NEW POLICE CHIEF ADDRESSES JAM, PERSONAL RUMORS

S E C R E T BASRAH 000058 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/28/2017 TAGS: PINS PTER MOPS IZ IR SUBJECT: NEW POLICE CHIEF ADDRESSES JAM, PERSONAL RUMORS REF: (A) BASRAH 55 (B) BASRAH 57 (C) BASRAH 56 CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy Office, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Basrah's new police chief Major General Jalil Khalaf Shueil met with the director of the Office of Provincial Affairs and the director of the Basrah Regional Embassy Office (REO) on July 27 to discuss his efforts to stabilize Basrah. Jalil said his primary objectives are to reform his police force by purging it of political and militia influences and to take on the Ja'ish al-Mahdi militia. He said his serious crimes unit (SCU) and intelligence unit are controlled by JAM. Jalil estimates the number of JAM fighters in central Basrah to be at 400, and he said given their disorganized structure, it will be easy to infiltrate the force. However, he said the police are not yet up to this task as many worry for the safety of themselves and their families. (See ref. A.) ¶2. (S) Jalil has spent much of his first week meeting with Basrah's leaders. He described the meetings as productive except for his meeting with Office of Martyr Sadr (OMS) officials. He said the OMS security director Abd-al-Sattar al-Bahadli warned him not to order the police to shave their beards, and another OMS official, Sayid Faleh, warned him against interfering with the SCU or intelligence unit. (Note: Al-Bahadli was to have accompanied the OMS cleric on his June 26 meeting with REO officials, but the cleric opted not to bring a security guard to maintain secrecy. (See ref. B.) End note.) Jalil described his meetings with Governor Mohammed al-Wa'eli and Badr leader Hasan al-Rashid as positive. He noted that both seemed supportive of his efforts to combat JAM, as long as he does not interfere with their interests. Jalil is also working to unite the tribes in Basrah against the militias and their Iranian supporters, but he is reluctant to arm the tribes because they are not organized, prone to tribal conflicts, and could turn against the government. ¶3. (C) The REO director told Jalil that the USG was committed to supporting his efforts to stabilize Basrah. He mentioned to Jalil that there were various rumors circulating Basrah about Jalil's past. The director said that most of these rumors were "none of [his] business," but he was concerned about rumors that Jalil had provided material support to militias and disciplined subordinates for arresting JAM members. Jalil did not explicitly deny the rumors, rather he said that JAM members had threatened him in the past. (Note: British sources are now questioning the veracity of allegations against Jalil reported in ref. C. End note.) Jalil added that the new Basrah JAM commander, known as "Muntasser," recently threatened him for implementing a curfew between 12:00 am and 5:00 am. The director replied that it appears to be working as the REO has lately not received rocket or mortar fire during these hours. ¶4. (C) The director told Jalil "your predecessor was afraid to stand up to JAM, so we asked the Prime Minister to send us a strong man. He sent us you. I hope you are up to this task." The director said the USG is committed to supporting Jalil, but Jalil will have to produce results. In response to Jalil's previous request to delay provincial Iraqi control (PIC) by six months (ref. C),the director said there is now discussion of postponing PIC until October as opposed to previous plans for August. The director assured Jalil that if he is able to show progress, he could continue to count on the support of the USG. BONO