SCENESETTER FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEAF

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 006011

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PTER MARR MOPS PINS PHUM TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEAF


Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. General Leaf, your visit to Thailand will
afford you a chance to see the importance of Thailand to our
regional security interests. You will also have an
opportunity to underscore the United States Government's
desire that Thailand return to democratically elected
government through free and fair elections on December 23.
End Summary.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION
--------------


2. (C) Much of the Thai middle class greeted with relief the
September 19, 2006, coup d'etat that removed former Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and ushered in the civilian
administration appointed by the military-led Council for
National Security (CNS). Anticipation of a new political
climate has been replaced, however, by the realization that
the CNS and the Cabinet have been unable to bring about
political reconciliation. The government has been criticized
for failing to prove corruption by Thaksin, for the stagnant
economy, and for the continuing violence in the South.


3. (U) Thailand will conduct a national legislative election
on December 23, based on a new constitution approved by the
Thai public in an August 19 referendum. Elections for the
Senate will take place early next year. The new charter
differs from the 1997 version by, among other aspects:
creating term limits for the Prime Minister; establishing a
partially-appointed/partially-elected Senate; and creating
multi-member electoral districts and regional party lists for
the House of Representatives.


4. (C) While it is still early in the political campaign
season many political analysts are predicting the election
will produce a weak coalition government that would represent
a return to pre-Thaksin Thai-style politics, when it was
difficult to implement bold policies. Even though the
Constitutional Tribunal dissolved Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai
(TRT) party in May, following credible allegations of
undemocratic acts committed during 2006 national elections,
many former members of TRT will participate in the election
under the banner of the People's Power Party (PPP) and the
Motherland Party. PPP is likely to garner significant
support in the North and Northeast and recent poll results
generally confirm the view that the party will win a
plurality but not a majority of the seats in the new
parliament.


5. (C) The CNS made no secret of wanting to "educate" the
public about the problems Thaksin brought upon Thailand, and
there were reports that the Army sent soldiers to the
countryside to warn the public that PPP would bring
corruption and abuses of power back to the country. Contacts
in provincial areas have not been able to confirm the
presence of troops in villages, however.

THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
--------------


6. (C) Prior to the coup, bilateral relations with Thailand
were very good and we are optimistic that this will be the
case after a new government is in place. The goodwill
generated by America's quick and massive response to the
December 26, 2004 tsunami was palpable. Thailand is a Treaty
Ally, has been firmly supportive of the International War on
Terror, and has participated in Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). American businesses
have over $20 billion in direct investment in Thailand. The
United States is Thailand's largest export market and its
second-largest foreign investor.


7. (C) Responding to the recent crackdown in Burma by the
authorities, Thai Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont used his
appearance at the UN General Assembly to criticize publicly
the Burmese regime's actions in a manner that we viewed as
constructive. This was consistent with the strong statement
made by ASEAN. In general, however, the Thai bureaucracy,
and especially the military, fears instability in Burma will
spill over across Thailand's border. Thailand relies on
Burma for energy imports as well. These factors incline
Thailand to want to preserve the status quo. We believe it
will be necessary to keep pushing the RTG to ensure it
remains energized on Burma and does not allow other
commercial ties or concepts of ASEAN solidarity to weaken the
stance Surayud took at the UNGA.

THE OVERALL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP
--------------


8. (C) The U.S.-Thai security relationship is based on over
50 years of close cooperation. Thai soldiers, sailors and
airmen participated in the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts
and Thai peacekeepers served in Afghanistan and Iraq. Prior
to coup sanctions, Thailand was the fourth largest
participant in the U.S. International Military Education and
Training (IMET) program. Thailand's willingness to allow the
United States to use Utapao Naval Air Station as the hub for
our regional tsunami assistance program was key to making
Operation Unified Assistance a success. In fact, PACOM has
designated Utapao as the most important Cooperative Security
Location (CSL) in the Asia Pacific Region. While we avoid
using the term "CSL" with the Thai due to their sensitivities
about bases, Utapao remains vital to our interests in the
region. In your meetings with Thai military officials, you
will want to note our desire to return to a more healthy
military-military relationship once a democratically elected
government is in place.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND SOUTHERN THAILAND
--------------


9. (C) Thailand's biggest domestic challenge is the unsettled
security situation in the far southern part of the country.
Southern Thailand, in particular the southernmost Muslim
majority provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, has
experienced episodic violence since it was incorporated into
the Siamese Kingdom in 1902. Since January 2004, we have
witnessed a dramatic increase in the level of violence. Press
reports indicate that over 2,000 persons have been killed
either by militants or by security forces during this period.
Local Muslim separatist militants have attacked symbols of
Thai and Buddhist authority, civilians, and local citizens
suspected of collaborating with the Government. Thaksin was
sharply criticized for not having an effective policy to curb
violence in the South. Despite initial optimism for Prime
Minister Surayud's reconciliation plans for the South, the
new government has not demonstrated a markedly improved
ability to counter the unrest.


10. (C) Southern separatists direct their anger at the
government in Bangkok, not at the United States. Since a U.S.
presence or perception of U.S. involvement in the South could
redirect that anger towards us and link it to the
international jihadist movement -- a link that is currently
absent -- we ensure that any offers of assistance or training
pass the "location and label" test. Put simply, we keep U.S.
military personnel away from the far South and we make sure
that we do not label any assistance or training as directly
linked to the southern situation. Likewise, we work to avoid
feeding rampant, outlandish speculation that we are somehow
fomenting the violence in the South in order to justify
building permanent bases -- a very sensitive issue in
Thailand. We do not want to jeopardize our access to key
military facilities in Thailand like Utapao Naval Air Station.


11. (C) Although some of our tools to work with the Thai
military on Southern issues have been affected by coup
sanctions, the Embassy maintains a three-pronged focus to
improve our military cooperation in order to address the
violence in the South:
--1) Using our exercise and training program to improve the
professional and operational skills of the Royal Thai Armed
Forces, especially the Thai Army;
--2) Help the Thai break down stovepipes between the Thai
military, police forces, and civilian agencies;
--3) Do everything we can to ensure the Thai respect
international human rights norms as they counter the violence.

MILITARY EXERCISE PROGRAM
--------------


12. (C) Thailand gives the U.S. military a platform for
exercises unique in Asia. Thailand offers the United States
military good base infrastructure, large areas in which our
aircraft and ground forces can conduct unrestricted
operations and access to bombing ranges -- all in short
supply in Asia. Located near strategic maritime choke points
and having good liberty ports, Thailand also has the
potential to play a greater role in U.S. Naval planning.
Perhaps due to their lack of a colonial heritage, Thai
leaders are far more willing to host multilateral exercises
than are other countries in Asia. Unlike Japan, which only
hosts annual bilateral exercises due to legal prohibitions
over collective security, or Australia, which avoids
multilateral exercises so as not to "dumb down" its own
training opportunities, the Royal Thai Government supports
multilateral exercises as a way to show regional leadership.
This has allowed us to use our exercises in Thailand to
further key U.S. objectives such as supporting Japan's
growing military role in Asia and engaging the TNI. We are on
track for the first multi-lateral FTX phase of the major
JCS-directed COBRA GOLD exercise, in addition to CPX and
UNPKF pieces.

THE ROLE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN THE REGION
--------------


13. (C) Southeast Asia continues to feel the rising influence
of China and India. While emphasizing the vital role of the
U.S. in the region -- and Thailand's desire to intensify U.S.
engagement -- Thai leaders also focus on developing stronger
relations with the two regional powers. Bangkok views both
countries as sources of unlimited consumer demand and hopes
to conclude Free Trade Agreements with both nations. The
Thai military has a number of Chinese weapons systems in its
arsenal. While Thai military links with the United States
are deeper and far more apparent than Sino-Thai links,
China's growing influence in Thailand and Southeast Asia is
evident in business, the arts, the media and the military.
The PLA Navy has close links with the RTN and recently
conducted a major ship visit to Phuket. After jointly holding
a limited naval exercise in the Andaman Sea in 2005, Thailand
and China are exploring conducting joint SAR exercises. The
RTN has acquired several ships from China over the past
decade. China is refurbishing tanks and air defense equipment
provided to Thailand in the late 1980's. Mil-to-mil
exchanges between China and Thailand have expanded in recent
years as has the number of bilateral military VIP visits.

REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY
--------------


14. (C) A key U.S. objective in the region is to improve
maritime security. As part of an effort funded by Section
1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, we
worked closely with PACOM and sister Embassies in Manila,
Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta and Colombo to develop a regional
maritime security architecture to improve communications,
domain awareness and intercept capabilities in the waters
surrounding Southeast Asia. The Thai portion of the
initiative, approved by Congress but suspended as part of
coup sanctions, was a layered approach to assist the Thai
military secure territorial waters while also providing
coverage of the northern shipping lanes feeding into the
Strait of Malacca. We hope to work closely with Thailand on
maritime security when the democratically elected government
takes office.

THE ROLE OF THE ARMY
--------------


15. (C) The Royal Thai Army (RTA) is a legacy force faced
with serious modernization issues. The RTA is still
primarily designed to defeat the large conventional threat
that Vietnam represented in the mid-1980's. On paper, the
RTA would seem to possess the capability to defeat a large
conventional attack -- however, it is plagued by an almost
universally low operational readiness (OR) rate. This
problem is a systemic weakness based on insufficient
sustainment of equipment as well as budget shortages since
the 1997 financial crisis.


16. (C) Much of this decline in effectiveness is due to the
budget constraints that were imposed from 1997-2001 after the
Asian Financial Crisis. Since that time, budgets have
increased slightly, but not to pre-1997 levels. Increasing
the military budget shortfall has been a key focus of the
interim government, allowing all the services to improve
their capabilities. The increase in the military's budget,
during a period of economic uncertainty, has been
controversial and has resulted in RTA plans to purchase
Ukrainian armored personnel carriers and Israeli rifles.


17. (C) While the RTA has a long history working with the
U.S. Army, recently we have also been working with MARFORPAC
and III MEF to improve links between the U.S Marine Corps and
the RTA. In many ways, our Marines are perfect training
partners for the RTA and field exercises in Thailand afford
our Marines many opportunities they do not have elsewhere in
Asia.

THE NAVAL RELATIONSHIP
--------------


18. (C) While our overall relationship with the Thai military
is good, our links with the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) are not as
strong as those with the Royal Thai Army or Air Force. The
RTN is smaller than the other services and tends to be less
willing to be open with U.S. counterparts. In the past, we
have had a better relationship with the RTN and we were
working to reverse the current trend through potential
projects like the 1206 Andaman Sea Maritime Security
Initiative. Prior to the coup, we worked with PACFLT and
Seventh Fleet to increase the tempo of U.S. Navy ship visits.
U.S. aircraft carrier visits were well received by the RTN,
received front page and prime time media coverage, and were
successful opportunities to demonstrate the benefits of the
U.S.-Thai security relationship. Recently, the Chinese have
improved their ties to the RTN as mentioned above. Likewise,
the RTN has been developing a closer relationship with the
Indian Navy and has conducted some exercises with the Indians.


19. (C) In addition to supporting our annual Cooperation
Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise with Thailand,
JUSMAGTHAI has worked closely with RTN Special Warfare units
to increase their capacity. USN SEALS have helped to provide
their Thai counterparts with some impressive capabilities.
For instance, Thai SEALS regularly conduct exercises aimed at
protecting oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Thailand.
This NSW relationship was graphically demonstrated during the
tsunami response when USN and RTN SEALS rapidly deployed to

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Phuket to assist in the recovery efforts. The Prime Minister
was photographed in a recovery boat manned by the SEALS.
Despite their improved professionalism, the Thai SEALS are
not well-supported by senior RTN officials.

THE AIR FORCE RELATIONSHIP
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20. (C) The annual COPE TIGER flight training exercise among
the United States, Thailand and Singapore is scheduled for
January 21 to February 8 in Thailand. COPE TIGER is the
largest joint/combined air combat exercise in Thailand.


21. (C) The RTAF recently announced plans to buy SAAB Gripen
planes to replace their F-5 aircraft. We are urging the Thai
to proceed with a Mid-Life Update for existing F-16A/B planes
or procure new F-16C/Ds for future fighter jet requirements
for interoperability reasons.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT
--------------


22. (U) I look forward to meeting with you when you come to
Bangkok and to sharing views on how best to promote our
strategic interests in Thailand.
BOYCE