IRAQI ARMY OPENS TALKS ON FUTURE OF BASRAH PALACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000035 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/30/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MOPS IZ IR SUBJECT: IRAQI ARMY OPENS TALKS ON FUTURE OF BASRAH PALACE REF: (A) BASRAH 31, (B) BAGHDAD 1451, (C) BASRAH 17 BASRAH 00000035 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Louis Bono, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy Office, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. The commander of the Iraqi Army's (IA) 10th division in charge of southern Iraq, Major General Habib Abbas al-Husseini, met with the Basrah Regional Embassy Office (REO) director on April 25. The two discussed efforts to stabilize the province and prospects for the IA taking control of the Basrah Palace Compound after the REO relocates to the Basrah Air Station. General Habib expressed interest in garrisoning troops in Palace Compound and declared that he is committed to aggressively countering the militias, despite being understaffed and inadequately equipped. The REO considers the IA 10th division, under General Habib's command, to be the best hope for stability in Basrah and recommends steps to support the division. End summary. REO, IA LAY TENTATIVE PLANS TO TRANSFER BASRAH COMPOUND ¶2. (C) General Habib said the housing trailers, equipped with furniture, plumbing, showers, televisions and air conditioning, would be welcomed by his troops, many of whom now sleep on bare floors. But he said that at his current force level, he does not have enough troops to occupy the Palace Compound while continuing to man other installations in Basrah that the British forces recently turned over to him. General Habib said that he has 2,000 troops under his command in Basrah province and has requested troop transfers from the IA 8th division. He said he needs 5,000 troops to stabilize the province. ¶3. (C) The REO director and the general discussed a two-pronged approach to secure the Palace: First the general will to continue to press the Ministry of Defense for additional troops to occupy the Compound. If this is not possible, the general will relocate his troops from the Old State Building and the Shatt al-Arab Hotel to the Basrah Palace Compound. (Note: The Old State Building could go to the Provincial Council and the hotel, to the Tourist Board. End note.) General Habib and the REO director agreed to meet again in the near future to discuss details of the proposed handover. 10TH DIVISION SHOWS PROMISE IN HANDLING DEMONSTRATIONS ¶4. (C) Regarding the security situation in Basrah, the general said he has deployed his forces at the oil fields, ports, government buildings, main traffic intersections and other key points in Basrah Province. To maintain order during demonstrations April 16-17 aimed at toppling Governor Mohammed al-Wa'eli (ref A),the general said he had imposed a ban on weapons in the streets. He added that the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) in Basrah were useless during the demonstrations and that the 10th Division had been forced to take over IPS duties as a result. General Habib declared that his units have stepped up raids on militia leaders and warned that his actions may provoke heavier militia rocket and mortar fire at the Palace Compound. The director praised him for offering promotions to troops who capture or kill militia fighters caught in the act of launching rockets and mortars. [In contrast to Basrah, other units of the IA 10th Division stationed in neighboring Muthanna Province have performed poorly. (Ref B)] The general informed the director that his forces are hampered by lack of telecommunications equipment and must rely on commercial cell phones to coordinate their operations. Unlike other IA units that operate in American sectors, he said, the 10th division receives little material support from the Coalition. When asked what he needs, he requested radios, uniforms and Humvees. GENERAL HABIB SOLICITS SUPPORT FROM TRIBAL LEADERS ¶5. (C) General Habib reported that he has had an initial meeting with tribal leaders to request their support for the IA's effort to stabilize Basrah. In the general's assessment, the sheikhs made some positive suggestions but no firm commitments. (Note: On February 21, REO, British Consulate and British military officials met with 25 tribal leaders to urge them to mobilize their members to stabilize Basrah. On that occasion, the majority of the sheikhs pointed the finger of responsibility for Basrah security at the Coalition Forces. (See ref C.) End note.) ¶6. (C) Comment: The REO and the British forces within MND-SE see General Habib as the best hope for stability in Basrah and the IA as the only reliable element of the central government capable of maintaining the Palace. Under General Habib's command, the IA is demonstrating a growing capacity to maintain security as Basrah moves toward Provincial Iraqi Control. In BASRAH 00000035 002.2 OF 002 the REO's assessment, all logistical support should be given to the 10th Division, including the provision of radios, uniforms or vehicles as requested by General Habib. This would go a long way towards building relations between the soldiers of the 10th and the USG. On the issue of tribal involvement in security efforts, the REO believes it would be useful to bring together U.S. military officers from Anbar and British officers to discuss the role tribal leaders have played in securing Anbar province. End comment. ¶7. (C) British Brigade intelligence assessment of General Habib: "Habib appears to be a competent commander of the 10th Division in comparison to his predecessor Latif. He is keen to establish a security plan with MNF but believes that to achieve the desired effect he will require the use of soldiers from outside the province, as those local to Basrah could be subjected to intimidation from the militia. It is believed that Habib has no real respect for Ali Hammadi in his role as head of the Emergency Security Committee and regards Mohammed Hammadi as incompetent. Habib also has aired his frustrations over the lack of progress in the Iraqi Police Service, probably due to the level of corruption and lack of effectiveness. "General Habib is two months in post. He is a 'high' Shia and commands a great deal of respect from the tribal leaders and from his officers. By his no nonsense approach and his insistence on high standards, he has already had a significant impact on the Division. Knowledgeable, experienced and professional, he is determined to confront all forms of crime and insurgency across his divisional area of operations and -- within the bounds of Arab culture -- appears to be free of corruption. His only stated interest is to raise the capability of the 10th Division of maintain security in Basrah and more widely across the area of operations, and while he has yet to demonstrate effect on the ground, he appears to be the best thing to have happened to the 10th Division in the last three years." End comment. ¶8. (C) General Habib's Biographical Information Full name: Habib Talib Abbas Musa al-Husseini Date of birth: 1 July 1958, Babil Province (Abu Gharaq area) Enlistment date: 12 November 1977 Commissioning date: 6 January 1980, Military College as a Lieutenant Appointments Platoon Commander Company Commander Commander of Corps Reconnaissance Regiment Instructor in the Military College Staff Office in Brigade HQ Staff Officer in Division HQ Staff Office in Corps HQ Brigade Commander Deputy Divisional Commander, 8th Division Units 1st Mechanized Division Staff College 4th Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division 425th Infantry Brigade, 22nd Infantry Division HQ 22nd Infantry Division HQ 17th Armored Division HQ 28th Infantry Division HQ Reconnaissance Regiment, 5th Corps HQ 3rd Corps Personal Lives in Nasariya Married with four children BONO