PARTY CONGRESS TO OPEN OCTOBER 15; PERSONNEL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 005706

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2032
TAGS: PGOV CH
SUBJECT: PARTY CONGRESS TO OPEN OCTOBER 15; PERSONNEL
RUMORS ABOUND

REF: A. FBIS/OSC CPP20070828004002


B. FBIS/OSC CPP20070828163002

C. SHANGHAI 549 AND PREVIOUS

D. BEIJING 5139

E. BEIJING 4420

F. BEIJING 2711

G. BEIJING 2190

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) The 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of
China (CPC),which will determine China's new Party
leadership lineup and policy direction for the next five
years, will open October 15 in Beijing, official media
announced August 28. No ed date for the Congress was given,
though the event is likely to last about one week. In
advance of the Congress's opening, personnel rumors abound in
Beijing, with the vast majority of contacts arguing that the
"core" of the current Party leadership, namely Hu Jintao, Wen
Jiabao and Zeng Qinghong, will remain, with most believing
that Wu Bangguo will stay as well. While there has been an
uptick in rumors indicating that a "fifth generation"
representative, most likely Li Keqiang, will make it onto the
Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC),other contacts continue
to argue that it is still "too early" for Li, with one source
claiming Li's shot will come in 2012, when "real elections"
within the Party for the PBSC will be held. Although Hu
Jintao should emerge from the Congress stronger than before,
he is still merely first among equals but quite skillful at
balancing among various interest groups. Hu's real
prerogative as Party General Secretary, one well-connected
source said, is his ability to intervene at the last minute
and act as "tie breaker" on controversial personnel
appointments. For that reason, this contact cautioned,
"nothing" will be decided for certain on personnel until the
very end, and no one at this point knows exactly how things
will turn out -- not even Hu Jintao. End Summary.

Party Congress Dates Announced
--------------


2. (U) The 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of
China (CPC) will open October 15 in Beijing, official Chinese
media announced the evening of August 28 (refs A and B). No
end date for the Congress was given. This event, held once
every five years, will determine China's new Party leadership
lineup and policy direction through 2012. The same
announcement said the Seventh and final plenary session
(Plenum) of the 16th CPC Central Committee will open on
October 9. These decisions were reportedly made at a
Politburo meeting chaired by General Secretary Hu Jintao on
August 28. (Note: The Politburo reportedly "decided" that
the Seventh Plenum will begin on October 9 but will only
"propose" to the Plenum that the 17th Party Congress open on
October 15. This is merely a formality; the Seventh Plenum
will officially approve the opening of the Congress as
instructed by the Politburo.)


3. (C) The content of the Political Report that Hu will
present to the Congress for approval, as previewed in Hu
Jintao's speech of June 25 (ref E),was again alluded to in
Xinhua's August 28 article and in an August 29 People's Daily
editorial, which said the Congress will continue to promote
reform and opening and adhere to "socialism with Chinese
characteristics," "Deng Xiaoping Theory" and (Jiang Zemin's)
"Three Represents," while also carrying out the "scientific
concept of development" and creation of a "harmonious
society," concepts closely identified with Hu Jintao. In a
sign that anti-corruption measures will also likely receive
prominent attention, Xinhua emphasized that the August 28
Politburo meeting also examined the draft work report that
the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) will
submit to the Congress.

The Likely Schedule of Events
--------------


4. (C) Assuming that this Congress follows roughly the same
schedule as the 16th Party Congress in 2002, the Seventh and
final Plenum of the 198-member 16th CPC Central Committee
will open on October 9 and meet for approximately three to
four days to discuss and approve final preparations for the
Party Congress, including officially authorizing the Congress
opening. (In 2002, the Seventh Plenum of the CPC 15th
Central Committee met for three days, from November 3-5.) On
October 15, some 2,217 delegates will gather for the opening
of the 17th Party Congress, which will last for about one

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week, during which time it will "elect" approximately 200
members to a new Central Committee and "approve" a Political
Report to be delivered by Hu Jintao that will outline the
policy and ideological direction of the country over the next
five years. The Congress should also "elect" approximately
120 new members to the CDIC. (In 2002, the 16th Party
Congress opened on November 8 and closed on November 14.)
The day immediately after the Congress closes, the newly
elected Central Committee will hold its First Plenum to
select and announce the Party General Secretary as well as
new members of the Politburo and Politburo Standing
Committee, CPC Central Military Commission and Party
Secretariat. (In 2002, the First Plenum of the 16th CPC

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Central Committee was held November 15.)

Personnel Rumors Abound: Some "Old Blood" to Remain
-------------- --------------


5. (C) As the behind-the-scenes jockeying for positions at
the top of the Party intensifies, a range of personnel rumors
abound. Nevertheless, in a series of conversations over the
past several weeks, the vast majority of well-connected
Embassy contacts have argued that the "core" of the current
Party leadership on the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC),
namely General Secretary and President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen
Jiabao and Vice President Zeng Qinghong will remain, with
most believing that NPC Chairman Wu Bangguo will also retain
his slot on the PBSC. For example, in separate recent
conversations, the following longtime Embassy contacts all
argued strongly that Hu, Wen, Zeng and Wu Bangguo will remain
following the Party Congress (strictly protect all):
Professor Liu Dexi of the Central Party School; Liu Yawei of
the Carter Center, whose brother is a senior PLA officer; Ma
Licheng, former senior editorial writer at the People's
Daily; Li Fan, Director of the World and China Institute; and
Gao Bo, a local official in the Henan Prefectural
Government's Agricultural Office who has close ties to
Central Party School officials.


6. (C) Meanwhile, two other well-connected and reliable
contacts also argued that the core of the current leadership
will remain, but they included only Hu, Wen and Zeng among
this group. Former Xinhua Senior Editor and Director General
of Foreign Affairs Yu Jiafu (strictly protect) said Hu Jintao
will of course stay, with Wen and Zeng "likely" to stay as
well, assuming that they want to. Cao Huayin (strictly
protect),Deputy Director General of Zheng Bijian's China
Reform Forum, also thought Hu, Wen and Zeng would stay,
though Cao said he is still hearing "rumors" that Wen might
want to retire. Both Yu and Cao said that they "did not
know" what other current PBSC members, if any, might remain
beyond the 17th Party Congress.


7. (C) A small number of other contacts had opinions that
differed significantly from the majority of sources above.
Professor Mao Shoulong (strictly protect) of Renmin
University, who said he had attended a Zhongnanhai leadership
compound meeting earlier this year on political reform and
improved governance, told Poloff that he was hearing change
would be greater at the top than most expected, with
everyone's position outside of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao's "up
for grabs." At the other end of the spectrum, Li Fan said
his sources were telling him that people may be surprised by
how little things will change at the top: in addition to Hu,
Wen, Zeng and Wu Bangguo, Li thought even Jiang Zemin ally
and Chairman of the Chinese People's Consultative Conference
Jia Qinglin, as well as the elderly Secretary of the CDIC Wu
Guanzheng, "still have a shot" at retaining seats on the
PBSC. Ma Licheng also said he "could not rule out" Jia
Qinglin's retaining his position, given Jiang Zemin's
residual influence.

"New Blood" to Enter PBSC
--------------


8. (C) Regarding the "new blood" that might enter the PBSC,
Poloff has detected a noticeable uptick in contacts who hear
that a "fifth generation" representative, most likely Hu
Jintao protege and Liaoning Party Secretary Li Keqiang, will
be elevated to the PBSC in October. Professor Liu Dexi said
that the "latest rumor" at the Central Party School is that
the PBSC will shrink to seven, meaning three new members will
join Hu, Wen, Zeng and Wu Bangguo at the top. Most believe
those newcomers will include Li Keqiang and Guangdong Party
Secretary and Politburo member Zhang Dejiang. Liu also said

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"it is possible" that Li Keqiang could be designated as Hu
Jintao's heir apparent. Gao Bo, who also had heard the PBSC
will shrink to seven, said "it is highly likely" that Li
Keqiang will be elevated to the top body. Contenders for
what he saw as the other two slots included Hubei Party
Secretary and Politburo member Yu Zhengsheng and NPC Vice

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Chairman and Politburo member Wang Zhaoguo, both of whom
reportedly are ahead of "other possibilities" such as
Minister of Public Security and Politburo Member Zhou
Yongkang, CPC Organization Department Director and Politburo
member He Guoqiang and CPC Propaganda Department Director and
Politburo member Liu Yunshan. (Note: Chinese-American
Professor Yi Xiaoxiong (strictly protect) of Marietta
College, who has close ties to Liu Yunshan because his son
studied at Marietta, also said he has heard that Liu is
"being considered" for the PBSC.) Professor Mao Shoulong, on
the other hand, argued passionately that "at least two, if
not more" fifth generation representatives will make it to
the PBSC, commenting that both Li Keqiang and Jiangsu Party
Secretary Li Yuanchao are rumored to "have an excellent shot"

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at making the top body. Yu Jiafu separately told Poloff
that, while Li Keqiang very well may make it, that decision
is "still not certain."


9. (C) Despite the uptick in those who see Li Keqiang rising
to the top, a number of other well-placed contacts continue
to argue that it is "too early" for Li or anyone else from
the fifth generation to make it to the PBSC, instead arguing
that a number of "young" leaders will be promoted to the
larger Politburo, where they will compete "equally" over the
next five years for possible elevation to the Standing
Committee in 2012. (Note: Such comments track closely with
the views of contacts earlier this year, per refs F and G.)
Cao Huayin, for example, repeatedly emphasized to Poloff that
there is too much opposition within the Party to bringing the
"inexperienced" fifth generation leaders onto the PBSC now.
Instead, the Party is reportedly considering reforms
involving a "real election" of members to the PBSC in 2012,
with anyone on the Central Committee being eligible to "run,"
which would be Li Keqiang's ticket to the top in 2012.
(NOTE: Cao's comment tracks loosely with a statement by
Professor Mao Shoulong, who told Poloff that fifth generation
leaders like Li Keqiang are interested in using "democratic"
means to enhance their authority, particularly vis-a-vis the
military, which reportedly has little respect for fifth
generation leaders, none of whom have significant military
experience.)


10. (C) The Carter Center's Liu Yawei and Li Fan also
separately argued that it is premature to bring a fifth
generation leader to the top now, and that competition among
that generation's leading contenders -- Li Keqiang, Li
Yuanchao, Shanghai Party Secretary Xi Jinping and Commerce
Secretary Bo Xilai -- is "too tight" to justify elevating

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just one now. Instead, Liu Yawei said, he was hearing
leading candidates for PBSC openings included Liu Yunshan,
Zhou Yongkang and He Guoqiang. Yu Jiafu, who as mentioned
above said it is "possible" that Li Keqiang could make it to
the PBSC, nevertheless also referred to "opposition" to Li on
the grounds that it would be "too hasty" to elevate young
leaders who are not even on the Politburo all the way up to
the PBSC without first having them go through the "required
intermediary steps."

Hu vs. Who? Negotiation Among "Mountaintops"
--------------


11. (C) Although Hu Jintao should emerge from the Congress
stronger than before, he is still merely first among equals
and must negotiate with others over personnel and other
decisions. Nonetheless, he is quite skillful at balancing
among various interest groups, contacts have told Poloff. Yu
Jiafu said that personnel lists will continue to be prepared
and discussed right up to the Congress, including at Beidaihe
(refs C and D). Senior leaders like Hu will intervene at
various stages of the process to negotiate over appointments.
There are various "groupings" within the Party, called
"mountaintops (shantou)," all of which are jockeying for
slots, Yu explained. The "mountaintops" break down according
to interests associated with policy, geography, patron-client
relationships and economic/business considerations. The
specific breakdown, Yu averred, is "extremely complex."


12. (C) Professor Liu Dexi had a similar view,asserting that
elite politics in the CPC has rown increasingly diverse and
complex since Mao's passing. While Mao enjoyed "one-man"
rule, Deng Xiaoping had to compete with Chen Yun. Things
grew more complicated under Jiang Zemin, who had to deal with
other senior Party stalwarts such as Qiao Shi, Li Ruihuan and
Li Peng. Today, Liu argued, Hu Jintao faces an "even more
complex" playing field. While still having to face some of
the elders from Jiang's time -- including, of course, Jiang
himself -- Hu also has to deal with a number of new
"groupings." When asked by Poloff to comment on Hu Jintao's
strength, Cao Huayin remarked that Hu is "not particularly
strong," but he is "exceptionally skilled" at negotiating
among these various interest groups. It is this skill that

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gives Hu power and allows him to operate effectively, Cao
commented.

"Nothing Has Been Decided"
--------------


13. (C) Yu Jiafu commented extensively to Poloff on his
understanding of the high-level personnel selection process.
Part of Hu Jintao's influence lies in his prerogative as
General Secretary to intervene at the last minute to cast the
equivalent of the "tie breaking vote" on controversial
personnel appointments, Yu claimed. "Nothing" has been
decided finally on positions for the PBSC, and no one at this
point knows precisely how this will turn out, even Hu Jintao,
though he obviously has his own preferences. Pronouncements
to the contrary are merely "speculation." There will be a
fair amount of "new blood" on the PBSC, and there will be a
few "surprises," but nothing is certain right now beyond Hu
Jintao's remaining on the PBSC, Yu claimed.


14. (C) Opinion within the Party on various candidates does
matter, Yu said. If "90 percent" of the Party opposes a
particular candidate, that will make it difficult for that
person to get a top post, even if supported by a senior Party
leader, Yu stated, putting United Front Work Department Head
Liu Yandong, reportedly a favorite of Hu's, in this category.
A split in opinion on a candidate presents Hu Jintao with an
opportunity to be the "tie breaker" and make the final
decision. Age will not play a major factor in personnel
decisions, except for those over 70. That means PBSC Member
and Secretary of the Central Commission of Political Science
and Law Luo Gan is the only one who must step down this time,
but there will be no "67/68" rule like in 2002. Instead,
purely political considerations will rule the day, Yu stated.
If necessary, "rules" to "justify" the decisions will be
made up after the fact.


15. (C) Even the size of the PBSC will not be decided in
advance, Yu asserted. Yu said he believes Hu has long wanted
to shrink the PBSC down to seven, but that decision will
depend on how the personnel situation shakes out. If, when
Hu intervenes in the final personnel decisions, he discovers
several candidates remaining who he doesn't like, he may push
to reduce size of the PBSC as a means of forcing them out.
Alternatively, he may try to leave the PBSC at nine members
if that is the only way to elevate his favorites. Again, the
political considerations of each appointment will drive the
train. The key, Yu claimed, is that jockeying will go on
until the last minute, and "nothing is final" until we see
the new leadership lineup appear at the First Plenum of the
new Central Committee immediately following the Party
Congress.

Comment
--------------


16. (C) This Party Congress is the most highly anticipated
political event in China since the 16th Party Congress of
2002, at which Jiang Zemin relinquished his General Secretary
position to Hu Jintao (though Jiang only gave up his slot as
Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission in 2004). Hu
Jintao will be presiding over his first Party Congress as
General Secretary, which presents him with an opportunity to
consolidate his power and leave his stamp on Party policy.
While Hu is almost certain to emerge from the Congress in a
stronger position than before, the precise outcomes,
particularly in terms of personnel, remain to be seen.
Randt