SOUTHERN DIALOGUE FACILITATOR GIVES OPTIMISTIC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 006281 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MLS NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2032 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH SUBJECT: SOUTHERN DIALOGUE FACILITATOR GIVES OPTIMISTIC READOUT ON BAHRAIN TALKS REF: A. BANGKOK 06161 (SURAYUD TALKS TO THE BRN-C) ¶B. BANGKOK 03846 (UPDATE ON JUNE PEACE TALKS) ¶C. BANGKOK 00938 (DIALOGUE MOVES FORWARD) ¶D. BANGKOK 04083 (FIRST RTG MEETING WITH PULO) BANGKOK 00006281 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: On December 26 a representative from the Henri Dunant Center (HDC) -- the organization facilitating talks between the Thai government and southern Thai separatist groups, briefed the Ambassador on the status of the on-going dialogue. According to the representative, the mid-December talks in Bahrain between Prime Minister Surayud and representatives of the BRN-C and PULO were extremely successful but the negotiations are now on hold while a new government is formed. In response to a question regarding the wisdom of making the dialogue public, the Ambassador advised the representative against it because of the current sensitive stage of the negotiations. The representative believes the process has taken on momentum, but that Prime Minister Surayud is key to its success. End Summary. Impact of the Election ¶2. (S/NF) Michael Vatikiotis (strictly protect),from the Henri Dunant Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC),on December 26 briefed the Ambassador on the latest round of HDC sponsored meetings between the RTG and the separatist groups BRN-C and PULO in Bahrain, December 10-12. (Note: See reftel A for a read-out Prime Minister Surayud gave the Ambassador on this meeting. Vatikiotis asked that we strictly protect this information as the RTG does not want him to brief the USG about his efforts to facilitate this dialogue. End note.) According to Vatikiotis, the southern peace talks, while in limbo after the December elections, are taking on momentum and HDC is being embraced by the Thai government as the facilitator that can best help them end the violence in the south. The process, however, depends on Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont, and there are questions as to whether it, and the progress made recently during talks in Bahrain (see reftel A),will survive when the next government comes into power. Vatikiotis believes a PPP-led government may not a bad thing for resolving the violence in southern Thailand because it would likely be advised on security in the south by supporters of former PM General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. The Democrats, on the other hand, told Vatikiotis they would appoint Chuan Leekpai as a special envoy for the south. He advised the Democrats that Chuan would be a poor choice for special envoy because of his prior history in dealing with the south and the continuing distrust of southern Thai Muslims. Vatikiotis is optimistic and believes Surayud will still be a player in the process after the new government is formed. (Note: General Chavalit, both before and during his tenure as Prime Minister, and again as Deputy Prime Minister under the Thaksin administration, was a proponent of moderation in dealing with the conflict in southern Thailand. Former PM Chuan Leekpai is known in southern Thailand for his harsh policies in trying to bring a similar upsurge in violence in 1998 under control. End note.) Should the Talks be Public ¶3. (S/NF) Regarding the current state of the process, Vatikiotis said Dr. Mark Tamthai, Surayud's advisor on the talks, wants the dialogue and meeting in Bahrain to be made public. He asked the Ambassador whether this would be advisable. Vatikiotis believes there may be some merit in making it public because there are multiple tracks of negotiations happening at the same time, which calls into question the legitimacy of the HDC track. For example, Vatikiotis cited an effort by Deputy Prime Minister General Sonthi and Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence General Kasem Yuktavira. According to Vatikiotis, Sonthi and Kasem believe the only way to solve the situation is by force and support negotiations only so they can identify and BANGKOK 00006281 002.2 OF 003 neutralize the militants. Vatikiotis said Kasem in particular supports the violent tactics of the Thai Rangers. Kasem and Sonthi represent the dark side of dealing with the insurgency. Surayud is doing this for the right reasons, Vatikiotis stated, but Sonthi is trying to undermine Surayud's efforts. Surayud is the only one approaching the process with sincerity, Vatikiotis concluded. ¶4. (S/NF) In answering the question, the Ambassador compared the southern Thailand process to Aceh. On numerous occasions after meeting with the GAM, Indonesian officials went public with the effort, saying the insurgents had agreed to give up the idea of separation from the state. GAM would then publicly deny it had done so and the negotiations would lose steam. Based on that experience, the Ambassador said, he felt that going public at this point would poison the process. If the militants say in private they are willing give up separation, there needs to be on-going negotiations to explore alternative scenarios and requirements to move to the next step of actually giving up the their demands for separation. Publicity could hamper that effort. Vatikiotis agreed. Bahrain and Beyond ¶5. (S/NF) Vatikiotis believes the meeting in Bahrain was very successful in moving the reconciliation process forward. Surayud was careful not to deny or play down the sense of injustice the separatists felt about the treatment of Muslims in the south, and listened patiently to the separatists' concerns. For their part, the separatists worked for two days on a joint statement about the meeting that was surprisingly moderate in tone. The harshest wording was that the separatists were being treated like guests in their own country, and that the RTG should stop "pretending" if it wanted peace. According to Vatikiotis, the statement also said "You say you want a peaceful approach, but then you don't do anything." Vatikiotis said the BRN-C representative tried to harden the edge of the meeting at the closing by pressing allegations about a specific incident. According to Vatikiotis, "autonomy was in the air," but not mentioned. The meeting lasted only one hour, and was conducted in Thai and Malay, with Vatikiotis translating. He said if the meeting had lasted another half-hour, he believes the atmosphere would have improved even more and both sides would have started to speak Thai. ¶6. (S/NF) Surayud and Dr. Tamthai have changed the composition of the group empowered to represent the Thai government and to take control of the dialogue with the insurgents, Vatikiotis said. The old committee, which had Sonthi and Kasem as members, has been discarded (See reftel C). Foreign Minister Nitya Pibulsonggram accompanied the Prime Minister to Bahrain for the official visit, which provided cover for the talks, and the Prime Minister used the time with the Foreign Minister to bring him around to the concept of a dialogue with the insurgents, although Nitya did not attend the actual meeting. Nitya is now a proponent of the process, but Foreign Ministry Permanent Secretary Virasak Futhakul is not as enthusiastic. Virasak tried to stop the meeting in Bahrain because he felt Surayud was being "reckless". Vatikiotis, however, believes Surayud would not have attended the meeting without support from the King. ¶7. (S/NF) Responding to questions about Surayud's comment to separatist representatives in Bahrain that Malaysia could play a useful role in the process to end the violence (see reftel B),Vatikiotis said Malaysia's role was confusing because of the number of governmental organizations trying to play a part. He reiterated previous statements that the Malaysian External Intelligence Organization was less than helpful, and that Wan Abu Bakar Omar, Director General of Task Force 2010, was not trusted by the militants. According to Vatikiotis, Surayud asked Mark Tamthai to meet with Task Force 2010 in order to better control Malaysia's involvement, BANGKOK 00006281 003.2 OF 003 and to marginalize a similar unit, Thai Task Force 960, headed by General Kasem. The Next Step ¶8. (S/NF) To build on the momentum of the Bahrain meeting, Vatikiotis said he suggested to Surayud that he release immediately a specific prisoner as a sign of good faith. Vatikiotis said the person he has in mind has been in prison for a while, is older, and does not represent a threat. He believes Surayud has ordered the NSC to initiate the release process. If it happens, it will demonstrate the RTG can follow through on a promise and the militant leaders will no longer be able to claim the RTG lacks sincerity and cannot deliver on promises. Vatikiotis said he also suggested to Surayud the NSC issue progress reports on the specific issues brought up in the dialogue. These issues include the removal a corrupt and abusive police officer stationed in the south, a report on the incident brought up by the BRN-C at the end of their meeting, and the release of the prisoner. (Note: It was not clear who the intended audience for the progress reports would be. End note.) Vatikiotis reiterated that Surayud is key to the process, which Vatikiotis believes has reached another level, and that Surayud may have plans to stay engaged in the south when he leaves office. ¶9. (S/NF) Comment: Surayud has struck us all along as having good instincts on the south. As Prime Minister he tried to pursue the right course, even in the face of criticism. That said, his days are numbered and it is unclear whether the incoming government will follow his lead on resolving the southern conflict or try another approach. If Surayud is interested in staying on in some sort of special envoy position, the idea would have great merit. ENTWISTLE