THAI MOVE TO DEPORT HMONG LAO FROM NONG KHAI BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 000596

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2017
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM TH LA
SUBJECT: THAI MOVE TO DEPORT HMONG LAO FROM NONG KHAI BUT
THEN BACK OFF


Classified By: AMBASSADOR RALPH BOYCE, REASON 1.4 (B, D)


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para. 10.


2. (C) Summary. On January 30, the RTG attempted to refoule
the 156 Lao Hmong at the Nong Khai detention facility. The
male members of the group resisted deportation and a
stand-off ensued that lasted most of the day. The Embassy,
as well as other diplomatic missions and UNHCR, intervened
with the Thai government at high levels. The RTG at the end
of the day agreed to stop the deportation under the
assumption that third country resettlement for the group
would be possible. End summary.


3. (C) Embassy received reports early in the morning on
January 30 that RTG authorities were taking steps to deport
the 156 Lao-Hmong held at the Nong Khai Immigration Detention
Center. There were indications the previous day that some
development might be in the offing when U.S. refugee
resettlement processing staff were denied entry into the
facility, for reasons that were unclear, to conduct
previously-scheduled interviews. Post attempted to clarify
the situation with MFA and the NSC. On January 30,
International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR
staff present at Nong Khai reported that there was a heavy
police presence and that Thai and Lao government officials
were meeting to discuss "movement" of the Hmong. (After
being invited by Thai officials to participate in the
meeting, resettlement processing staff and a DHS interviewing
officer also present at Nong Khai were instructed that they
should not attend.) Post also began receiving emails and
telephone calls from Hmong-Americans and a Hmong advocate,
who were in cellphone contact with some of the Hmong and were
told that a deportation seemed imminent.


4. (C) Reports from the Hmong-Americans and UNHCR staff
stated that most of the Lao-Hmong women and children were
moved onto one of three waiting buses with Laotian license
plates by late morning. A reliable report in mid-afternoon
said that the women and children on the bus mostly appeared
calm and in good shape, but two women in an emotional state
tried to get off the bus and were pushed back on. It is
unclear what degree of force may have been used to move the
women and children onto the bus. The reports also said that
the Lao-Hmong men were resisting the deportation and had
locked themselves into their cells. In response, the Thai
authorities were reported to be trying to break into the
cells and also using a white gas, possibly tear gas, and
beatings in order to subdue the men.


5. (C) Upon hearing the reports, Embassy made a series of
calls to the RTG to raise our serious concerns with this
development and try to dissuade the Thai from carrying out
any deportation. The Ambassador reached MFA PermSec Krit
while he was in a Cabinet meeting and asked him to look into
the reports of deportation and treatment of the Hmong. Krit
responded in the early afternoon that 40-50 of the Hmong were
resisting deportation. He said that instructions had been
given to Thai law enforcement and military personnel that no
force should be used. Krit added that the Lao had not
objected to third party monitoring by NGOs or Vientiane-based
diplomats of a return of the Hmong group. (Comment. We do
not think these continuing, vague reassurances from the Lao
are adequate. End comment.) Ambassador responded that if
the RTG went ahead with the deportation there would surely be
a hail of criticism from the international community given
that the Thai would have refouled a considerable number of
persons with UNHCR refugee status.


6. (C) Ambassador also spoke in the early afternoon with
Secretary-General of the Council on National Security and

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former head of the Thai NSC Winai Phattiyakul and expressed
serious concern about any deportation of the Hmong. Winai
said he understood that the group had been deported in the
morning as a result of long-standing negotiations with the
Lao government. He indicated concern at the reports of gas
and violence, and promised to look into them.


7. (C) In mid-afternoon, Ambassador sent a letter to Prime
Minister Surayud which expressed deep concern about the
reports of deportation and treatment of the Hmong. The
letter also stated opposition to deportation given the
Hmong's UNHCR refugee status and noted that any such action
would draw wide international criticism. It asked the Prime
Minister to reconsider the decision. The letter reported
that the U.S. and other resettlement countries were
interviewing the refugees for possible resettlement. The
Ambassador also encouraged his Australian counterpart to send
a similar message to the PM, which he did.


8. (C) Other Embassies expressed their concern during the day
to the RTG. The Australian Ambassador also raised the issue
with the Thai Head of Immigration and the German Ambassador,
as chair of the EU, was drawing up a statement and discussed
the issue with MFA. UNHCR discussed the matter in a meeting
with the MFA.


9. (C) Late in the afternoon, MFA PermSec Krit informed the
Ambassador that the deportation had been put on hold given
information that the Hmong would be accepted for resettlement
by third countries. Secretary-General Winai informed the
Ambassador that Thai military Supreme Commander Boonsang had
told Winai that tear gas had not been used and reports of the
use of force were exaggerated. DHS and UNHCR staff at Nong
Khai reported at the end of the day that the women and
children had gotten off the bus and returned to the
immigration detention facility. The buses waiting to
transport them and the men were seen pulling away from the
site. The New Zealand Ambassador was told by a high-ranking
MFA official that the Thai decision to back off from
deportation was a direct result of representations by the
U.S. and Australian ambassadors.


10. (C) Action request. That the Thai moved off their
intention to deport the Hmong due to opposition from the
Hmong themselves and international pressure represents a
successful outcome at this point. Given the need to continue
to work with the Thai to find a solution, Embassy recommends
minimalist press guidance along the following lines:

-- The USG is pleased that the Thai did not refoule the
group of Lao Hmong at Nong Khai.

-- We hope that the RTG will work with the international
community to find a durable solution for this group of
refugees.
BOYCE