APPEAL OF GOVERNOR'S CASE IMPEDES RECONCILIATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000110 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2017 TAGS: PGOV MOPS IZ IR SUBJECT: APPEAL OF GOVERNOR'S CASE IMPEDES RECONCILIATION REF: (A) BASRAH 93 (B) BAGHDAD 3776 BASRAH 00000110 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy Office, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request; please see paragraph 8. ¶2. (C/Rel MNCI) SUMMARY: Basrah's Badr leader, Hasan al-Rashid, expressed optimism that increased dialogue among local political parties was improving the political environment. He characterized the Sadrists' recent engagement with the Provincial Council (PC) as encouraging and added that despite Badr complaints that Governor Mohammed Wa'eli (Fadhila Party) is not sharing power, both parties are meeting to smooth things over. Wa'eli, however, is skeptical of Badr's intentions, but said he would seek to make amends with the opposition and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who advocated for his removal. Unfortunately, Wa'eli's opponents in the PC have appealed the September 30 court decision in Wa'eli's favor, thus complicating reconciliation efforts. End Summary. SADRISTS ENGAGING PROVINCIAL COUNCIL & BADR MEETING FADHILA -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C/Rel MNCI) Hasan al-Rashid (Badr),a leader of the Basrah Islamic List (BIL) in the Provincial Council (PC),began our November 13 meeting by noting that the political climate in Basrah is improving due to increased dialogue among the parties. He said the Sadrists were renouncing violence and moving towards reconciliation because: (1) they lost ground in Diwaniyah, Nasiriyah, and Karbala; (2) ISCI leader, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, pressured Iran to have Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) cease attacks against Badr; and (3) because of the Badr/ISCI - OMS committees set-up by al-Hakim and Muqtada al-Sadr. As a result, and thanks to British encouragement, the Sadrists created a dialogue committee with the PC. Al-Rashid admitted that dealing with the Sadrists was difficult but hopes these initiatives keep them on the political track. ¶4. (C/Rel MNCI) Al-Rashid also told us that Badr/ISCI and Fadhila are holding discussions in Baghdad, and these discussions would determine the framework for relations in Basrah. So far, Badr noticed increased Fadhila cooperation, and as a good faith gesture, Badr decided not to appeal the September 30 court decision in favor of Governor Wa'eli (ref A). Al-Rashid cautioned, however, that Fadhila should not overplay its hand or an appeal was still possible. He noted that Fadhila was "having internal problems" and predicted that in one year, Fadhila would have less influence over Basrah's government, zero presence in the central government, and little strength in the southern provinces. ¶5. (C/Rel MNCI) Al-Rashid said the rift between BIL and Wa'eli (and hence Fadhila) was not about money per se, but about the Governor's power over the administrative institutions that control Basrah's resources. From Badr's perspective, Wa'eli could hold onto the governorate, but needed to stop ignoring the other parties and equitably distribute power. He said Fadhila was making political errors because it was a "young party," but it needs to learn from its mistakes. FADHILA'S WA'ELI DOUBTFUL, BUT SEEKS RECONCILIATION -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C/Rel MNCI) Governor Wa'eli seemed oblivious to any Fadhila problems on the horizon when we met with him on November 15. Emboldened by his court victory (and recent liposuction surgery),Wa'eli bragged, "I've knocked them [BIL] out. Trying to get rid of me is a lost cause." He expressed doubts that Badr would reconcile with him given their Iranian tethers. Despite this, Wa'eli confirmed that Fadhila was negotiating with Badr, and he was trying to make amends with his opponents. He noted that BIL members visited him while he was recovering from his surgery, and for his part, he invited a BIL member to accompany him to the dedication of a new library. He also plans to request, through an intermediary, a reconciliation meeting with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who advocated against him. Wa'eli was uncertain if the Prime Minister would receive him, but agreed it was necessary to improve relations with the central government as Basrah approaches Provincial Iraqi Control. ¶7. (C/Rel MNCI) On November 19, Wa'eli informed us that Maliki directed his Dawa Party colleague, PC Chairman Mohammed al-Obadi, to file an appeal. Another PC member later confirmed BASRAH 00000110 002.2 OF 002 that an appeal has been filed. Wa'eli lamented that the High Tribunal Chief Midhat al-Mahmoud, a close ally of Maliki and ISCI leader al-Hakim, was already examining the Administrative Court's September 30 decision. Wa'eli said that "other procedures" existed for him should another court over-turn the Administrative Court's ruling. He believes Maliki's actions are being driven by the United Iraqi Alliance and Iranian interests. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C/Rel MNCI) Wa'eli and al-Rashid's comments highlight how bumpy the road to reconciliation will be when both believe that they are in the driver's seat. The appeal complicates matters further by putting Wa'eli up against the wall and disrupting reconciliation with BIL. UK officials agree that an appeal is unhelpful, increases party tensions, and may derail reconciliation. Still, there are encouraging signs: the Sadrists are speaking to the PC; the parties are talking to each other; and according to UK officials, al-Rashid opposed the appeal. We continue to press the parties not to make disruptive moves, to engage in dialogue, and for the Governor to reconcile with Maliki. We request that Embassy Baghdad likewise continue to encourage the Prime Minister to reconcile with Wa'eli to ensure a smooth transition at PIC (ref B). End Comment. BONO