NEW POLICE CHIEF ADDRESSES JAM, PERSONAL RUMORS

S E C R E T BASRAH 000058

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/28/2017
TAGS: PINS PTER MOPS IZ IR
SUBJECT: NEW POLICE CHIEF ADDRESSES JAM, PERSONAL RUMORS

REF: (A) BASRAH 55 (B) BASRAH 57 (C) BASRAH 56

CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Basrah's new police chief Major General Jalil Khalaf
Shueil met with the director of the Office of Provincial Affairs
and the director of the Basrah Regional Embassy Office (REO) on
July 27 to discuss his efforts to stabilize Basrah. Jalil said
his primary objectives are to reform his police force by purging
it of political and militia influences and to take on the Ja'ish
al-Mahdi militia. He said his serious crimes unit (SCU) and
intelligence unit are controlled by JAM. Jalil estimates the
number of JAM fighters in central Basrah to be at 400, and he
said given their disorganized structure, it will be easy to
infiltrate the force. However, he said the police are not yet
up to this task as many worry for the safety of themselves and
their families. (See ref. A.)


2. (S) Jalil has spent much of his first week meeting with
Basrah's leaders. He described the meetings as productive except
for his meeting with Office of Martyr Sadr (OMS) officials. He
said the OMS security director Abd-al-Sattar al-Bahadli warned
him not to order the police to shave their beards, and another
OMS official, Sayid Faleh, warned him against interfering with
the SCU or intelligence unit. (Note: Al-Bahadli was to have
accompanied the OMS cleric on his June 26 meeting with REO
officials, but the cleric opted not to bring a security guard to
maintain secrecy. (See ref. B.) End note.) Jalil described
his meetings with Governor Mohammed al-Wa'eli and Badr leader
Hasan al-Rashid as positive. He noted that both seemed
supportive of his efforts to combat JAM, as long as he does not
interfere with their interests. Jalil is also working to unite
the tribes in Basrah against the militias and their Iranian
supporters, but he is reluctant to arm the tribes because they
are not organized, prone to tribal conflicts, and could turn
against the government.


3. (C) The REO director told Jalil that the USG was committed to
supporting his efforts to stabilize Basrah. He mentioned to
Jalil that there were various rumors circulating Basrah about
Jalil's past. The director said that most of these rumors were
"none of [his] business," but he was concerned about rumors that
Jalil had provided material support to militias and disciplined
subordinates for arresting JAM members. Jalil did not
explicitly deny the rumors, rather he said that JAM members had
threatened him in the past. (Note: British sources are now
questioning the veracity of allegations against Jalil reported
in ref. C. End note.) Jalil added that the new Basrah JAM
commander, known as "Muntasser," recently threatened him for
implementing a curfew between 12:00 am and 5:00 am. The
director replied that it appears to be working as the REO has
lately not received rocket or mortar fire during these hours.


4. (C) The director told Jalil "your predecessor was afraid to
stand up to JAM, so we asked the Prime Minister to send us a
strong man. He sent us you. I hope you are up to this task."
The director said the USG is committed to supporting Jalil, but
Jalil will have to produce results. In response to Jalil's
previous request to delay provincial Iraqi control (PIC) by six
months (ref. C),the director said there is now discussion of
postponing PIC until October as opposed to previous plans for
August. The director assured Jalil that if he is able to show
progress, he could continue to count on the support of the USG.

BONO