PARTY ENACTS "SAFE" POLITICAL REFORM BY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 005584

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2032
TAGS: PGOV CH
SUBJECT: PARTY ENACTS "SAFE" POLITICAL REFORM BY
RESTRUCTURING LOCAL PARTY COMMITTEES

REF: A. FBIS/OSC CPP20070212704001


B. BEIJING 2711

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.
4 (b) and (d).

Summary
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1. (C) The Chinese media has trumpeted nationwide,
local-level reorganization of Communist Party committees over
the past year as an example of political reform desiged to
increase efficiency and "inner-Party deocracy." The most
visible change has been reduction of the number of local
Deputy Party Secretary positions to two, with one overseeing
Party affairs, the other supervising Government matters.
Despite the laudatory press coverage, reaction to the changes
has been decidedly mixed. One scholar told us the
restructuring amounted to mere "administrative tinkering" and
did not rise to the level of "political reform," as it was
only a natural correction to the proliferation of Deputy
Party Secretary positions in the 1990s. Another scholar
related complaints from local officials who are confused
about how to divide up work under the new structure. One
contact critically observed that, despite the emphasis on
"inner-Party democracy," the upshot of recent changes in the
provinces has been to increase the power of the Party
Secretary, making local-level politics even less democratic

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than before. End summary.

Reducing Deputy Party Secretary Slots as "Reform"
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2. (SBU) Reorganization of Communist Party committees at the
local level, represented most visibly by reduction of the
number of local Deputy Party Secretaries to two, has been
hailed over the past year by official Chinese media as an
example of political reform designed to increase the
efficiency of Party organs and "inner-Party democracy." The
idea surfaced publicly at the September 2004 Fourth Plenum of
the Communist Party Central Committee, which issued a vague
call for reducing the number of Deputy Secretaries in local
Party committees. In 2006, a more focused announcement
regarding implementation of a "one chief, two deputies"
system was issued, with implementation starting in fall 2006
as the first in a staggered wave of nationwide local Party
Congresses was held.


3. (SBU) The reorganization has been carried out in
conjunction with the recently completed nationwide "change of
term" (huanjie) personnel turnover that has taken place in
Party apparatuses over the past year at four levels:
province, city, county and township. According to a Xinhua
News Agency report dated August 9, 2007, personnel turnover
was successfully completed in 31 provinces, 408 cities, 2,763
counties and 34,976 townships. Among them, the "vast
majority" of areas reduced their Deputy Party Secretary slots
to two, including 90 percent of provinces (i.e., all but
three),79.4 percent of cities and 84.4 percent of counties.
This change resulted in an overall reduction of Deputy Party
Secretary slots by 91 at the provincial level; 806 at the

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city level; 5,165 at the county level and 41,476 at the
township level. Reasons for those Party apparatuses that did
not carry out the reductions reportedly varied, but at the
provincial level, the reasons cited were the need to include
ethnic group representatives in Inner Mongolia and Tibet, and
in Xinjiang, the desire to include a representative from the
massive Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. The
Party-sponsored People's Forum magazine in January of this
year hailed the reorganization as a "bright spot" in China's
political reform and an "acceleration" of changes to the
leadership system.

Why the Change? "Efficiency" and "Democracy"
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4. (SBU) According to official media, the goals of the
changes are to increase the efficiency of Party organizations
at the local level and to promote greater "inner-party
democracy." In terms of efficiency, Liaowang Magazine, a
Xinhua News Agency publication, earlier in 2007 (Ref A)
reported that the reduction in the number of Deputy Party
Secretary slots has decreased duplication and overlap of

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portfolios among local Party leaders, clarified
responsibilities and pushed greater responsibility to lower
levels. For example, under the old system, the Standing
Committee of a Party Provincial Committee, which is the
supreme political organ at the provincial level, had as many
as 15 members, led by a Party Secretary and from three to
eight Deputy Party Secretaries. Deputy Party Secretaries
were given nominal responsibility for departments under the

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Standing Committee, including the Party Organization,
Propaganda, United Front Work and Political Science and Law
Departments, as well as the Provincial Commission for
Discipline Inspection. But each of these departments also
had a department head, some of whom concurrently were also
Deputy Party Secretaries, some of whom were not. Further
adding to the complexity of the previous structure was the
fact that other members of the Party Standing Committee who
were not Deputy Party Secretaries sometimes also had partial
responsibility for issues that overlapped with these
departments.


5. (SBU) Under the new system, these problems have supposedly
been resolved, with only one Standing Committee Member
designated as the Deputy Party Secretary in charge of all
Party affairs, while the other Deputy is in charge of all
government affairs (at the provincial level, for example, the
other Deputy would concurrently hold the position of Governor
or its equivalent). There has reportedly also been a clearer
delineation of responsibilities, with each local Standing
Committee member given specific responsibilities for a
portfolio and corresponding department under the local Party
committee. Additional efficiency has supposedly been gained
by giving Department heads greater responsibility and freedom
of maneuver, as well as greater access to the Party
Secretary. Some commentators have even claimed the

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restructuring will result in cost savings, because in
addition to slashing the number of Deputy Party Secretaries,
the total number of Standing Committee members in most
provinces has been reduced to 11. In fact, Xinhua has
reported that the number of officials in the "leadership
group" (lingdao banzi) has decreased by 21 persons at the
provincial level, 149 at the city level, 859 at the county
level and 34,368 persons in townships.


6. (SBU) Promoting "inner-Party democracy" and expanding
"collective" decision making has been another stated goal of
the changes. As reported in Liaowang and other official
media, by eliminating several Deputy Party Secretary
positions, central officials hoped to force local Party
Secretaries to deal directly with local Standing Committees

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as a whole, rather than consulting only with a small clique
of Deputy Party Secretaries in "Secretaries' work meetings,"
as had become the unofficial norm in most of the country. By
forcing more contact between the Party Secretary and local
Standing Committees, the policymaking process is supposed to
be more "democratic" and "collective," as is policy
implementation, which now is more fully the responsibility of
the entire Standing Committee.

Reaction Mixed: "Tinkering" Viewed as "Safe" Reform
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7. (C) Reaction to the reorganization among Embassy contacts
has been decidedly mixed and mostly negative. According to
Dong Lisheng (protect),long-time Embassy contact and scholar
at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS),reducing
the number of local Deputy Party Secretaries amounts to
"administrative tinkering," not "real" political reform.
Dong recently asserted to Poloff that the reduction is a
natural correction to the proliferation of the number of
Deputy Party Secretary slots in the 1990s. That expansion
was partially a reaction against the political reforms pushed
by Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang in the 1980s, as well
as the reforms adopted at the 13th Party Congress in 1987.
Those reforms included abolishing Party organizations in the
ministries and generally attempting to separate the functions
of the Party and the state. (Note: According to Dong, it
was Hu Yaobang who first proposed reducing the number of
local Deputy Party Secretary slots.) After Hu's fall from
grace in 1987, followed by his successor Zhao Ziyang's ouster
in 1989, a series of post-Tiananmen steps were taken to
strengthen the Party's position throughout the 1990s,
including increasing the number of Deputy Party Secretary
positions. Another objective was to increase career
opportunities for cadres in charge of propaganda, youth
league and other issues by creating Deputy slots for them.
The result was a "cumbersome" local Party structure. Now the
pendulum has swung back the other way, and the Party is
trying to correct the unforeseen consequences of earlier
changes, Dong said.


8. (C) Central Party School (CPS) scholar Li Xiaoke (protect)
was largely dismissive of the reorganization, calling it a
kind of "safe" political "reform" that the center can promote
while avoiding doing anything that might threaten Party
supremacy. According to Li, the reorganization was
originally carried out as an "experiment" somewhere in China,
later catching the eye of top leaders, which resulted in its
being ordered as the model to follow nationwide. Li
therefore cautioned against buying into central propaganda by

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placing too much emphasis on the importance of these changes.

Confusion Reigns Locally
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9. (C) Professor Kang Shaobang (protect),also of the Central
Party School, separately related to Poloff the criticisms of
the restructuring that he had heard from local officials,
some of whom are his students at the CPS. According to Kang,
many local officials grouse that the changes have merely
resulted in confusion over precisely who is supposed to be in
charge of issues. For example, the one Deputy in charge of
Party affairs cannot possibly oversee all the work previously
done by several Deputies, but there has been no clear
guidance on exactly what the one Deputy should do. There is
also reportedly skepticism that department heads will be able
to carry out their newly expanded responsibilities, many of
which used to be handled by more senior cadres. An August
2007 article in the reformist Southern Weekend (Nanfang
Zhoumo) newspaper contained similar commentary, criticizing
the "inefficiency" of the restructuring because the remaining
Deputy Party Secretaries now have such large areas of
responsibility that they "cannot really manage anything at
all."

Less Democracy, not More
--------------


10. (C) Many observers have been critical of the
restructuring's failure to increase the "democratic" nature
of policymaking at the local level, which has instead
resulted in the further concentration of power in the Party
Secretary's hands. CPS Professor Kang, however, thought the

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changes had succeeded mildly in this regard, arguing that the
reduction in the number of Deputy Party Secretary slots had
corresponded with increased involvement by more people on the
local Standing Committees, which might even serve as a model
for changes at the center at this fall's Party Congress (Ref
B). Nevertheless, most contacts have been critical of the
move's "undemocratic" tendencies. CPS Scholar Li Xiaoke said
the changes have increased the power of Party Secretaries by
expanding the divide between the top leadership and Standing
Committee members. Not only has this made policymaking less
rather than more collective, but it also dooms the
restructuring to failure, as the large gap between the Party
Secretary and those carrying out the policies makes it

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impossible to sufficiently monitor and guide the work being
done, Li asserted.


11. (C) A May 2007 article in the provocative Southern Window
magazine, which is managed by the Guangzhou Party Committee,
also argued that the changes have nothing to do with
"inner-Party democracy" but rather seek to strengthen the
Party Secretary's power, particularly over budget decisions.
The report claims that the Deputy Party Secretaries
previously had too much control over the budget, but now
Party Secretaries under the new system can exert more
influence over department budgeting by dealing directly with
Standing Committee members. Professor Jin Canrong (protect)
of Renmin University similarly told Poloff that such
administrative reform at the local level is merely an attempt
to enhance "good governance," which does not necessarily have
anything to do with "democracy." Summing up the changes,
CPS's Li Xiaoke said the reduction in number of Deputy Party
Secretaries, coupled with other changes such as making most

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provincial Party Secretaries concurrently serve as Chairmen
of the provincial People's Congresses, has resulted not only
in more power in the hands of Party Secretaries but also a
local policymaking process that is even less democratic than
before.

Impact on Anti-Corruption Fight?
--------------


12. (C) Chinese media have als debated whether reducing the
number of Deput Party Secretaries has weakened the functions
of the local Discipline and Inspection Commissions, precisely
at a time when the center is trying to crack down on
corruption. "Demoting" the head of local Discipline and
Inspection Commissions, who in many cases had been a Deputy
Party Secretary, has resulted in an overall weakening of the
Commissions' oversight powers, some have argued. The
Liaowang article mentioned above (Ref A) carries commentary
from both sides of the debate. An April 2007 article in the
Central Party School's Study Times newspaper, however, argues
that despite the demotion in rank of some local Commission
heads, their influence has actually increased, because the
Central Government now holds the power of nominating and
appointing provincial Commission secretaries. The CPS's Li
Xiaoke told Poloff he thought the local restructuring would
have little effect on the Commissions' anti-corruption work,

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which in general is likely to fail, but for reasons unrelated
to the current restructuring of local Party Committees.

Comment
--------------


13. (C) As speculation about political reform continues in
the run up to this fall's 17th Party Congress, propaganda
organs have not been shy about touting administrative changes
such as the reduction in the number of Deputy Party
Secretaries as successful "reform" that has already been

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implemented. While it is perhaps in part an attempt to
correct governance problems at the local level, the
restructuring also clearly provides the center with a
convenient, and safe, way to promote "reform" and "democracy"
without in any way undermining the Party's authority. At the
same time, the move has only further contributed to the
skepticism among many contacts regarding the prospects for
any "real" political reform this fall.
Piccuta