GOVERNOR'S OPPONENT PLANS STREET ACTION

S E C R E T BASRAH 000025

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR IZ
SUBJECT: GOVERNOR'S OPPONENT PLANS STREET ACTION

REF: A) Basrah 024 B) Basrah 023

CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) The head of Thar Allah in Basrah, Sayid Yusif al-Batat,
met with the director of the Regional Embassy Office (REO) on
April 9 and informed him that thousands of people are planning
to take to the streets of Basrah on April 16 in a bid to oust
Governor Mohammed al-Wa'eli from office. Sayid Yusif, a sworn
enemy of the governor, said the demonstrators plan to set up an
encampment outside the governor's office with follow on plans to
launch a civil strike. He hinted that if this does not work,
they would resort to violent means to achieve their objective.
Sayid Yusuf refused to say who he supports to replace al-Wa'eli,
but his close friend, Defense Ministry advisor Majid al-Sari,
who accompanied Yusif, suggested "Sayid Hashem" as a possible
replacement. Al-Sari gave no further details.


2. (C) Thar Allah, which means vengeance of God, is an
Iranian-backed political organization/militia, with limited
popular support, that seeks to impose an Iranian-style
theocracy. Sayed Yusif told the REO director that it is useless
for the Coalition to try to promote democracy and stability by
engaging with the elected officials of Basrah. (Note: Sayid
Yusif is a member of the Basrah Provincial Council, but he
boycotts the council meetings. End note.) He asserted that a
large portion of the billions of dollars that the United States
and Coalition partners have spent in southeastern Iraq on
reconstruction have ended up in the pockets of politicians. In
addition to enriching crooks, the Thar Allah leader said, the
corruption has alienated the Basrah public from the Coalition.
He said, in contrast, Iran has been more effective in generating
goodwill by meeting with the public and donating funds directly
to universities, hospitals and other civic institutions in
Basrah. He urged the Coalition to do likewise. (Note: The
high security threat makes it is extremely difficult for REO
staff to conduct meetings in Basrah. (See ref. A.) End note.)

3. (C) Sayed Yusif encouraged the director to meet with
Iranian officials to discuss security in Basrah. At Majid
al-Sari's suggestion, he offered to set up a luncheon meeting
between the REO director and the Iranian consul general in
Basrah. The director said that U.S. policy prevents him from
speaking directly with Iranian officials, but he suggested that
Sayid Yusif convey the message to the Iranian CG that the United
States is on a mission of peace in Basrah. The director added
that Iran's recent abduction British sailors has dimmed Iran's
credibility as a serious partner for international dialogue.


4. (S/NF) Comment. It is difficult to gauge Sayid Yusif's
credibility or the extent of his influence, but his report of a
possible coup attempt is consistent with other reports that
rival militias are plotting against the Governor and his
Fadillah milita. (See reftel.) If true, this is just another
dark omen that Basrah may be descending into civil war as local
groups vie for power to fill the vacuum created by the
reposturing of the British forces. It is also noteworthy that
Majid al-Sari, a vocal opponent of Iranian influence in the
region, has such close ties with an Iranian proxy. Perhaps this
just reinforces the cliche that all politics are local. End
comment.

BONO