PRT BASRAH: LESSONS LEARNED: JUNE 2006 - JUNE 2007

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000054 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID PGOV IZ UK SUBJECT: PRT BASRAH: LESSONS LEARNED: JUNE 2006 - JUNE 2007 BASRAH 00000054 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. The Basrah Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is a multinational PRT under British direction. This cable records the observations and lessons learned by the U.S. deputy team leader, James Donegan, during his deployment period, June 2006 to June 2007. It is being recorded in this informal, unclassified manner in order to allow maximum distribution among SIPDIS the various Coalition partners who contributed to the team's financial and personnel resources. It is important to note that the paper is not to be read as U.S. policy. It represents the deputy team leader's individual observations. ¶2. SUMMARY OF MAIN OBSERVATIONS -- All members of the PRT, whether from government agencies or employed through contractors, should have the same terms of employment and reporting chain. -- The Basrah PRT team leader should be assigned from HMG's Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). -- The PRT should take the lead in developing a strategy for transitioning control of projects and programs to organizations that will potentially have a longer term presence in the province. -- We should think creatively about ways to leverage our reconstruction and capacity building programs in the province to support the "empower the moderates" efforts ongoing countrywide. ¶3. BACKGROUND The Basrah PRT was established on 9 April 2006 and reached full operating capacity on 17 July 2006. It is a British-led, multinational team and has included members from the United Kingdom, the United States, Denmark, Australia, and Canada, as well as locally engaged Iraqi staff. The PRT was originally structured with a UK team leader and three deputies, one each from the United States, Denmark and the United Kingdom, who coordinated the governance, rule of law, economic and infrastructure work streams. The original organization chart had a structure of 38 individuals plus local staff spread across the streams, although in reality the team never reached more than 25, plus locals. ¶4. MANAGEMENT Staffing and management of personnel issues presented significant operational challenges during the deployment period. The multinational nature of the PRT and the percentage of contractors from various sources meant that there were numerous arrangements regarding leave and conditions of assignment with which PRT management had to grapple when trying to provide coverage and continuity for the various work streams. At times, staff members would be tasked by their respective home agencies, and in some cases lifted from theater or have leaves extended, to perform tasks unrelated to PRT business. Recommendation -- All members of the PRT, whether from government agencies or employed through contractors, should have the same leave conditions. (Note: Most of the PRT members are assigned by the FCO which provides two weeks of leave for every six weeks worked. End note.) As a condition of joining the team, it should be recognized that during the deployment period, members should be seconded to the PRT and report through the chain to the team leader. Sending organizations should not remove members for other duties during the deployment period. The team was originally located at the Basrah Palace Compound with the U.S. Regional Embassy Office and British Embassy Office. Due to the increase in volume and accuracy of indirect rocket and mortar fire, the team was forced to relocate to the Basrah Air Station, or the Contingency Operating Base (COB),as it is now known, in November 2006. The team established a satellite office in Kuwait while accommodations were prepared at the COB. Due to limited space at the COB, the team had to downsize to approximately 18 members, and has restructured the hierarchy to a team leader, a deputy team leader and three coordinators for the work streams. Strategic Communications has recently been added as the fifth work stream. Originally, the team was structured with a team leader who was contracted by HMG's Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit. While the individual was an outstanding leader and brought significant experience in southern Iraq to the position, his lack of a direct tie to the government structures in London at times left the PRT out of the loop on certain issues, particularly in regard to long-term comprehensive policy-making decisions. The BASRAH 00000054 002.2 OF 003 current team leader is "double-hatted" as deputy consul general in the British Regional Embassy Office. This has given the PRT a direct link to the UK policy and decision-making apparatus, both in Iraq and London, and has served to make the PRT an essential component of the "comprehensive approach." It also more closely reflects PRT configurations throughout the rest of the country, where State Department Foreign Service officers fill the team leader positions. Recommendation -- The Basrah PRT team leader should be assigned from the British FCO. The current "double-hatted" configuration is working well, but should the PRT grow substantially (unlikely given the move toward Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC)), consideration should be given to the option of an FCO officer being assigned full time to the PRT. ¶5. PROGRAM PROGRESS Despite the inevitable loss of momentum linked to the relocation and the inherent inefficiencies related to the security environment, particularly the inability to meet with Iraqi interlocutors in town, the PRT has made progress in furthering its main objectives, which include: -- Preparing for the application of the rule of law; -- A detailed provincial development strategy; -- Developing the basis for functioning self-administration, especially in financial systems and managing public works; and -- Creating the foundation for private sector-led economic growth, by stimulating key components, coordinating labor-intensive infrastructure programs, and removing barriers to trade and development. In specific work streams, over the past year, the PRT has successfully implemented the following: ¶A. Governance - Institutional Reform -- Development of an effective model for donor engagement with machinery of government, adopted by the Provincial Council (PC). -- Mentored four provinces to create provincial development strategies (seen as best practices by Ministry). -- Focused the PC development budget for 2006 on core activities and provision of essential services. -- Supported the PC's development plans for 2007 spending. -- Used Economic Support Funds (ESF) to further build capacities of PC, Provincial Reconstruction and Development Committee (PRDC) and Sector Working Groups. ¶B. Economic Development -- Facilitated a visit by representatives of 10,000 farm cooperatives to Kuwait to lobby for the easing of trade barriers. -- Established several business organizations to promote private sector development and compiled the Business Investment Guide for Basrah. -- Provided support for restructuring two state-owned enterprises, fertilizer and petrochemical plants. ¶C. Infrastructure and Public Works -- Compiled the database of donor programs for 2007 in Basrah Province. -- Developed the concept and achieved buy-in by the PRDC for the Basrah Public Works Initiative. ¶D. Rule of Law -- Secured funding for Basrah Central Courthouse and Basrah Central Prison. -- Developed a "Human Rights Passport" designed to give law enforcement officials portable access to HR standards. -- Delivered legal, forensic and human rights training to judges BASRAH 00000054 003.2 OF 003 and lawyers. As the province moves toward PIC and the subsequent drawdown of military and PRT assets, it will be important to address protection of the many gains we have made with the PC and other public and private institutions. Part of the "Better Basra" review process should include a strategy for transitioning responsibilities for the programs and projects listed above to institutions that will have a long-term presence in the province, such as USAID, UNDP, and NGOs currently operating out of country but poised to return once the security environment allows. Recommendation -- Upcoming milestones (the handover of Basrah Palace and/or PIC) should trigger a comprehensive review of "Better Basra" and its associated programs and benchmarks. An additional section should be added to map out a strategy for transitioning control of projects and programs to organizations that will potentially have a longer presence in the province, such as UNDP. ¶6. LEVERAGE The international community dedicates significant financial resources to reconstruction and capacity building efforts in Basrah. Recent experience has shown that the governor and provincial council will engage with U.S. and UK representatives in the province as it suits them, often choosing to disengage if they perceive it to be politically expedient. Recommendation -- We should think creatively about ways to leverage our reconstruction and capacity building efforts, as well as ESF, for the province to support the "empower the moderates" efforts ongoing countrywide. ¶7. CHALLENGES Looking forward, there are a number of challenges to the success of the PRT programs, which will have to be considered and, where possible, addressed. -- Accessing Iraqis and Iraqi institutions: We currently do not travel to town due to the security environment, but our interaction with Iraqi interlocutors using facilities at the commercial airport has proved quite successful. -- IDF: Increasing accuracy and volume. We will have to monitor closely the impact of IDF at the COB when turning over the Basrah Palace to the Iraqis in August. -- Intimidation of local staff: We will have to balance the requirement to obtain information on the local environment with the need to keep staff safe. -- GOI national versus provincial strategies: We must continue to work to narrow the gap in provincial-central government coordination and communication. BONO