ISF-JAM CLASHES PREVIEW BASRAH PIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000102 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/1/2017 TAGS: PINS MARR IZ SUBJECT: ISF-JAM CLASHES PREVIEW BASRAH PIC REF: (A) BASRAH 99 (B) BASRAH 100 BASRAH 00000102 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, Basrah Regional Embassy Office, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C/REL MNF-I) Summary: On October 26, Police Chief Major General Jalil Khalaf Shueil provided Regional Embassy officers (REO) with an account of the recent clashes between Iraqi security forces (ISF) and Jaysh al-Mahdi fighters (JAM). (Ref. A) While the Iraqis were able to resolve the conflict without Coalition support, Jalil's testimony underscores that the ISF in Basrah are still no match for JAM. End summary. ¶2. (C/REL MNF-I) Jalil said that at approximately 1100 on October 23, Iraqi National Police confiscated an unlicensed SUV with tinted windows at the al-Junaynah checkpoint. The SUV belonged to Thamer Tarteip (aka Abu Abdullah),an advisor for the Ministry of Transportation employed at the Umm Qasr port, and a JAM leader. (Note: Umm Qasr is reputedly controlled by JAM. End note.) The driver was arrested and was taken with the vehicle to the 6/2 National Police Headquarters, located at the former Naval Building on the Shatt al-Arab. ¶3. (C/REL MNF-I) Shortly thereafter, Tarteip sent a delegation to Jalil to demand the return of the driver and the SUV, which they claimed was an official Port Authority vehicle. In return, they offered Jalil a deal: if Jalil would allow the militia unfettered movement throughout Basrah, militia members would not attack the police. Jalil told them that Tarteip must honor the rule of law and insisted on an official letter from the Port Authority to verify ownership of the vehicle. ¶4. (C/REL MNF-I) At approximately 1320, gunmen attacked the al-Junaynah checkpoint. Two members of the National Police were injured and two others were kidnapped. This was followed by coordinated attacks against several checkpoints. JAM fighters also overtook the National Police headquarters, freed the driver and commandeered several vehicles, including two Humvees, as well as weapons, ammunition and communications equipment. About 50 police were taken hostage. (Note: There are conflicting reports that two other police stations were over taken and that some soldiers were also taken hostage. End note.) Jalil said GEN Mohan was slow to respond. He claimed that Mohan could have released Iraqi soldiers from the 1st of the 14th who were located "minutes" from the Police HQ, but he failed to do so. ¶5. (C/REL MNF-I) Between 1600 and 1630, Sheikh Khadim al-Ghatrani, leader of the Basrah al-Ayan Tribal Council, and other tribal leaders approached JAM and OMS leaders to resolve the conflict. They then approached Jalil and arranged for him to meet with the JAM and OMS leaders, including Sheikh Bakir, the reputed leader of JAM. Jalil insisted on the immediate release of his police officers and the return of his vehicles, weapons, and equipment. Around 1700 hostages were ordered released, and JAM withdrew from the police headquarters and checkpoints, but only the two Humvees were found, and none of the weapons or communications equipment was returned. ¶6. (C/REL MNF-I) On Wednesday, October 24, several masked gunmen attacked Jalil's motorcade as it was departing the al-Maghez market. The following day, October 25, a Sadrist delegation from Najaf called on Jalil to "promote peace and cooperation." Jalil refused to meet with the delegation because he "did not have authority from GEN Mohan" and in order "to appear strong." He did speak to them by telephone and listed four conditions for JAM: (1) disarm, (2) respect the rule of law, (3) turn over the attackers, and (4) do not interfere in police matters. ¶7. (C/REL MNF-I) Jalil said that the National Police officers stood and fought with JAM but were overwhelmed. As for the performance of local police units, Jalil said they failed. If anything, the local police and local IA troops assisted the JAM fighters. Jalil said he has little confidence in his local police force. Indeed during the meeting he received a phone call reporting that a person was kidnapped and placed into a police vehicle. ¶8. (C/REL MNF-I) Comment: The events of October 23-25 provide some insight into what Basrah may look like under Iraqi control. On a positive note, Mohan and Jalil did not have to resort to Coalition ground forces, and upon request, they received Coalition UAV and fast air cover (albeit late, according to Jalil). The Iraqis also demonstrated a willingness and ability to quickly resolve the conflict. On the other hand, the Jaysh al-Mahdi served notice that it is still a powerful force in BASRAH 00000102 002.2 OF 002 Basrah and is willing to openly confront the ISF when ordered. Further, local contacts have decried the ISF's performance as abysmal. This calls into doubt the ISF's ability to implement Mohan's security plan. (Ref. B) BONO