THE GAMBIA: MILITARY COOPERATION WITH IRAN

S E C R E T BANJUL 000281 SIPDIS SIPDIS DAKAR PLS PASS ODC, DAO, AND RAO E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS GA IR SG SUBJECT: THE GAMBIA: MILITARY COOPERATION WITH IRAN REF: A. DAKAR 1144 (NOTAL) ¶B. BANJUL 197 ET AL ¶C. DAKAR/DAO MSG IIR 6 886 0045 07 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH STAFFORD, REASON 1.4 (B AND D) ARMS DEAL WITH IRAN? -------------- ¶1. (S) We note, per ref a, indication from GOS that Iran has agreed to supply arms to the GOTG. We also note previous reporting in other USG channels of possible Iranian weapons deliveries here. While Gambian officials deny any weapons deal with the Iranians, a well-informed journalistic source told us that Gambian President Yahya Jammeh, during his December 2006 trip to Iran, visited arms factories. This source concluded that Jammeh "likely" reached some sort of an agreement with the Iranians on military cooperation involving arms as well as training, but had no specifics and could not confirm Iranian arms deliveries to The Gambia. MILITARY TRAINING -------------- ¶2. (S) Our source did confirm that Iranian military advisers -- he estimated their number at 15 -- continued to train Gambian forces near President Jammeh's home village of Kanilai (see ref b for previous reporting). He went on to corroborate a recent report in a foreign-based online "journal" (reported in ref c) that the Iranians were not providing standard military training, but rather were focussing on such areas as commando operations and counter-insurgency warfare. The source added that those receiving the training were elements of a special militia unit established by Jammeh and included some Senegalese personnel from the Casamance. COMMENT -------------- ¶3. (S) Little is known about the Presidential militia force at Kanilai, but we find credible the reports of its expansion in past months -- following the abortive coup plot here in March 2006 -- and of Jammeh turning to the Iranians to provide it with special forces-type training, and possibly weapons. In addition, like the GOS, we do not rule out the possibility of Jammeh channelling Iranian-supplied weaponry to hard-line Casamance rebel elements opposed to peace efforts. END COMMENT STAFFORD