BASRAH BADR CHIEF SAYS JAM BEHIND THE VIOLENCE; ASKS FOR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000059

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/2/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH BADR CHIEF SAYS JAM BEHIND THE VIOLENCE; ASKS FOR
"STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP" WITH THE USG

REF: (A) BASRAH 47; (B) BASRAH 56; (C) BASRAH 58; (D) BAGHDAD 2115; (E) BAGHDAD 2182

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CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth E. Gross, Acting Regiional Director, REO
Basrah, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (S) Summary: The leader of Badr Organization in Basrah,
Hassan al-Rashid, told the acting REO director that JAM is the
chief culprit for violence and should be strongly dealt with by
the new Basrah security chiefs. If the security apparatus and
Coalition Forces vigorously confront JAM, al-Rashid said he was
confident that it could be smashed within a month. He also
proposed that the USG begin discussions to form a special
relationship with Badr/ISCI. Al-Rashid said that this
combination could achieve most of the goals of both parties if
they work closely together. End Summary.

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VIOLENCE IN BASRAH - THE CAUSE AND THE SOLUTION
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2. (C) The acting regional director for REO Basrah on July 1
met with Hassan al-Rashid, a former contact and the leader of
Badr Organization. Renewing their acquaintance after an
eight-month absence from Basrah, the acting director asked
al-Rashid about the deteriorated security situation. Al-Rashid
laid the blame squarely on Ja'ish al-Mahdi (JAM). Emphasizing
that "security affects everything," he alleged that 70 percent
of the violence in Basrah is directly attributable to JAM. The
remaining 30 percent is typical of problems faced by every large
city. Al-Rashid said that given the fractured nature of JAM in
Basrah, talks with putative JAM leadership would not be
productive. He related that he had spoken to the former JAM
leader Abu Qadir (see Ref A),and he told al-Rashid that there
was no central command in JAM that could control cell leaders.


3. (C) Al-Rashid asserted that the weakness of the security
apparatus leadership was responsible for not containing or
eliminating JAM. The acting director asked about the new
security officials assigned to Basrah (see Refs B and C),and
al-Rashid replied that his early impressions of them are good
and that they are saying the right things. Adopting a
wait-and-see attitude, he suggested that time is needed to
determine whether they follow up their words with concrete
actions to improve security. If they work together and are
supported by Coalition Forces, al-Rashid predicted that they
could eliminate JAM in one month. Advocating a robust campaign
against JAM, al-Rashid compared the violence in Basrah to a bad
toothache -- the short period of intense pain experienced when
the tooth is pulled is necessary to remove the rotten tooth.


4. (C) Turning to the question of Basrah moving soon to control
of its own security (the PIC process),al-Rashid opined that it
would be ready to do so if the Basrah security forces united to
destroy JAM and forged a close relationship with Coalition
Forces. Noting that this still remained uncertain, he would not
suggest a possible date for Basrah to move to PIC. But if PIC
is successful, al-Rashid argued that a British withdrawal of its
military forces should be gradual rather than abrupt.

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"NEW" COALITION AND DESIRE FOR SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
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5. (S) Moving on to national issues, al-Rashid said that Badr,
the Islamic Supreme Council for Iraq (ISCI),Dawa, the main
Kurdish parties, and individuals from other political parties
are forming a new coalition in the Council of Representatives.
(See Ref. D.) Boasting that it will be very strong and will
play an important role, al-Rashid urged that the United States
support the coalition so that it could confront terrorists and
others opposed to the Government of Iraq. If the coalition
receives U.S. support, he said that it could achieve many of the
goals of the United States and Iraq.


6. (S) Al-Rashid took the conversation a step further with a
plea for instituting a closer relationship between the USG and
Badr/ISCI. He said that a majority of the leadership in
Badr/ISCI would like to develop a "major strategic relationship"
with the United States. Because of Badr/ISCI's good
relationship with Iran, al-Rashid said that the USG believes
that it cannot have a close association with Badr/ISCI.
Al-Rashid explained that the relationship with Iran was one of
necessity - under the previous regime, Iran supported and

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harbored those fighting against Saddam. These ties to Iran do
not mean that Badr/ISCI is beholden to Iran, al-Rashid asserted,
and Badr/ISCI is not loyal to the USG. But Badr/ISCI is anxious
to develop closer ties to the United States.


7. (S) Noting that Badr/ISCI enjoys good relations with both
Iran and the United States, al-Rashid said that its main concern
is the welfare of the Iraqi people. With its broad base of
popular support and the tacit backing of the religious leaders,
Badr/ISCI is well situated to work closely with the USG and
would like to gain its trust as have the Kurds and some of the
Sunnis.


8. (S) Al-Rashid said that he broached this with the acting
director in his capacity as part of the top leadership in Badr
and as an ISCI member. He said he had the approval of the
central leadership in Baghdad ("they welcomed the idea") to
raise the issue and that it had been put forth in Baghdad before
and cited Vice-President Adil Mahdi as one who had done so.
Al-Rashid suggested that a reply or discussion on this subject
continue in Baghdad where more details could be provided. The
acting director promised to pass his message on to Baghdad and
Washington.


9. (S) Comment: Hassan al-Rashid is a good contact of the
acting director, but in the past has been fairly circumspect in
his conversations. His assertion that JAM had to be eliminated
reflects both his long-standing concern over the security crisis
in Basrah and the long-term effects it is having on Basrah
citizens. He owns a house near the REO, but confided to the
acting director that he had to abandon it because of the volume
of IDF in the neighborhood. His house was hit twice by IDF, and
his four-year-old son now asks when he hears a mortar or rocket,
"is that JAM?" Al-Rashid said his family is in Iran visiting
some of the shrines and that he plans to join them soon. With
the lack of security in Basrah, al-Rashid said that your house,
car, and office become a prison, and he is looking forward to
joining his family and not worrying about possible violence to
them for a few days.


10. (S) Comment continued: Al-Rashid's entreaty for a
strategic relationship or increase in trust between Badr/ISCI
and the United States also was somewhat out of character for
him. Discussions with him in the past have steered clear of any
stronger association with the United States and were mostly
factual in nature. Al-Rashid made it clear that the development
of a stronger relationship with the United States is very
important to Badr/ISCI, and is likely part of its end-game to
situate itself in the driver's seat vis-`-vis OMS and Fadillah.
Embassy has an ongoing strategic dialogue with ISCE leaders in
Baghdad. During the most recent meeting (Ref E),ISCI leaders
and Embassy representatives agreed to seek concrete ways to
cooperate; Embassy will explore whether al-Rashid's proposal is
feasible. End Comment.
GROSS