PRINCE OF THE MARSHES GIVES TOUR DE HORIZON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000112

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PINR EAID IR IZ
SUBJECT: PRINCE OF THE MARSHES GIVES TOUR DE HORIZON

REF: BASRAH 27

BASRAH 00000112 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)


1. (S) SUMMARY: The famed Abu Hatem, (aka "Prince of the
Marshes") visited the Regional Embassy Office on November 16.
Having closely dealt with USG agencies in Iraq for several
years, he observed the need to improve interagency coordination
and expand our contacts in the rural areas. He opined that Iran
wants to kick the Coalition out of Iraq by using the Jaysh
al-Mahdi as a proxy and then export the Iranian revolution via
the Badr Organization and Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. He
suggested that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki was too close to
Iran for Iraq's own good. He provided his vision for a tribal
force, which he said must have ties to the central government.
He added that militias control Maysan, criticized reconstruction
efforts as being ineffective, and praised Basrah's Chief of
Police. End Summary.

U.S. AGENCIES NEED BETTER COORDINATION IN IRAQ


2. (S) Abu Hatem (real name Karem Mahud al-Muhammadi) began by
pointing out his close working relationship with the entire
gambit of the USG - including diplomats, the military, and
Congress - over the last four years. As a result, he has
concluded "each agency in Iraq is doing its own thing without
coordinating with the others" and unfortunately, soldiers paid
the price when information was not shared. Solid intelligence
was critical to the success of not only our military operations
but also necessary to keep U.S. policy-makers informed. In this
respect, he recommended that U.S. expand its contact base beyond
the cities and into the rural areas.

IRAN


3. (S) He said that Iran's short-term objective is to kick the
Coalition out of Iraq and over the long-term, export its Shi'a
revolution throughout the Middle East. Iran has co-opted the
Jaysh al-Mahdi to achieve its short-term goal and uses the Badr
Organization and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq for the
long-term prize. He opined that Iran and Al-Qaeda arrogantly
believe they can defeat the Coalition in Iraq as they did with
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.


4. (S) Abu Hatem fell just short of calling PM Maliki an
Iranian. He said that Maliki asked him to form a tribal
confederation throughout southern Iraq, but he refused, telling
Maliki he should first form a legal committee to save Iraq from
government corruption. He added, "How can I be in a bloc the PM
wants when he would have it infiltrated by Iran on the first
day?" Abu Hatem opposes the inclusion of Dawa, 15 Shabaan,
Sayyid al Shuhada, and ISCI in such a bloc. When it came to
Iran, Maliki works both above and below the table, he claimed.

TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT


5. (S) Abu Hatem next related his vision for a tribal force in
southern Iraq to thwart Iranian weapons smuggling, help
stabilize the security environment and provide employment.
Initially, an intelligence cell should be formed to vet recruits
and identify smuggling routes. The force would be comprised of
three battalions totaling 1500 men from various tribes. He
cautioned that they needed to be properly budgeted for and fall
under the authority of the Ministry of Defense or Interior (and
eventually integrated into the ISF).

THE SITUATION IN MAYSAN


6. (C) He described security in Maysan as weak. The militias,
he said, were in control because the Iraqi Security Forces fear
confrontation. He told us the tribes asked the Provincial
Council to disband the militias, but the officials either fear
or have ties to the militias. Maysan's politicians often tell
him "a coward policeman is better than a dead one." Abu Hatem
rolled his eyes when it came to the Governor Maliki, saying he
had JAM cells at his disposal and used them for assassinations.

RECONSTRUCTION


7. (C) Abu Hatem said that billions of dollars have been spent
on reconstruction, yet Maysan has not seen any improvements
because of Provincial Council corruption and graft. Water
filtration systems and playgrounds in the villages would be more
beneficial in Maysan than multi-million dollar projects. He
also said Maysan needs a mobile medical clinic to service the
rural villages. By demonstrating tangible improvements to

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Iraqis, a reconstruction program could also combat Iranian
influence. He cautioned however, that security was more
important and essential to economic growth.

"SUPPORT MG JALIL"


8. (C) He praised Basrah Chief of Police, Major General Jalil
Khalaf Shueil, noting the irony as the two had fought against
each other in the past. What matters to Abu Hatem is that Jalil
is a nationalist trying to stand up to the militias. He opined
that Jalil's inner circle was infiltrated by Iranian-backed
militias that need to be purged. He told Jalil to vet his
officers and diplomatically transfer the bad ones away so as not
to make any more enemies. Jalil may have survived multiple
assassination attempts, but his death would be a loss for Basrah.
BONO