BASRAH GOVERNOR'S FATE FURTHER DELAYED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000085 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/21/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS UK IZ SUBJECT: BASRAH GOVERNOR'S FATE FURTHER DELAYED REF: A. BASRAH 38 B. BASRAH 77 C. BAGHDAD 1773 D. BASRAH 66 E. BASRAH 83 BASRAH 00000085 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, A/Director, Regional Embassy Office - Basrah, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C/NF) Summary: Fadhila member Aqeel Talib told Regional Embassy Officers September 17 that the High Tribunal Court reviewing the Basrah Provincial Council's (PC) no-confidence vote against Governor Mohammed Wa'eli had closed the case and would issue a verdict around September 28. On September 6, PM Nouri al-Maliki prohibited the government from dealing with Wa'eli. Fadhila parliamentarians responded by requesting that Maliki stop interfering pending the court's decision. Fadhila refused Maliki's renewed offer to replace Wa'eli with a Fadhila member. Maliki then authorized Basrah's security chiefs to forcibly remove Wa'eli if the court ruled against him. Meanwhile, the British are now opening a dialogue with Wa'eli through Talib. End Summary. COURT WILL DETERMINE WA'ELI'S FATE -------------- ¶2. (C) Basrah PC member and Wa'eli confidant Aqeel Talib told us that the three-judge court reviewing the PC's no-confidence vote against Wa'eli had closed the case to further evidence on September 17 and would render a verdict around September 28 (ref A). According to Talib, the Court was tired of the PC constantly delaying the proceedings (ref B). Fadhila, he said, remained confident Wa'eli would win the case. FADHILA MEETS PM MALIKI -------------- ¶3. (C) Talib related that on September 6, Maliki's office instructed all government offices to stop dealing with Wa'eli. In response, Fadhila parliamentarians Dr. Sayid Hassan al-Shammari, Jaber Khalifah, Basim al-Sherif, and Dr. Ammar Tu'ma privately met with Maliki on September 10 and asked Maliki to stop using his office to remove the Governor. They asked that the Court resolve this issue and noted that the recent deployment of troops to Basrah came off as a Unified Iraqi Coalition (UIC) threat to forcibly remove the Governor. ¶4. (C) According to Talib, Maliki responded that he was not personally against Wa'eli, but he was under intense pressure from Dawa, Badr Organization, and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq to remove Wa'eli. Maliki again offered to give Wa'eli an 
ambassadorship and replace him with another Fadhila member. Talib said that Fadhila refused the offer because, in their view, Wa'eli did nothing wrong and the constitution did not allow the PM to replace a Governor. ¶5. (C/NF) Talib said, Maliki also told the Fadhila representatives that both the U.S. and the UK were putting pressure on him to remove Wa'eli. Senior Fadhila leaders, including spiritual leader Muhammed al-Yacubi, later met in Najaf to discuss the accusation of U.S. pressure, but ultimately decided Maliki was mistaken. We reminded Talib that this was a legal matter for an Iraqi court to decide, but while the case was pending we would continue to treat Wa'eli as Governor (ref C). JALIL PREPARED TO REMOVE WA'ELI WITH FORCE -------------- ¶6. (C) Basrah police chief, Major General (MG) Jalil Khalaf Shueil, confided to us September 18 that he and Basrah security chief General Mohan Hafith Fahad met with Maliki last week to discuss the possibility of forcibly removing Wa'eli (ref D). Jalil said "we will let the Court decide," but if the decision is against Wa'eli and he refuses to leave office, then Jalil is prepared to force the Governor out by "surrounding the city and cordoning off neighborhoods." Jalil called Wa'eli the "best of the worst" possible governors, but noted he was under Maliki's orders not to communicate with the Governor. BRITISH OPEN DIALOGUE WITH FADHILA -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) Talib told us that he met with UK Consul General Richard Jones, September 15 at their request. Talib said he confronted Jones about the UK's refusal to meet with Wa'eli and UK pressure on Maliki to remove the Governor (ref E). Jones, according to Talib, said that the UK supported the central government's position based on the Council of Minister's letter BASRAH 00000085 002.2 OF 002 telling Wa'eli to step down, the PC's vote against Wa'eli, and CPA Article 71. Comment: We have encouraged the British to meet with Wa'eli. Recently, MND-SE commander MG Graham Binns agreed with our approach and encouraged the Foreign Office to open a dialogue with Wa'eli in case he wins his court case. The FCO appear to have taken a more cautious approach by seeking out Wa'eli's right-hand man. End Comment. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) While Maliki may be under pressure from the UIC's Shi'a parties and has authorized the use of force against Wa'eli if necessary, Maliki appears content to let the Court decide Wa'eli's fate - if what Talib says is true. Talib opined that if Wa'eli were deposed by force, there would be violence in Basrah, especially between Fadhila and Badr, which has led efforts to oust Wa'eli. Although battalions from the north are bolstering Jalil's forces, a confrontation with Fadhila, reputed to have the largest militia, could indeed be messy. Maliki's opposition to Wa'eli may also have influenced Fadhila's withdrawal from the UIC and pushed Fadhila into the arms of the Sadrists (septel). End comment. HOWARD