BASRAH'S SHEIKHS TO OFFER POLICE RECRUITS

S E C R E T BASRAH 000120 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2017 TAGS: MCAP MOPS PGOV PINR PINS PREL PTER IZ SUBJECT: BASRAH'S SHEIKHS TO OFFER POLICE RECRUITS CLASSIFIED BY: Hal Howard, A/Director, Regional Embassy Office - Basrah, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 7. ¶2. (S/NF) Summary: Basrah's leading tribal sheikhs and Police Chief met December 17 with Regional Embassy Officers to discuss how the tribes could contribute to improving the province's security situation. The Police Chief, MG Jalil Khalaf Shueil, is prepared to hire approximately 1,500 new officers from the tribes based on the nominations of the tribal leaders. The sheikhs agreed with the idea, in principle, and resolved to form a council to work through the nomination procedures. Jalil and the sheikhs requested USG assistance in convincing the GOI that they were not forming an unauthorized militia or an "Awakening Council", but rather providing recruits to the legitimate GOI police force. End Summary. ¶3. (S/NF) Basrah's Police Chief, MG Jalil Khalaf Shueil, and tribal sheikhs Amr al-Fais, Sabah Ka'an al-Maliki, Abdul Karim al-Dosari, and Mansur al-Tamimi met December 17 at our invitation to discuss tribal contributions to Basrah's security. Jalil began by noting that the Iraqi Police (IP) was infiltrated by political party militias, that he was transferring untrustworthy officers out of the province, and that he needed new, reliable officers. The sheikhs could help by nominating approximately 1,500 tribesmen to the IP. He opined it was unfortunate that the GOI has disregarded the traditional balance the tribes provide because the parties fear any tribal opposition. Jalil noted that he was under pressure from Minister of Parliamentary Affairs Dr. Safa al-Safi to take 1,200 recruits with militia ties into the IP, but doing so would make the police worse not better. He ended by encouraging the tribes to provide trustworthy recruits. ¶4. (S/NF) The tribal sheikhs were supportive of this initiative, but expressed some concerns. A more inclusive body of tribal sheikhs was needed, Basrah's more troublesome northern tribes (originating from Amarah) may need to be excluded, nominated tribesmen needed to be educated, and the initiative should for now remain secret. They expressed concern that the GOI might view this effort as subverting Baghdad's authority and result in a backlash against them. POLOFF allayed their fear by noting that this was not a tribal "Awakening", but a method of hiring IP officers that fell under the legitimate authority of Jalil and should therefore, be acceptable to Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. ¶5. (S/NF) Participants resolved the following: -- to meet among themselves after Eid al Adha (December 19) to determine how to form a tribal council that would nominate the tribesmen to the IP, how many tribesmen each tribe could nominate, and the nomination procedures; --to write a document whereby each sheikh vouches for the tribesmen they nominate; -- to select a delegation to present this plan to the PM and GOI; -- and to use their influence with Baghdad political parties and contacts to win support for their initiative. ¶6. (S/NF) All participants requested that the U.S. support their effort by convincing the GOI, and PM Maliki in particular, that their initiative is not a tribal "Awakening" or even a Concerned Local Citizen's group. Instead, they pointed out that they were supporting the GOI and the rule of law, their initiative was done with the full cooperation of Jalil, and that they were merely nominating future IP officers they vouched for and Jalil could trust. U.S. intervention would also be needed to dissuade the GOI from forcing Jalil to accept Safi's militia recruits. ¶7. (S/NF) Comment: This is a sound initiative to help provide Jalil with a cadre of officers that will be free from political/militia affiliation, responsive to his commands, capable of confronting the militias if necessary, as well as providing jobs to the disaffected tribes, and deserves our support. We request that Embassy Baghdad use the points in paragraph 6 to gain PM Maliki and the GOI's support for this initiative. We also request that Embassy Baghdad discourage the GOI from forcing Jalil to accept the 1,200 militia members identified by Safi for Basrah's police force. End Comment. HOWARD