PLA-AFFILIATED SCHOLARS WARN THAT TAIWAN'S UN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 004517

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2032
TAGS: PREL PGOV CH TW
SUBJECT: PLA-AFFILIATED SCHOLARS WARN THAT TAIWAN'S UN

REFERENDUM MAY TRIGGER RESPONSE UNDER ANTI-SECESSION LAW

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) The mere process of holding a referendum on
participation in the UN under the name "Taiwan," even if it
does not pass, could trigger a response from China under the
Anti-Secession Law, three scholars from a PLA-affiliated
think tank told EAP DAS Christensen on July 4. A raging
debate on this point is reportedly underway within the
Beijing security and policymaking communities, with the
military scholars hinting that pessimists are gaining the
upper hand and that the PLA and the Party have initiated
detailed contingency planning. Managing this looming
"crisis" will be a stern "test" of the U.S.-China bilateral
relationship and could, if handled badly, negatively affect
our cooperation across a range of issues. In the run up to
this fall's 17th Party Congress, the Chinese leadership is
coming under increased internal pressure to be "tough" on
Taiwan, after having taken a more "moderate" stance since
President Hu Jintao came to power. Given Chen Shui-bian's
referendum proposal, critics argue that a moderate approach
has produced little, if anything. Part of the ongoing debate
centers on whether the United States is willing or able to
influence Taiwan, and how Washington might react to a series
of possible PRC responses, ranging from limited "non-peaceful
means" to the "use of force." The scholars stressed that we
must act now to influence the situation, before it is too
late and the referendum process has advanced beyond the point
of no return. End Summary.

Taiwan Referendum Process May Trigger PRC Response
-------------- --------------


2. (C) In a July 4 meeting with visiting EAP DAS Thomas
Christensen, Chairman Chen Zhiya (strictly protect) of the
PLA-affiliated think tank China Foundation for International
and Strategic Studies (FISS),said that the mere process of
Taiwan's holding a referendum on UN membership under the name
"Taiwan" could trigger a PRC response under China's
Anti-Secession Law. A raging debate is reportedly underway
within the Beijing security and policymaking communities over
the definition of "de jure independence," with Chen hinting
that an increasing number of people believe that simply
staging the referendum, even if it were to fail, would
constitute an incident of Taiwan de jure independence. If
that is the case, it represents an "extremely serious turning
point," Chen underscored, as that definition would
automatically trigger application of China's Anti-Secession
Law and obligate some sort of Chinese response. Chen said he
"could not emphasize enough" the seriousness of this debate,
confessing that he is "extremely worried" about the direction
this "crisis" is headed.


3. (C) Part of the debate, FISS Research Director Zhang
Tuosheng (strictly protect) explained, is that the referendum
process would irrevocably alter Taiwan public opinion
regarding independence, causing more and more Taiwan people
to favor it. Thus, no matter who wins the presidential
election, if the referendum goes forward, the "independence
card will forever be on the table," Zhang declared. Of
course, were the referendum to pass, things would be "even
worse." Zhang said he personally supports the view that a
referendum automatically equals a declaration by Taiwan's
government of de jure independence. He therefore has already
begun to consider just how the Chinese government should
respond, and how the United States subsequently might react,
even though he considers himself generally to be a "moderate"
and "friend" of the United States.

Taiwan as "Test" for Bilateral Relationship
--------------


4. (C) Taiwan's referendum represents a stern "test" for the
U.S.-China bilateral relationship, Zhang said, although many
Americans do not appreciate the seriousness of the current
situation. Americans mistakenly believe that the referendum
is meaningless, because whether it passes or not, Taiwan can
never join the UN. Such thinking puts the PRC in a very
difficult position. Many on the Chinese side are therefore
trying to determine the "true" U.S. position on the
referendum, asking questions such as, Does the United States
have the ability to stop Chen Shui-bian? Or, will the United
States only "talk" about opposing the referendum but take no
action? If the United States does not react strongly, Zhang
said, China will feel obligated to take a "very hard line" on
Taiwan, which could potentially harm the U.S.-China bilateral
relationship. "The chance for misunderstanding between us"
is quite high, Zhang lamented. A chain of actions and

BEIJING 00004517 002 OF 003


reactions by both sides could quickly escalate out of
control, he said.


5. (C) China's ongoing preoccupation with Taiwan has hampered
its ability to cooperate with the United States and the
international community in a variety of areas, including
peacekeeping operations, according to Lu Dehong (strictly
protect),Deputy Research Director at FISS. Should a
conflict occur between Washington and Beijing over Taiwan,
existing bilateral cooperation would suffer severe damage.
Only Taiwan can incite a conflict between the United States
and China, Chen Zhiya stressed, reiterating that he was
"extremely worried" about how the Taiwan situation might
impact our relations. Unlike the Taiwan-related crises of
the 1950s, the channels of communication between our two
countries today run wide and deep. We need to take advantage
of these links to avoid the "nightmare scenario" of
Sino-American military confrontation. A first step might be
for both sides to engage in more crisis management exercises.
Perhaps we could even discuss the definition of "de jure
independence" for Taiwan, Chen said. Regardless, we should
not let a man "as stupid as Chen Shui-bian" drag our two
countries into a conflict neither wants.

Chinese Leadership under Pressure
--------------


6. (C) China's leadership is coming under increased domestic
pressure to "be tough" on Taiwan, Zhang said. There are only
two things the leadership is currently focused on:
preparations for the 17th Party Congress and Taiwan. In the
leadup to the Congress, some critics of current Taiwan policy
within the government are arguing that, given Chen
Shui-bian's referendum proposal, the moderate approach Hu
Jintao has adopted on Taiwan has produced little, if
anything. Lu said many Chinese feel that in the past few
years China has "done nothing" on Taiwan, instead always
compromising, always retreating. In return, Chen Shui-bian
has only become more aggressive. Hu Jintao is "not crazy,"
Chen declared. His first choice, of course, will always be
peace. Nevertheless, we need to be aware of the pressure
that Hu is under. If the Taiwan "alarm bells" continue to
sound, he will increasingly be pressed to act. The sources
of that pressure come both from the elite and popular levels.


Gaming Possible U.S. Responses
--------------


7. (C) Returning to the definition of "de jure independence,"
Chen Zhiya said this is the key issue that may determine
China's response to Taiwan's referendum. If Chinese
policymakers decide that Taiwan's referendum itself equals de
jure independence, then China must act. That has led to the
next logical step, which is planning and gaming scenarios to
determine how the United States would respond to a variety of
possible Chinese actions. Zhang Tuosheng said the
Anti-Secession Law outlines two possible responses:
"non-peaceful means" and the "use of force." While refusing
to distinguish clearly between the two, Zhang said people are
asking a range of questions about how China ought to respond,
and what kind of reaction this would elicit from the United
States. For example, China's options might include applying
economic sanctions against Taiwan, enforcing a blockade to
choke off the island's energy supplies, the full-blown use of
military force, or merely sending some sort of military
"signal" that fell short of an attack.


8. (S) The ultimate question, of course, Zhang said, is would
the United States come to the aid of Taiwan militarily?
Although some on the Chinese side believe the United States
can restrain Chen Shui-bian, others believe that the United
States military, "in accordance with '5077'," (which they
notably labeled as the "U.S. war plan on Taiwan") would
support Taiwan militarily during a conflict, Lu and Chen
Zhiya said. Zhang said many Chinese are puzzled by the fact
that Taiwan in recent years has often refused to buy arms
from the United States, yet Washington still appears
committed to defending the island. Some U.S. concerns about
China's military buildup vis-a-vis Taiwan are confusing,
Zhang said. Is a huge continental power like China, with a
rapidly growing economy, supposed to forever remain at the
same level militarily as the "tiny island" of Taiwan? he
asked.

"Wrong Signals," Chen Shui-bian's Desperation
--------------


9. (C) Chinese observers are concerned the United States
might send the "wrong signal" to Taiwan authorities and
thereby exacerbate the current situation, Chen said.

BEIJING 00004517 003 OF 003


Allowing Taiwanese leaders to transit the United States is
one such signal, although the FISS scholars commented that
top officials had noticed Vice President Annette Lu's travel
had been tightly restricted. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are
another signal. We must keep in mind, Zhang argued, that
Chen Shui-bian is desperate to ensure a DPP electoral
victory. If the KMT were to win, Chen almost certainly will
face criminal prosecution. Given his personal situation,
Chen Shui-bian will "do anything" to prevent a KMT victory.
Nothing should be done to signal support for him during this
time, he said.

Time to Act is Now
--------------


10. (C) The time to act is now, Zhang said, because if we
wait too long, things will advance past the point of no
return on both sides of the Strait. If the referendum goes
forward on Taiwan, that very well could touch off a crisis.
On the other hand, the referendum could lead to a hardening
of public opinion in the PRC, severely restricting the
Chinese leadership's room for maneuver. We want to avoid
confrontation, Chen Zhiya said. We therefore need to talk
and plan now, so that we have a chance to prevent a crisis.
If the problem does reach crisis levels, escalation control
will play a key role in whether we can avoid conflict, Chen
said.


11. (C) DAS Christensen responded by stating there has been
no change to the United States' one China policy based on the
three joint communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act. The
United States has publicly stated its opposition to the
referendum because it "appeared desined" to change the
status quo. China should ot overreact to such purely
symbolic electora tactics. But, in fact, even if a
referendum were held and it passed, it would not change
Taiwan's status in any practical sense. China should bear in
mind that any cross-Strait conflict would involve great costs
and dangers for China and would certainly destroy all of the
significant progress that we have achieved in the past
several years in our bilateral relations. China should also
be aware that its own behavior, including recent attempts to
limit further Taiwan's international space and its fast-paced
military buildup across from Taiwan, has had a
counterproductive impact on Taiwan public opinion, has
increased support within Taiwan for Chen Shui-bian's
referendum proposal and has destabilized cross-Strait
relations. The United States does make available to Taiwan
defense articles that allow Taiwan to maintain a credible
defense as provided for in the Taiwan Relations Act. These
arms sales have contributed to stability across the Strait.
The sales are not designed to send a signal of support for
individual leaders and certainly do not represent support for
Taiwan independence. The Chinese side should keep in mind
the difficulty of escalation control and should not
overestimate either side's ability to control the pace and
level of escalation were military force to be used even in a
limited fashion.


12. (U) DAS Christensen has cleared this cable.
RANDT