TOP FIVE THINGS THAT MAY (OR MAY NOT) HAPPEN AFTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 006226

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TH
SUBJECT: TOP FIVE THINGS THAT MAY (OR MAY NOT) HAPPEN AFTER
THE THAI ELECTIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: Despite all the polls and
predictions, no one is sure how the epic struggle between
supporters of former PM Thaksin and his equally-determined
opponents will turn out. Sunday's election so far appears to
be a genuine horserace, with vigorous campaigning underway.
Looking beyond the election, we cannot make any categorical
predictions. On balance, we believe that a Democrat-led
coalition government is slightly more likely that other
outcomes, but only slightly. Other possible outcomes (PPP-led
coalition, minority party-led coalition, serious failure by
the Election Commission) carry a high risk of provoking a
political stalemate or other very undesirable results,
including the possibility of military intervention. Below we
review possible outcomes, in roughly descending order of
probability. We will encourage all the players to ensure the
fairest possible election and abide by the results. End
summary and introduction.

HAPPY ENDING
--------------


2. (C) For the Bangkok elite, at least, the happy ending
would have the Democrats clearly winning enough seats to form
the nucleus of a government. This is still, we think, the
most likely outcome, but perhaps only by a very narrow
margin. In this scenario, the handsome young Democrat
Abhisit is able to woo two to three other parties (including
probably Chart Thai and Motherland) to join him in a
coalition government. The "happily ever after part" may be
short-lived, as this coalition would face persistent
challenges from the very strong parliamentary opposition that
the pro-Thaksin Peoples Power Party (PPP) would likely
present in this scenario. But it would give another year or
two of respite before the country had to face elections again.


CLIFFHANGER ENDING
--------------


3. (C) If the pro-Thaksin PPP wins a substantial plurality,
particularly if it only needs to attract just one of several
other parties to lead a coalition government, it will be hard
to stop them. (Some projections even give the PPP an
outright majority.) This outcome appears slightly less
likely than the "happy ending." PPP is campaigning strongly,
but it would probably need around to win at least 200 seats,
and this is a high target to hit -- and maintain in the face
of inevitable ECT challenges fueled by fraud allegations (see
para 8). We understand that leaders of the smaller parties
have been encouraged by the great and the good of Thailand
not to join with PPP -- for example, we have heard that Chart
Thai leader Banharn has promised "the Palace" (presumably
Privy Counselor President Prem) that he would not join with
PPP. Political promises are easily broken, however, and
perfidy cannot be ruled out. Some of the old anti-Thaksin
campaigners have already threatened to return to street
protests if PPP forms the government, but the public shows
little appetite for more political street theater. The only
real obstacles to the PPP in this scenario would be the
courts (possible party dissolution, see para 11) or another
military intervention.

THEATER OF THE ABSURD
--------------


4. (C) This election is viewed by many as a contest between
the pro-Thaksin PPP and the anti-Thaksin Democrats. Many
projections, however, have three centrist "third force"
parties - Chart Thai, Motherland, and Ruam Jai Thai/Chart
Pattana -- cumulatively equaling or surpassing the Democrats,
and they may have considerable weight to throw around if they
can cooperate. The name of Chart Thai leader Banharn
Silpa-Archa has been mentioned as a possible compromise
candidate for Prime Minister in a "third force" led
coalition. A former prime minister and politician of long
experience noted for his pragmatism, Banharn would be an
uninspiring but non-threatening choice as a compromise
candidate for Prime Minister.


5. (C) Motherland party leader Suwit Khunkhitti has also been
campaigning hard in the vote-rich, rural Northeast (a Thaksin

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stronghold) by emphasizing his local roots and telling the
voters they can have a native son as Prime Minister if they
vote for Motherland. Some projections have the newcomer
Motherland Party out-polling the long established Chart Thai
to take third place. Suwit is an experienced politician
(former minister and deputy prime minister); he is not an
impossible compromise candidate for PM.


6. (C) Either the PPP or the Democrats would have to
participate in such a "third-force-led" coalition, and both
would be galled at the prospect of taking a back seat to
parties they beat. If the election were to seem headed for
another deadlock, however, they might agree; such a
compromise could avert more serious political conflict.
Needless to say, such a coalition would be hard to establish
and perhaps even harder to maintain. There has also been some
discussion of a government of national unity. This idea was
supported by former PM Thaksin, following a series of
speeches by the King calling for reconciliation and unity.
Thaksin's proposal was rejected by most other parties. These
are both unlikely outcomes, but not impossible if the
election fails to produce a clear winner.

TRAIN WRECK
--------------


7. (C) There is a concern that the Election Commission (ECT)
will simply collapse under the weight of the responsibilities
it faces. The election regulations the ECT set are quite
strict, limiting the amount of money a candidate can spend,
the size and placement of campaign posters, and many other
aspects of campaigning. There are a lot of ways that a
candidate can break the rules, even leaving aside serious
fraud. The ECT is expected to disqualify candidates who
commit serious infractions; these "red cards" are issued up
to 30 days after the election, leading to re-run elections in
which the red-carded candidate cannot run. The ECT is also
expected to rule on and organize re-run elections where more
minor infractions occurred ("yellow cards"),and all
candidates can run again -- also within 30 days of the vote.
Any cases not resolved within 30 days are referred to the
Supreme Court of Justice for resolution.


8. (C) There are real questions about how the ECT can handle
the expected avalanche of fraud claims it is expected to
face. As the front-runner, the PPP is likely to be the target
of many fraud allegations, but they will be smart enough to
fight back with counter-claims of their own, many of which
are likely also to merit investigation. With some 40 parties
in the race, there will be plenty of losers ready to claim
they were robbed of their victory. The ECT must adjudicate
fraud claims in a reasonably transparent, fair, and efficient
way, and it has to announce winners for at least 95 percent
of the seats within 30 days, so the new parliament can meet
the deadline in the constitution for its first session.

BACK TO THE FUTURE - DISSOLUTION, ANNULMENT, COUP
-------------- --------------


9. (C) A serious failure by the ECT, calling into question
the validity of the election, would give the military a more
plausible excuse to intervene (more plausible than "the wrong
party won," at least.) It might also form the basis for a
court decision to annul the election, as happened with the
2006 vote -- again, opening the door for the military to
anoint itself savior and intervene.

10 (C) Allegations of serious irregularities in connection
with the absentee/advance voting are a particular
vulnerability. Several minor party candidates have filed a
petition with the Supreme Court to call off the elections,
claiming that the ECT had no legal right to permit advance
voting. A PPP candidate has called for annulling the results
of the advance voting in Samut Prakan, claiming that
incorrect information was posted mis-identifying the
candidates and misleading voters. If the advance voters turn
out to have voting patterns suspiciously different from those
who vote on December 23, more questions may be raised.


11. (C) Violent protests could also provide a pretext for the
declaration of a state of emergency, delaying the convocation
of the new Parliament and the installation of the new
government. Such a delay could provide further time for more

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serious fraud accusations against PPP to be adjudicated,
possibly leading to the dissolution of the party before it
could form the government and exert influence over the
process. The allegations so far being investigated against
the party (such as distributing a video disk of Thaksin)
would probably be insufficient to credibly dissolve the
party. However, if the authorities could prove any of the
rumors of large movements of cash by Thaksin for his
supporters (at least some of which appear credible),this
might be defensible legal grounds for party dissolution.


12. (C) We emphasize that this is not a likely outcome, but
a worst-case scenario. We believe that the public is not
prepared to put up with a non-elected government for much
longer, and this should be clear to the military leadership.
Many who were willing to accept the 2006 coup would not
accept another intervention. However, if the ECT is unable to
deliver a credible election result, it is unclear just how
the country could move forward to solve such a political
impasse without the military playing some role.

COMMENT
--------------


13. (C) One common thread of all these possible outcomes,
even the rosiest, is that they provide no long term solution
for the divisions in the country. However the vote turns out,
the period until the formation of the new government (about
mid-February) is likely to be particularly tense and
uncertain, as the losers consider their options. We will
encourage all the players to work for the fairest possible
election, including in the adjudication of fraud claims, and
to abide by the results.







BOYCE