JUDGING THE THAI ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 006058

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR U/S BURNS, EAP A/S HILL, NSC FOR WILDER FROM
THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TH
SUBJECT: JUDGING THE THAI ELECTIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
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1. (C) The Thai elections for members of Parliament are on
track for December 23. Despite efforts by hard-line
opponents of former PM Thaksin to delay or derail the
election process, the campaign is in full swing. Our steady
message advocating for elections this year helped to
influence this very positive outcome.


2. (C) Just having the elections, however, is not enough.
We, and the Thai people, want to see fair elections that put
in place a government capable of healing the rifts in
society, and putting Thailand back on course for economic
growth, political stability and a renewed respect for
democratic governance.


3. (C) The prolonged crisis of the past two-plus years showed
up all the weak places in Thailand's democratic
infrastructure. Some of these weaknesses will have a direct
impact on the December elections, and on the government that
follows. These problems are deeply rooted, and we cannot
expect them to be quickly solved. This election will not mark
the end of Thailand's deep political problems, but it may be
a solid step forward towards a solution. We can play a role
in encouraging this outcome.


4. (C) Immediately after the vote will come the moment of
truth. One side or the other is likely to be very unhappy
with the election results. This will be the juncture at
which each side - pro- and anti-Thaksin - considers whether
to accept the election results or look for ways to win the
political contest through some other means -- coups, street
protests, boycotts... We should be prepared by OOB December
24 local time to issue a statement showing strong support for
the return to civilian elected government resulting from this
election. We should acknowledge that the election day
process was smooth (if true),encourage a transparent and
fair process of adjudicating fraud claims and call on all
parties, the government and the military to respect the
results of the election. Although we will likely need to
acknowledge infractions, we do not want to give any of the
players an excuse to abandon the election process and take
their battle back to the streets. As the election will take
place in the middle of the Christmas holidays, we hope to be
able to agree in advance on language the Embassy and
Department can use in assessing this election; post will
forward suggested language for consideration shortly. This
cable reviews the factors I believe we should take into
account in assessing this step in the Thai return to elected,
civilian government. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.

ABUSING MONEY AND POWER
--------------


5. (C) The potential problems facing the election process
fall, broadly, into two categories. One is the influence of
money -- more specifically, the fear that politicians will
buy votes or bribe officials to such a degree that they will
undermine the legitimacy of the elections. The other
potential problem is the abuse of power -- more specifically,
that the military and the interim government will use their
authority to distort the outcome of the election. There is a
tendency to expect the pro-Thaksin forces, drawing on
Thaksin's enormous personal wealth, to rely on money
politics, and the anti-Thaksin forces, favored by the
military and the bureaucracy, to rely on government power.


6. (C) The reality is not as clear-cut. The scourge of money
politics appears to cross all party lines to one degree or
another. Media, political and government contacts are all
predicting that this will be one of the most fraud-riddled,
or at least, most expensive elections in history, and we see
no reason to doubt this assessment. As for the potential use
of government power, while the central Election Commission
and government ministries, made up of the Bangkok elite, are
no doubt prejudiced against the pro-Thaksin People Power
Party (PPP),enormous responsibility resides with the local
election, security, and administration officials. In our
travels in the countryside, we have repeatedly been told that
the military will have little influence on voters, but that
local officials will play an important role. In Thaksin
strongholds, those officials are just as likely to share the
views of their neighbors in personally favoring the former PM
and his proxies.

RETURN TO NORMALCY
--------------


7. (C) Three months ago, we were uncertain whether the
elections would take place this year, whether a junta leader
would wind up as the next prime minister, and whether the
military would smother the political campaign of supporters
of former PM Thaksin. A lot has changed in these three
months. The election is on track for December 23, despite
serious efforts by some political forces to delay it. None
of the coup leaders is running for Parliament, meaning that

none of them will be eligible to be Prime Minister in the
next government. The cabinet overrode security officials,
and voted to lift martial law in over half the districts
where it had remained in force for most of the year. The
professional GEN Anupong edged out the hot-headed GEN Saprang
as Army commander. Thaksin's banned party has reincarnated
itself as the Peoples Power Party (PPP),and is doing well in
the campaign so far, with 'banned' politicians working behind
the scenes. The Election Commission rolled back some of the
most onerous restrictions on campaign activity in response to
protests from the media and political parties. In each of
these cases, the outcome is far from perfect -- we would have
preferred elections before September, no political role for
the junta leaders, no martial law, no party dissolution, and
a more competent Election Commission. In each case, however,
the authorities ultimately accepted the need to move back
toward democratic practices -- partly in response to
international concerns, but more as a reaction to criticisms
from within Thailand.


8. (C) I believe the interim leadership understands that it
must take measures to win acceptance for the elections both
internationally and internally. This is a formidable task
here, especially as vote-buying and abuse of power are
regular features of Thai elections. Like everything else
since the coup, the election is unlikely to be as good as we
would urge and hope. But, based on the track record of the
past year and the campaign so far, it can be good enough to
reflect accurately the wishes of, and be accepted by, the
Thai people, and to move the country back on the path to
civilian, democratic rule.

ENFORCING THE RULES ON MONEY AND THE MILITARY
--------------


9. (C) Tackling the problem of money politics will be
extremely difficult. Any effort to crack down on the
activities of candidates or "vote canvassers" - the
campaigners who also hand out the incentives on behalf of
their candidates -- will inevitably elicit cries of
persecution and prejudice. Any politician penalized for
infractions of the election rules will be able to say, in all
honesty, that other candidates are getting away with much the
same thing. We will need to monitor closely the overall
fairness of the Election Commission (ECT) in the enforcement
of the election rules. In making this assessment, however,
it is not reasonable to expect the ECT to catch all the
vote-buyers before it punishes any of them. On the contrary,
we should be encouraging the ECT to get tough on vote buying
and other fraud, to the best of its ability. Decades of
vote-buying have undermined the faith of the citizens in
elections, and in democracy itself. So far, the Election
Commission has not singled PPP candidates out for
disqualifications. (There have been 37 candidates so far
disqualified, mostly for holding membership in more than one
party; only one of these was from the pro-Thaksin PPP.)
However, we anticipate accusations of vote-buying and similar
fraud, and a corresponding Election Commission response, to
increase as the campaign continues.


10. (C) We must also monitor closely the role of the
military. Thailand's military has, unfortunately, long had
an accepted role in internal security. The prevalence of
election fraud and corruption over the years has given the
military an excuse to meddle in politics - from launching
coups in the name of good governance to sending out soldiers
to campaign against vote-buying. In the short term, we will
continue to express our concerns over the possibility of
military intervention in the democratic process. GEN Anupong
told me that he wanted the military to stay out of politics,
and I will remind him of that pledge.


11. (C) Based on the recent experience of the constitution
referendum, I believe that we will continue to see some
efforts by elements of the military to undermine support for
the pro-Thaksin Peoples Power Party, but these efforts are
unlikely to be very successful. So far, they are not
widespread. Despite accusations by politicians, the
villagers we meet during our travels are not raising concerns
about pressure from the military. The very high vote against
the new constitution in August showed that the population was
in large part prepared to vote as they pleased, regardless of
what the government or military wanted.

OLD-FASHIONED FRAUD
--------------


12. (C) In discussions with politicians and officials, the
problem of garden-variety election day fraud, such as
stuffing the ballot boxes, is rarely mentioned. While
politicians are generally dissatisfied with most of the
changes in the election laws, they seem to support the return
to counting the ballots at the polling station. (Note: During
2001-2006, ballot boxes were first transported to the
provincial capital, and consolidated before counting. This
was to discourage vote-buying, as no one could tell how a
particular village had voted -- but it made the polling
harder for political parties to monitor as well. End note.)
Contacts acknowledge that crude fraud may take place in some
locations, but they cite campaign abuses and possible unfair
adjudication of fraud accusations as more pressing concerns.
While there will not be a single large organization
conducting systematic monitoring of election day activities,
there will be some 200 organizations around the country
involved in monitoring activities. We plan to coordinate with
the most effective of these groups to supplement the
embassy's own observation teams (about 15-20 teams planned).
This, combined with the press and party monitors, should give
us a decent view of election day procedures.

WHEN WILL WE KNOW THE RESULTS?
--------------


13. (C) One difficult feature of Thai elections is the way
fraud allegations are adjudicated. The ECT can disqualify a
candidate before or after the vote, call for a new election
in a constituency, and even bar a suspect candidate from
competing in the new poll, if they have evidence he committed
serious election fraud. In the 2001 elections, the ECT
overturned the election day results and required re-votes in
a whopping 62 of the 400 constituencies due to fraud
allegations (about half of these were for Thaksin's Thai Rak
Thai party seats, roughly proportional to the number of seats
it had won). The pro-Thaksin PPP is particularly concerned
that the Election Commission will unfairly disqualify their
candidates, while overlooking infractions by other parties.
Thus, while unofficial results will be available within hours
after the polls close, it may be weeks before we actually
know which parties have enough seats to form the government.
It is possible that the balance of power in the new
parliament could be decided, not on December 23, but in a
series of re-votes held throughout January. This system of
fraud adjudication -- with the potential for dozens of seats
to be thrown into a second round of voting -- strikes us as
inefficient, but it is now the established practice here, and
the voters appear to accept it.


14. (C) The immediate post-election period may be one of the
most sensitive in the past year. The military leadership and
former coup leaders appear to accept that the supporters of
the former prime minister will do very well in the elections.
Nonetheless, December 23 will be a moment of truth for the
military and, despite Anupong's pledge to me, we cannot
discount the possibility they could again intervene in the
political process (although more likely through means short
of another coup). This is also a turning point for Thaksin
supporters, for whom gaining control of the legislature is
the next step towards stymieing the investigations into
corruption by the previous administration, and paving the way
for Thaksin's return. If they do not do as well as they
anticipate, they may also try to use street demonstrations or
other means to disrupt and discredit the process.

HOW DO WE CALL IT?
--------------


15. (C) In a perfect world, we would hope to be able to issue
a statement shortly after the polls close giving an
unqualified welcome and endorsement to the Thai elections.
In the real world, this is unlikely to happen. These
elections are likely to be a messy business, although perhaps
not so much messier than previous elections here. If things
continue as they have started, however, there is reason to
hope that this election will be accepted by the public and
will result in a government with a legitimate mandate to get
Thailand back on track.


16. (C) Provided the parties continue to campaign freely and
the election day process is credible, we should be prepared
on the morning of December 24 local time to show strong
support for the return to civilian elected government
resulting from this election. We should acknowledge that the
election day process was smooth, encourage a transparent and
fair process of adjudicating fraud claims and call on all
parties, the government and the military to respect the
results of the election. Depending on circumstances, we will
likely need to acknowledge infractions or other shortcomings,
but we do not want to give any of the players an excuse to
abandon the election process and take their battle back to
the streets. The weary majority of Thailand's population is
tired of political drama. They want a government with the
legitimacy and competence to tackle the country's economic
and security problems. In other words, they want exactly
what we want.
BOYCE