REO BASRAH EAC MEETING ON 04/14/2007

S E C R E T BASRAH 000029

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, NEA/EX, NEA/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/16/2017
TAGS: ASEC PTER AMGT IZ
SUBJECT: REO BASRAH EAC MEETING ON 04/14/2007

REF: A) BASRAH 026, B) BASRAH 023

CLASSIFIED BY: Dan Wilhelm, ARSO, REO Basrah, Department of
State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)



1. (S) Summary and Introduction: The Regional Director chaired
a meeting of the expanded Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on
April 14, 2007 to discuss the continuing incidents of indirect
fire (IDF),including the attack of April 13, in which four
housing trailers were damaged, and three personnel narrowly
avoided serious injury. Attending the meeting were the Acting
Regional Security Officer, Management Officer, Information
Management Officer, Public Affairs Officer, Acting ORA Chief,
and representatives from the Strategic Counter-Intelligence
Directorate (SCID),KBR, and Triple Canopy. The Committee
resolved to continue the course of action decided upon at the
last EAC meeting (April 10. See ref. A). It was agreed that
more could be done at all levels to expedite the move to the
Basrah Air Station (BAS),and that more should be done to
protect the personnel at the Basrah Palace compound while
preparations for the move are underway. To limit the likelihood
of casualties at the Palace compound, the Committee agreed that
the REO needs to press for a better offense, while at the same
time, improving our defense. End summary.


2. (S) The EAC members agreed on the need to "weather the storm"
in order to effectuate an "organized and timely move" as first
put forth in ref. A. The RSO and Director explained that in
order to do so, we need to further minimize the exposure of
personnel to IDF. The RSO explained that the practice of
overstaying the prescribed time limits spent in the trailers,
the wearing of only ballistic plate-carriers (smaller, lighter
vests),and unfastened helmets is insufficient protection
against the more frequent and accurate IDF that we have been
receiving. He therefore announced that more stringent controls
would be put into place. Personnel will be permitted to spend
up to three, one-half hour blocks in their trailers, but must
sign in and out. (The previous policy was up to one hour at a
time in trailers.) Personnel will also be required to properly
wear their full PPE whenever outside of hardened cover. The
Director and RSO explained that a "zero tolerance" policy would
be in effect for those who choose to disregard these personal
protective measures. To alleviate some of the stress, we are
working to install satellite television in all of the hardened
buildings and are acquiring individual hardened accommodations
on the FCO compound, which we will be made available to REO
personnel.


3. (S) The Committee also expressed frustration over the delay
in the relocation process. We appreciate the extensive
attention and assistance we have received from the Department
and Embassy Baghdad, particularly the Management Office. We are
aware that there were obstacles in commencing construction of
the overhead cover project (OHP) at the Parsons camp and were
told it would commence on April 15. However, construction has
been delayed pending a notice to proceed to the contractor. We
are living on borrowed time, and each day this move is delayed,
the risk of death or serious harm to REO personnel increases.
We therefore request that the process for the OHP and funding
for the relocation project be approved with all due speed. The
latter will enable KBR to commence the modifications to the
Parsons camp necessary to accommodate the REO, notably life
support facilities, and begin transferring equipment to the Air
Station.


4. (S/NF) We also note the increase in counter-IDF activity by
MND(SE)and appreciate Embassy Baghdad's support in acquiring
additional resources for this purpose. (See ref B.)
Nevertheless, with the closing of three other British bases in
Basrah, attacks on the Palace compound are not subsiding. This
creates the perception that no efforts are being made to counter
the attacks, and severely impacts upon morale. We are
consulting with MND(SE) to see if additional assets, such as
close-air fire support, would assist in curtailing IDF attacks.
If so, we would appreciate Embassy Baghdad's support in securing
these assets during the transition process.


5. (S) The Director held a "town hall" meeting for all personnel
on April 14. The Director, RSO and Management Officer discussed
the situation. As in the past, the Director emphasized that,
for all personnel, their continued presence at the REO is
voluntary. The RSO reiterated that every person at the REO
should be made aware that if the level of IDF attacks continues,
it is probable that casualties, including deaths could occur.
Personnel expressed concerns about the additional restrictions
and the Director and RSO advised they would revisit the
situation later this week.

BONO