chinese concerns. RANDT