S/I SATTERFIELD HELPS BASRAH GOVERNOR AND PRIME MINISTER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000114 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/3/2017 TAGS: ECON PTER PGOV PREL MARR MOPS IR IZ SUBJECT: S/I SATTERFIELD HELPS BASRAH GOVERNOR AND PRIME MINISTER IMPROVE RELATIONS REF: A. A. BASRAH 113 ¶B. B. BASRAH 110 ¶C. C. BASRAH 93 ¶D. D. BASRAH 96 ¶E. E. BASRAH 97 ¶F. F. BASRAH 98 ¶G. G. BASRAH 88 BASRAH 00000114 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Hal Howard, A/Director, Regional Embassy Office - Basrah, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d) ¶1. (S/Rel MCFI) SUMMARY: Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq (S/I),Ambassador David Satterfield, encouraged Basrah Governor Mohammed Wa'eli to contact and work through Iraqi National Security Advisor (NSA) Muwafaq al-Rubaie as an intermediary to improve the Governor's relations with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in advance of planned December 16 Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) taking place, during a November 25 visit to Regional Embassy Office (REO)- Basrah. Wa'eli agreed (and subsequently traveled to Baghdad for ongoing discussions with Rubaie and the PM). Satterfield also discussed a range of issues with other key Basrawis including reconciliation among local political parties, security in the province, the economy, and Iranian influence. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C/Rel MCFI) In advance of a visit by Deputy Secretary John Negroponte to REO Basrah on November 25, S/I David Satterfield met with a range of key Basrawis (each in a separate meeting) to discuss general conditions in the province. The participants included Basrah Governor Mohammed Wa'eli, Basrah Operations Commander Lieutenant General Mohan Hafith Fahad, Police Chief Major General Jalil Khalaf Shueil, and Sheikhs Amr al-Fais, Mansour al-Tamimi, and Sayid Abd al-Mousawi. BRINGING WA'ELI AND MALIKI CLOSER ¶3. (S/Rel MCFI) S/I Satterfield told Governor Wa'eli that with the Higher Juridical Council's ruling in Wa'eli's favor and the Governor's status finally settled, all parties needed to respect the decision and it was now inappropriate for the GOI to exclude Wa'eli from the Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) process planned to take place December 16 (Refs A-C). Satterfield informed Wa'eli that, as a result of a November 25 USG-UK-GOI dialogue, PM Maliki authorized NSA Rubaie to speak with the Governor as an intermediary. Satterfield encouraged Wa'eli to seize this opportunity to improve relations with Baghdad and quickly contact Rubaie. Wa'eli agreed; he subsequently traveled to Baghdad for discussions with Rubaie and the PM. ¶4. (S/Rel MCFI) LTG Mohan told Satterfield that he was ordered by Maliki not to turn over the security portfolio to Wa'eli at the PIC ceremony because the Emergency Law placed all Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) under Mohan's control (Ref D). (Note: According to Embassy Baghdad Legal Advisor, Mohan's authority under the Emergency Law may have expired. End Note). Satterfield said that may be true for security, but stressed it was not useful for the GOI to continue ignoring the Governor's political and administrative responsibilities, especially after the court settled the matter. Mohan agreed that his work would be easier if Wa'eli and Maliki resolved their differences. Unfortunately, he opined that Maliki would find it difficult to step back from previous statements deposing the Governor. Satterfield responded that we would continue to bring the two parties together. LOCAL PARTY RECONCILIATION ¶5. (C/Rel MCFI) S/I Satterfield asked the Governor about reconciliation among Basrah's political parties. Wa'eli responded that his Fadhila party was working with the opposition Basrah Islamic List (BIL) to identify a democratic path towards a power-sharing arrangement (Refs B & E). He also noted that the Sadrists made a positive declaration to support the ISF, punish criminals in their ranks, and obey the law. He lamented that if the leaders of the BIL parties in Baghdad stopped interfering, the local parties would get along much better. For his part, Wa'eli said he is ready to do development projects with all the parties to make Basrah better. SECURITY IN BASRAH PROVINCE ¶6. (S/NF) Interlocutors expressed deep concern for Basrah's security and according to Mohan, the province was not ready for BASRAH 00000114 002.2 OF 002 PIC. Each participant noted that the Iraqi Army (IA) was mildly better than the Iraqi Police (IP),but neither was capable of facing down the militias (Refs F & G). The police were still beholden to the political parties, infiltrated by militias, and responsible for committing crimes. Police Chief Jalil emphasized this by stating that the army, not the police, needed to impose the rule of law. That said, Wa'eli noted that Basrah's sole IA division was not sufficient. ¶7. (S/Rel MCFI) Mohan claimed some progress has been made in reforming the ISF by transferring the worst units out of the province, restructuring his command to limit party influence, and noted the increases in ISF activities and arrests. However, there was still a long way to go, he surmised. He and Jalil described their intentions to continue reforming the ISF by transferring and purging, step-by-step the malign elements from their forces. Both lamented the lack of support they were receiving from the GOI to improve their forces. Mohan mostly blamed the Interior Ministry for either ignoring their requests or being too slow to respond. Satterfield said he would communicate their requests to MNF-I. ECONOMY ¶8. (C/Rel MCFI) Wa'eli stressed the economic and geo-strategic importance of Basrah given its oil resources, Iraq's only port facilities, and shared border with Iran. Basrah's resources could greatly assist Iraq's economic development, but were not sufficiently leveraged due to the weak security environment. Wa'eli said he wanted to pursue Basrah's economic and security improvements on parallel tracks starting in the safer areas close to the Gulf. ¶9. (SBU) As one of Basrah's leading businessmen (and a respected Shi'a cleric),Mousawi told Satterfield that the economy was in chaos. Some were benefiting from new developments, but unemployment remained high, temporary jobs failed to provide long-term security, the Ministry of Planning was weak, incomes were unpredictable, and the security situation discouraged economic development and foreign investment. Both Mousawi and Wa'eli suggested passing the investment law as a step forward, but Mousawi said security needed to improve first. (Note: the Basrah Development Forum is scheduled for December 12 at Basrah Airport. End Note.) IRAN ¶10. (S/Rel MCFI) Every interlocutor complained of Iran's negative influence. Jalil said Iran uses various means, each like an octopus tentacle, to slowly gain control of Iraq. Politically, Mohan claimed that 90 percent of Basrah's parties are under Iranian influence, notably Badr/Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (who he called the "sons of Iran"),Hizbollah Movement, Thar Allah, Sayyid al-Shuhada, and to some extent Dawa. Wa'eli pointed out that Iran pressures these parties to integrate their militias into the ISF so that the IRGC can control them. ¶11. (S/Rel MCFI) On the intelligence front, Wa'eli and Mohan said that Basrah's Iranian Consul, Mohammed Rida Baghaban, is an IRGC-QF intelligence officer; Mohan called Baghaban the "real decision-maker in Basrah." Not only is the Iranian consulate an intelligence headquarters, there are several branches throughout the province. Mohan, Wa'eli and Jalil all claimed that Iranian-supported secret cells were targeting them for assassination, and in Wa'eli's case the Iranian-backed parties were behind the efforts to oust him. Each interlocutor expressed concern over Iranian training, financial, and logistical support for some militias. ¶12. (S/Rel MCFI) Tamimi also noted the extraordinary amount of Iranian investment in Basrah. Culturally, he said that Iran used Shaheed al-Mihrab in Amarah and Sayyid al-Shuhada in Basrah to spread the Iranian revolution's ideology through exhibits, conferences, book publishing, educational programs, teacher exchanges, and funding clerical salaries. Basrawis were divided: a majority opposed Iran, but were silent due to intimidation; a small minority who once lived in Iran were already indoctrinated; and the remainder were the parties and militias beholden to Tehran. Iran opens its borders to Iraq, while the other neighbors are shutting them. If this continues and the Coalition does nothing, Tamimi opined we would loose that silent majority. ¶13. (U) S/I Satterfield cleared this cable. HOWARD