CHINESE PROVIDE CASE BRIEFINGS AND CRITICIZE U.S.

S E C R E T BEIJING 005361 E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2027 TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC IZ IR IS LE KN CH SUBJECT: CHINESE PROVIDE CASE BRIEFINGS AND CRITICIZE U.S. SANCTIONS IN AFTERNOON NONPRO DIALOGUE SESSION REF: A. BEIJING 2486 ¶B. BEIJING 2485 ¶C. BEIJING 5269 ¶D. 06 BEIJING 14992 ¶E. BEIJING 4643 ¶F. BEIJING 5070 ¶G. BEIJING 5138 ¶H. 06 BEIJING 24237 ¶I. BEIJING 4327 ¶J. 06 BEIJING 6312 ¶K. BEIJING 3603 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (S) Summary: In an afternoon session of bilateral nonproliferation talks August 13, MFA Arms Control and Disarmament Department Director General Zhang Yan touted China's actions on nonproliferation enforcement and criticized U.S. sanctions on Chinese firms and our "wide-scope" interpretation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Zhang responded to ISN PDAS McNerney's call for increased transparency and feedback on proliferation cases with briefings on several outstanding cases. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation Patricia McNerney met August 13 with MFA Arms Control and Disarmament Department Director General Zhang Yan to hold the bilateral U.S.-China Nonproliferation Dialogue. The morning of the dialogue focused on regional issues (septel),the afternoon on bilateral issues (reported here). CHINA'S "CONCRETE" NONPROLIFERATION MEASURES -------------- ¶3. (S) "China firmly opposes any kind of proliferation," Zhang Yan stated at the outset of the afternoon session of the dialogue. "We don't support, encourage or help any country develop weapons of mass destruction (WMDs),and we don't allow Chinese companies to do so." Supporting nonproliferation is in China's interest and provides the international peace, security and stability necessary for China's continued economic development. Zhang highlighted four measures China has taken on nonproliferation enforcement: (1) China has established an "effective export control legal system," including regulations on dual-use products related to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, in the spirit of Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group and Chemical Weapons Convention standards. (2) China has strengthened its interagency law enforcement mechanisms to "intensify investigation capabilities" on specific cases. (3) China has stepped up its enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 (North Korea),1737 (Iran) and 1747 (Iran) and has reached out to Chinese firms, educating them on how to "strictly observe relevant clauses" of the resolutions. (4) China has increased its international cooperation on nonproliferation, responding to cases referred by other countries, pursuing channels like the Nonproliferation Dialogue, and taking an active role on nonproliferation in the Security Council. "OBSTACLES" IN U.S. NONPRO POLICY -------------- ¶4. (S) DG Zhang addressed U.S. nonproliferation policy, citing "two aspects now creating some obstacles" for bilateral cooperation. Unilateral U.S. sanctions are "not helpful and not constructive," Zhang said, arguing that it is "inappropriate to invoke U.S. domestic law or sanctions" against entities in another country. U.S. sanctions have affected 30 Chinese companies since 2001, hurting China's industry and undermining China's own enforcement efforts, he claimed. Zhang insisted it is not in the United States' political or economic interest to continue to press for coercive measures. He called for continued talks and cooperation, saying China hopes to increase information sharing through Embassy channels and expert-level exchanges and welcomes Washington's "new track of increased dialogue" with North Korea. The United States' "wide-scope" interpretation of UNSC Resolutions on nonproliferation is also a "major obstacle," Zhang said. All sides must accept that the resolutions may not be perfect and some times reflect "the lowest common denominator," but they are "a consensus, produced through long negotiations" and must be strictly interpreted to preserve their legitimacy and support among all countries. Zhang said China shares U.S. concerns and will not ignore issues we raise with them, but warned against stretching resolutions' "words and spirit" in order to fit our message. ¶5. (S) PDAS McNerney acknowledged our good bilateral nonproliferation cooperation, but called for continued progress toward a level of cooperation similar to that, for example, between the United States and Canada, where a recent proliferation case referred by the United States was investigated, stopped and reported back within one month. When PDAS McNerney reminded Zhang that continually expanding export control lists is not enough to stay ahead of proliferators, citing the catch-all provisions in UNSCR 1540 and in China's domestic law, Zhang replied that China's domestic catch-alls are not as "clear cut" as the United States claims. PDAS McNerney also called for increased transparency and feedback on cases referred by the United States, adding that better information on punitive actions taken by PRC authorities might help avoid U.S. sanctions against Chinese firms. BRIEFINGS ON OUTSTANDING CASES -------------- ¶6. (S) AMBASSADOR'S APRIL IRAN REFERRALS: DG Zhang began his discussion of open proliferation cases by referring to three cases he said Ambassador Randt initially raised with Assistant Foreign Minister He Yafei in April. Fuzhou Yihua Chemical was seeking to export 900 tons of sodium perchlorate to Iran's Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI) and had previously exported 211 tons of similar chemicals to PCI in October 2006 (ref A). The Ambassador also raised China North Wanxing International Corporation, saying that the company planned to export 200 tons of sodium perchlorate to Iran. Zhang stated that China investigated the allegations and found that both companies had entered into negotiations to export these items, but no exports had taken place. Although the export of this chemical is not prohibited, in light of U.S. concerns, China persuaded the companies to stop the exports, Zhang stated. Finally, the Ambassador raised the case of Tianjin Honghua Trading Company selling three tons of copper wire to Iran. China found that Tianjin Honghua is actually an Iranian-owned company, not a Chinese one, and "we are continuing our investigation," DG Zhang stated (ref B). ¶7. (S) LIMMT/Sunny Dalian: DG Zhang called LIMMT "an old case" that the UK and Israel have also raised with China. The company's owner is a former government official who later entered into private business and has been using his old government connections, Zhang noted. China found that LIMMT has conducted activities in violation of export regulations. Since 2003, China has detained four LIMMT consignments of graphite being shipped to Iran and stopped "several attempts" of illegal exports. In 2006, China "canceled LIMMT's business license. Now the company cannot export graphite," Zhang said. The company had found loopholes, for example sending small consignments below the licensing requirement, but China responded by "stopping all of LIMMT's exports of graphite" and introducing interim export controls on graphite in September 2006. This brought about complaints from other graphite exporters, Zhang said. In January 2007, China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) decided to take punitive measures against LIMMT. The company has appealed these measures, and the case is now being reviewed. PDAS McNerney noted that just the previous Friday, August 10, we raised with the MFA further attempts by LIMMT to export potentially controlled items (ref C). DG Zhang said the MFA is looking into these allegations. ¶8. (S) ZIBO CHEMET: DG Zhang addressed Zibo Chemet (ref D), which the United States raised with China in connection with the export of glass-lined vessels to Iran in 2005. China investigated the case and found that Zibo's activities were in violation of Chinese export regulations. China is "working on punitive measures" against Zibo and will inform the USG when the measures have been implemented. ¶9. (S) HEBEI SMART: Zhang discussed the case of Hebei Smart, which sought to export several tons of potassium bifluoride to Iran. In March 2006, Chinese Customs authorities detained a quantity of a chemical compound being shipped from the company to Iran, Zhang said. After testing, Customs determined that, despite being labeled as another substance, the chemical was in fact potassium bifluoride. As the company was attempting to export a substance controlled by China without a license and under a false label, Chinese authorities concluded the actions constituted a case of smuggling. The chemicals were confiscated and Hebei Smart was fined RMB 10,000 (approx USD 1,250),Zhang explained. The case is published on MOFCOM's website. ¶10. (S) SHANGHAI TECHNICAL BY-PRODUCTS: Regarding U.S. information that Shanghai Technical By-Products (STBP) is working to transfer items such as magnesium powder, aluminum powder, a hot isostatic press (HIP),vacuum hot presses and stainless steel pipes to Iran, Zhang stated that the company has never exported an HIP or aluminum powder to Iran (ref E). He acknowledged, however, that STBP has exported one vacuum hot press and four tons of magnesium powder to Iran, but he claimed that these exports were "normal trade." ¶11. (S) On the interdiction of two consignments of STBP-supplied electronic parts interdicted by the United Arab Emirates (UAE),DG Zhang stated that the items were ordinary cables not prohibited by the UN Security Council resolutions and not controlled by China (ref F). China was not happy with how the UAE or the United States handled the case; the United States should have come to China about its concerns first. Nevertheless, China was "thinking loudly" about a resolution and still considering taking back the two consignments, he said. (Note: In an August 6 meeting with Staffdel Fite, ref G, Zhang stated that these two shipments "clearly can not be permitted to go to Iran.") ¶12. DG Zhang noted the case of an Iranian company seeking to purchase items from Chinese firm CPEI (ref H). After investigating the case at U.S. request, China found an agreement signed for a transfer of aluminum. China determined that this was a widely available product used for "housing and machines," but in view of U.S. concerns China asked the firm to cancel the agreement. ¶13. (S) PAKISTAN TRANSFERS: DG Zhang noted that China had investigated recent allegations by the United States of transfers to an unsafeguarded nuclear program (ref I),which he identified as Pakistan's, but found nothing to substantiate them. ¶14. (S) UNSAFEGUARDED TRANSFERS: PDAS McNerney reminded Zhang that the United States has now been waiting two years for Beijing to approve the mutual legal assistance request we provided to Hong Kong in 2005 on the transfer of U.S.-origin Tektronix oscilloscopes to an unsafeguarded nuclear program through Hong Kong and mainland Chinese entities. Zhang replied that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region's processes were distinct from Beijing's and that it was his understanding that Hong Kong authorities were still working on "the format for cooperation." (Note: This response is inconsistent with earlier dialogues we have had with Hong Kong and the MFA on this matter. The United States was previously informed by Hong Kong authorities that approval from central authorities in Beijing is required before Hong Kong can respond to the U.S. request. In December 2005, the MFA indicated that the MFA Legal Department was reviewing the request and would inform Embassy Beijing when a decision was reached.) ¶15. (S) PDAS McNerney provided new information indicating that the shipment of an aluminum production line to an unsafeguarded nuclear program, which we first asked China to prevent in January 2006 (ref J),was completed around March ¶2007. She expressed serious concern that this transfer is inconsistent with China's obligation not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear programs, highlighting that Chinese citizen Gao Yiming would possibly travel to the unsafeguarded nuclear program this month to provide on-site support and is currently working to supply hydraulic fuel for operation of the production line's extrusion press. Zhang claimed that U.S. allegations regarding Gao were not substantiated by Chinese investigations and that Gao had not engaged in smuggling sensitive items to Pakistan. He pledged, however, to look into the new information. ¶16. (S) DPRK-IRAN TRANSFERS THROUGH CHINA: PDAS McNerney urged China to adopt more stringent checks on air shipments between Iran and North Korea. She informed Zhang of U.S. information indicating at least 10 shipments of jet vanes transiting Beijing from the DPRK to Iran, and U.S. expectation that these shipments would continue. In the past, these sensitive technologies have been transferred in Beijing from Air Koryo to Iran Air flights, she said (ref K). She encouraged China to make more random spot inspections of cargo on these flights and pledged to provide information, when available, on specific shipments. She emphasized, though, that random inspections of Iran Air cargos would be useful to ensuring these shipments are detected. She reminded Zhang of the transit of Iranian and DPRK missile-related delegations through Beijing en route to Tehran or Pyongyang, and encouraged Chinese efforts to prevent such transit in keeping with UN Security Council obligations. DG Zhang took the information on board and promised to look into it, but made no commitments. ¶17. (U) PDAS McNerney cleared this cable. RANDT NNNN End Cable Text