17TH PARTY CONGRESS: PERSONNEL RUMORS HINT AT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 002190 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2032 TAGS: PGOV CH SUBJECT: 17TH PARTY CONGRESS: PERSONNEL RUMORS HINT AT HU'S CAUTION REF: A. BEIJING 620 ¶B. 06 BEIJING 16057 Classified By: Political Internal Unit Chief Susan Thornton. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) This fall's 17th Party Congress provides Hu Jintao with the opportunity to consolidate his power and leave a long-lasting imprint on the Party, both in terms of policy and in the selection of China's next generation of leaders. In terms of personnel, nothing is guaranteed, beyond Hu Jintao remaining as General Secretary until at least 2012, when internal Party age norms would dictate that he step down. It is virtually certain, however, that Luo Gan and the ailing Huang Ju will vacate their spots on the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) this fall. Premier Wen Jiabao, generally acknowledged to be China's most popular leader, will likely remain, although some in business circles are critical of his performance. Vice President Zeng Qinghong's fate is a subject of debate, though many surmise that he will remain on the PBSC, perhaps with another portfolio. National People's Congress (NPC) Chairman Wu Bangguo is likely to stay and is reportedly in charge of preparations for the Congress. Several contacts have indicated they doubt that Hu Jintao has the political muscle to remove other senior leaders and pack the PBSC with several of his favorites from the younger "fifth generation" or to shrink the size of the PBSC from nine to seven as he reportedly desires. Instead, Party leaders may elevate several young leaders to the Politburo, leaving the question of which of them rises to the PBSC -- and succeeds Hu Jintao -- to 2012 and the 18th Party Congress. Comment: Given Hu's style, his need to further consolidate his authority and maintain unity in the top echelon of the Party, he will likely move carefully to preserve some balance among China's top leaders. End Summary. 17th Party Congress: Attention Turns to the Fall -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) With the conclusion of China's annual legislative session earlier this month, all eyes are turning to this year's main political event: the 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Interest in the Congress was further heightened this past week with the latest announcements in the ongoing nationwide personnel reshuffle, this time involving the appointment of new Party Secretaries in Shanghai, Tianjin, Shandong, Shaanxi, SIPDIS Zhejiang and Qinghai, several of which may involve concurrent appointment to the Politburo this fall. Held only once every five years, the Congress will be the biggest political happening in China since the 2002 16th Party Congress, at which Jiang Zemin relinquished his position as General Secretary and passed the baton to Hu Jintao (though Jiang only relinquished his title as Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission in 2004). The precise timing of the Congress has yet to be made public, though last year's Party Plenum Decision stipulated that the 17th Party Congress should be held in "the last half of 2007." Contacts say the event could be held anytime between September and November. (The 16th Party Congress was held in November 2002, the 15th in September 1997.) ¶3. (C) The Congress itself will involve more than 2,000 delegates, currently being selected from across China, who will assemble in Beijing to elect the new members of the Central Committee (which currently has 198 members and 156 alternates). Its other main task is to approve a Political Report that will determine the Party's policy and ideological direction for the next five years. Immediately following the conclusion of the Congress, the new Central Committee will convene its first Plenum to elect the Party General Secretary, Politburo (currently 24 members) and its Standing Committee (currently 9 members),as well as members of the CCP Central Military Commission (currently 11 members). Decisions on Government leaders -- President, Vice President, National People's Congress Chairman, Premier, Vice Premiers, State Councilors and so on -- will not be affirmed until the March 2008 NPC session, though it may be possible to determine some of those decisions in advance, based on the outcome of the Congress this fall. Personnel: Changes at the Top? -------------- ¶4. (C) Anticipated personnel changes at the pinnacle of the Chinese Communist Party are the primary focus of political BEIJING 00002190 002 OF 004 observers in Beijing. The difficulty, of course, is predicting what might happen, given the opaque nature of the political system. As Central Party School Professor Qin Zhilai recently cautioned, high-level personnel decisions are "top secret," so no one knows exactly what will take place. Nevertheless, according to Dong Lisheng, China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) scholar, one thing is clear: the Congress is both an "opportunity and test" for Hu Jintao and will demonstrate whether he can fully consolidate his power vis-a-vis the influence of former President Jiang Zemin and other top leaders. Dong conceded that relations on the Politburo break down in complex ways, including between Communist Youth League and "princeling" factions, generations and by economic interests across various actors. Nevertheless, the most important fault line continues to break between Hu Jintao's attempts to expand his authority and the residual influence of those elevated by Jiang. He Weixin, Peking University Professor of Law commented that Jiang Zemin still weighs in on high- level personnel matters, due to concerns over his legacy, even though he plays "no role" in policy making. Politburo Standing Committee -------------- ¶5. (C) Regarding membership on the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC),every contact with whom we have spoken has said there is perhaps only one certainty: Hu Jintao will remain as the Party's General Secretary through at least 2012, when he will be over 70 years old and expected to step down in accordance with informal Party norms. Beyond that, the situation is less certain. Despite a range of opinions, a majority of observers have made the following predictions: Wen Jiabao, Zeng Qinghong and Wu Bangguo are likely to stay on the PBSC, while Luo Gan and Huang Ju almost certainly will retire. However, no two predictions have been exactly the same, as the following specific comments reveal: -- Luo Gan, Huang Ju to Go: All observers with whom we have spoken believe that Luo Gan, Secretary of the Political Science and Law Commission and already over 70, will retire, to be replaced by Politburo Member and Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang. (Xinhua editor Yu Jiafu, however, pointed out that, in replacing Luo, Zhou would not necessarily have to be elevated to the Standing Committee.) The ailing Huang Ju, believed to have cancer, rarely appears in public and is widely assumed to be slated for retirement this fall -- if he lasts that long. -- Wen Jiabao Likely to Stay, but Some Complaints: Most contacts assume that Premier Wen Jiabao will retain his spot on the PBSC (and as Premier). Li Fan, Director of the World and China Institute, told Poloff there was "no way" Hu Jintao could allow Wen to be sacked, given that the Premier is the most popular Chinese leader and the humane face of Hu's "harmonious society" policy. Wen's leaving would only undercut Hu's position, CASS's Dong separately declared. CPS Scholar Qin argued that both Hu and Wen are "absolutely secure" in their positions. Nevertheless, An Hongquan of the State Council Development Research Center thought Wen's future was "unclear," given complaints from the business community that Wen lacks the capability to effectively manage the economy the way former Premier Zhu Rongji did. What does appear to be clear from the prevalence of talk on the subject is that at least several other candidates are pretenders to the Premier's throne, including Hubei Party Secretary Yu Zhengsheng and all three Vice Premiers on the current Politburo. -- Zeng Qinghong, Likely to Stay, Portfolio Unclear: Several of post's contacts believe that influential Vice President Zeng Qinghong, who will be 68 at the time of the Party Congress, is likely to stay on the PBSC, though his portfolio could change. For example, CASS's Dong, CPS's Qin and Cao Huayin, Director General at the China Reform Forum (CRF),all thought it "highly likely" that Zeng would remain. They were dismissive of rumors reported earlier this year that Zeng was campaigning to replace Hu Jintao as Party General Secretary. Dong and Qin both predicted, however, that if Zeng does stay, his portfolio is likely to change, with Qin believing a change would only reduce his influence. In that sense, they found a separate Reuters report claiming that Zeng had been offered the largely ceremonial Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) chair to be plausible. In contrast, well-connected free lance journalist Chen Jieren predicted that Zeng will step down at the Congress, without offering a specific rationale. -- Wu Bangguo: Several contacts have argued that Wu BEIJING 00002190 003 OF 004 Bangguo, ranked number two in the Chinese protocol hierarchy, is likely to stay. Journalist Chen, Xinhua's Yu Jiafu and the Carter Center's Liu Yawei all shared this assessment. Liu claimed that Wu is nominally in charge of preparations for the 17th Party Congress, further strengthening his position. -- Jia Qinglin, Wu Guanzheng, Li Changchun? Opinion appears divided regarding the futures of Jia Qingling, Wu Guanzheng and Li Changchun. Some contacts, including journalist Chen Jieren and retired Party theorist Sun Changjiang have argued that all three will be forced to retire. Other contacts simply refused to speculate. Meanwhile, Fang Jinyu, Beijing Bureau Chief of the Guangzhou Nanfang Ribao Group, thought that all three would stay. Fifth Generation: Promotions in Store? -------------- ¶6. (C) The elevation of younger "fifth generation" leaders to the Politburo -- and perhaps its Standing Committee -- continues to be the subject of intense speculation. A list of "usual suspects" mentioned as promising members of this generation include Liaoning Party Secretary Li Keqiang, Jiangsu Party Secretary Li Yuanchao, new Shanghai Party Secretary Xi Jinping, Commerce Minister Bo Xilai, Chongqing SIPDIS Party Secretary Wang Yang and Zhang Gaoli, new Party Secretary in Tianjin. Several observers, such as SIPDIS University of Politics and Law Professor Yang Yusheng, have argued that Hu Jintao strongly wishes to get at least one fifth generation leader on the PBSC, the favorite being Li Keqiang. ¶7. (C) Recently, however, a range of contacts have argued that it is possible that no one from the fifth generation will make it to the Standing Committee this time around. Instead, Party leaders may elevate several young leaders to the Politburo, but not the Standing Committee, leaving the question of which of them rises to the PBSC -- and succeeds Hu Jintao -- to 2012 and the 18th Party Congress. For example, CRF's Cao Huayin emphasized that the fifth generation leaders are "too young and inexperienced" for immediate elevation to the PBSC and, in line with the center's emphasis on "collective leadership," a number of them will be elevated together to the Politburo now, but no further decision will be made on their futures until 2012. In separate conversations, CPS's Qin and Xinhua's Yu made nearly identical arguments. (Note: the Party Secretary appointments of the past week already give an initial hint of some fifth generation leaders who may make it onto the Politburo, but not the PBSC. Shanghai Party Secretary Xi Jinping almost certainly will be one. Zhang Gaoli, new Tianjin Party Secretary may get on as well, given that former Tianjin Party Secretary Zhang Lichang was a member. There has also been some talk of making the Shandong leadership position a Politburo slot, perhaps giving new Shandong Party Secretary Li Jianguo a shot at making the Politburo. End note.) Shrink Numbers on Politburo Standing Committee? -------------- -- ¶8. (C) Speculation, much of it conflicting, continues about possible changes to the number of PBSC members. Late last year and early this year, several contacts, including Xinhua's Yu Jiafu and CASS's Dong Lisheng, argued that Hu Jintao wanted to reduce the number of PBSC seats to seven, given the unwieldy coordination among nine members. More recently, however, CRF's Cao and CPS's Qin have implied that the likely "small-scale" changes at this fall's Congress may include leaving the PBSC at nine members. One observer was more explicit: Nanfang Ribao Group's Fang Jinyu asserted that, at a minimum, the PBSC numbers will stay at nine, claiming there was pressure from some quarters, particularly provincial leaders, to raise the numbers even higher. Other Politburo Members -------------- ¶9. (C) If a number of fifth generation leaders are to be appointed to the Politburo, then several current members will have to be retired to make way for the new blood. Contacts have pointed to a number of current Politburo members who are likely to retire, beginning with General Cao Gangchuan, who is already over 70. Others close to 70 and thus candidates to retire include Zeng Peiyan, Zhang Lichang and Wu Yi. Journalist Chen Jieren said it is "certain" that Wu Yi would step down this fall. Separately, Swee Fong Wong, a Singapore diplomat based in BEIJING 00002190 004 OF 004 Beijing, recently told Poloff that Wu Yi told her Singapore Vice Premier counterpart in August 2006 that she would probably not see him again, given that she was "likely to go" in 2007. There have been some recent indications, however, that Wu Yi herself is pushing to stay on (somewhere) in the leadership for another five years. ¶10. (C) A number of current Politburo members currently in their early to mid-sixties have been mentioned as candidates to move to the Politburo Standing Committee, assuming there will be openings there. Some contacts have referred to these leaders as members of the "fourth and a half" generation. For example, Yu Zhengsheng, Hubei Party Secretary, could move to the PBSC and become the senior SIPDIS Vice Premier, according to Xinhua's Yu Jiafu. Journalist Chen surmised that other Politburo and "4.5" generation members Zhang Dejiang, Hui Liangyu, Liu Qi and Wang Lequan all have a possible shot at making the Politburo Standing Committee. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Making predictions about personnel decisions at the top of China's opaque political system is an uncertain business, at best. We expect that rumors will continue to float (and be floated) with a view, in some cases, toward influencing the process. While much will be made of factional struggles and political jockeying among rivals, there is a notable uptick of recent opinion predicting fairly modest leadership changes. The recent appointment of compromise candidate Xi Jinping to replace the disgraced Shanghai Party Secretary is indicative of the kind of consensus outcome that has been the hallmark of Hu's leadership to date. Given Hu's style, his need to further consolidate his authority and maintain unity in the top echelon of the Party, he will likely move carefully to preserve some balance among China's top leaders. RANDT