FORMER PM ANAND DOWNBEAT ON ADMINISTRATION BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000940

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM TH
SUBJECT: FORMER PM ANAND DOWNBEAT ON ADMINISTRATION BUT
OPTIMISTIC ON EVENTUAL RETURN TO DEMOCRACY

REF: 06 BANGKOK 5832 (ANAND ON COUP)

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Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun told the
Ambassador he was concerned by the Surayud administration's
lack of competence. In a February 14 lunch hosted by the
Ambassador, Anand suggested the cabinet should be reshuffled.
He did not object to the current political role played by
the Generals who launched the September coup. He expressed
contempt for deposed Prime Minister Thaksin but did not feel
Thaksin could stage a political comeback. Anand suggested
the authorities should begin moderating public expectations
for constitutional reform. Conditions in the South appeared
to be improving, but it would take years for violence to
taper off. He expressed concern that the King had few
friends or trustworthy advisors. He appeared satisfied with
the state of the U.S.-Thailand relationship. End Summary.

NO CONFIDENCE IN THE CABINET
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador, hosting Anand for lunch on February
14, opened the discussion by asking whether he remained as
hopeful about the post-Thaksin era as he had appeared in
their September 21 meeting (reftel). Anand flatly replied,
"no," saying he was "quite concerned." Anand expressed great
disappointment with Prime Minister Surayud's cabinet, saying
it included a half dozen people whom he (Anand) would never
have appointed. He identified Thirapat Serirangsan,
Dhipawadee Meksawan, and Nitya Pibulsonggram as among the
weaker figures, although he generalized that the cabinet
consisted of "all lightweights, if not flyweights." While
Deputy Prime Minister Pridiyathorn Devakula had previously
struck Anand as a potential Prime Minister, he had managed to
commit political suicide with a series of policy blunders.
Overall, Anand said, the administration had "no national
agenda, no strategy, no management skills, and no guts."


3. (C) It would have been better for General Sonthi
Boonyaratglin to have appointed a Prime Minister with a
civilian background, Anand suggested. Doing so would have
allowed Sonthi to dismiss the Prime Minister if necessary and
establish a new, more effective cabinet. Because of
Surayud's military background, and his recent service on the
Privy Council, it was politically impossible for the Council
for National Security to push Surayud out of office. While
Anand respected Surayud's integrity, he complained Surayud
had failed to coordinate the cabinet's work and impose a
sense of collective responsibility.


4. (C) Both Surayud and Sonthi were somewhat shy, Anand
noted, and they did not know how to maneuver in political
circles. Given his own experience as a successful two-time
appointed Prime Minister, Anand decried the failure of
(unnamed) key administration figures to consult him until
late January.


5. (C) Citing Anand's recommendation in September that the
coup council dissolve itself after appointing the civilian
government, the Ambassador asked Anand's assessment of the
present role played by the Council for National Security
(CNS). Anand observed that the CNS's role was not very
significant, but he said the situation might worsen if the
Generals were to abandon their current political
responsibilities, since the civilian administration was so
weak.

THAKSIN AND THAI RAK THAI
--------------


6. (C) Anand said he was relatively unconcerned about the
prospects of loyalists of deposed Prime Minister Thaksin
sabotaging the referendum on the new constitution (likely to
take place this fall). He believed Thaksin -- whom he
considered a "pathological liar" -- would prove unable to
resurrect his political career, having been fully discredited
by his own missteps and blunders. Nevertheless, Anand
recommended that Surayud spend more time visiting the
Northeast and other pro-Thaksin areas. Surayud should not
only adopt an agenda popular with the rural voters, but he

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should employ a no-holds-barred approach -- similar to
Thaksin's -- in order to discredit the former regime. This
could be done most effectively by showing that Thaksin had
been anti-Royalist.


7. (C) The Ambassador asked Anand's view of recent defections
from the Thai Rak Thai party (septel). Anand said he did not
trust these old style politicians; they were all corrupt and
"part and parcel of the Thaksin regime." In the future, they
should be marginalized.

CONSTITUTION
--------------


8. (C) Asked to provide his views on the draft charter, Anand
stressed that the constitution should improve the system of
checks and balances, and strengthen traditions essential to
democracy, like freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
A constitution was not sufficient to provide democracy,
however, as Thailand would also have to develop values such
as accountability for public officials. The Thai people
could not expect a perfect constitution, Anand noted -- any
draft would have loopholes, and the authorities should work
now to moderate popular expectations. Anand hoped that the
Constitution Drafting Assembly would see its role as
improving the 1997 Constitution, rather than starting from
scratch. He also predicted that the fight over whether
Buddhism should become the state religion would prove
draining, as it had during the drafting of the 1997
constitution (which Anand chaired).

SOUTH
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9. (C) Anand said he had had occasion to speak with Surayud
recently, at a large gathering, and he had conveyed to
Surayud that the government's policy toward southern Thailand
was on the right track. It would be important to convey to
the Thai people that they could not expect an instant
solution, and violence would continue. Anand envisioned a
five year timeframe to bring the situation in the South back
to one of relative normalcy. He acknowledged that he did not
know well the current situation in the South, but he stated
that both Buddhist and Muslim leaders there welcomed
Surayud's visits. With Thaksin-era "ultra-rightists" (like
Samak Sundaravej and Dusit Siriwan) no longer stoking a "hate
campaign," nationwide ethnic tension had decreased.

PALACE
--------------


10. (C) Anand said he was less concerned about the King's
physical health than about his ability to receive objective
advice and to benefit from the company of friends. Anand
remarked that half the people who work at the Palace did so
only to acquire status and peddle influence; only around
one-third of those at the court were there solely out of
devotion to the King. He said the King was lonely and, for
the most part, could not select the people with whom he
spends his time. Anand considered it fortunate that the King
still benefited from the company of Princess Sirindhorn every
evening.


11. (C) The Ambassador asked Anand about rumors that he had
turned down an offer to join the Privy Council. After a
long, poker-faced pause, Anand noted that if he were to
accept such a position, he would have to give up his
positions on various corporate boards, in order to avoid a
perception of possible conflicts of interest. He also would
have to accept limitations on his ability to present his
views publicly. Finally, he did not feel drawn to the
ceremonial aspects of such duties.

U.S. POLICY
--------------


12. (C) The Ambassador requested Anand's view of the
U.S.-Thai relationship. Anand said he disagreed with USG
actions in Iraq, but he had no qualms with America's policy
toward Thailand. He asked whether it might be possible for
Surayud to be invited to Washington. The Ambassador replied
that no such invitation would likely be forthcoming.
Nevertheless, the USG remained committed to friendly
relations with Thailand. The Ambassador noted his

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expectation that U.S. forces would join the Cobra Gold
military exercise this year. He added that, if the
administration wanted to improve the climate with the USG, it
should lift martial law throughout the country.

COMMENT
--------------


13. (C) Had Surayud or other top administration figures
flattered Anand by soliciting his views, he might have been
less blunt in his criticism. Nevertheless, we believe his
derision is not simply the product of a bruised ego, but
warranted by the administration's lack of focus and lame
performance. While history is unlikely to assess Surayud's
government as approximating Anand's, we believe the key
measure of success for this interim administration is not how
capably it manages affairs of state, but whether it promotes
a peaceful and orderly return to democratic governance. On
that most important issue, Surayud may still succeed.
BOYCE