PRO-THAKSIN PARTY'S VIEW OF UPCOMING ELECTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 005939

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM TH
SUBJECT: PRO-THAKSIN PARTY'S VIEW OF UPCOMING ELECTION

REF: A. BANGKOK 5881 (OATHS AND INSULTS)


B. BANGKOK 5717 (PPP SPOKESMAN VIEWS)

C. BANGKOK 4734 (WARY FRONTRUNNER)

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Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. James F. Entwistle; reason: 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Top officials of the pro-Thaksin People's Power Party
(PPP) anticipate winning over 200 seats in the December 23
election but remain concerned about bias from the Election
Commission and the military's Internal Security Operations
Command. In separate meetings with us on November 20-21,
PPP's Secretary General and Advisory Board Chairman shared
their views; we solicited views on where Embassy observers
might be most usefully deployed on election day. Both
interlocutors expressed dismay over PPP Party Leader Samak
Sundaravej's abrasive manner. They also presented divergent
views on the likelihood of PPP's being able to attract
certain coalition partners to form a government after the
election. End Summary.

UPDATED SEAT PROJECTIONS
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2. (C) PPP Advisory Board Chairman Somphong Amornwiwat, who
also serves as PPP's national campaign coordinator, provided
us on November 20 with updated projections for PPP's
performance in the coming election. He assessed PPP would
likely win close to the 241 seats required to form a
government, distributed as follows:

- 100 constituency seats in the Northeast;
- 50 constituency seats in the North;
- 40 constituency seats in the Central/East regions;
- Up to 15 of the 36 constituency seats in Bangkok; and
- A nationwide total of 30 or more party list seats.


3. (C) Somphong admitted that PPP would likely fail to win
seats in southern Thailand, the stronghold of the rival
Democrat Party. He further conceded that PPP Party Leader
Samak Sundaravej's aggressive style in responding to a
reporter's questions (ref A) had hurt PPP's prospects in
Bangkok. (PPP's Secretary General expressed the same view
about Samak's recent outburst; both men made it clear to us
that various PPP figures had shared their dismay with Samak.)


4. (C) Somphong did believe, however, that PPP had already
secured the loyalty of many community leaders and
opinion-makers in the northern and northeastern areas. He
related that in previous elections he had had to work more
actively than he did at present to retain the professed
allegiance of such figures.

EC AND FRAUD REMAIN OF CONCERN
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5. (C) PPP's Secretary General, Surapong Amornwiwat, told us
separately that he felt the type of fraud most likely to
affect PPP would be the distortion of the vote count as
tallies are relayed from the polling stations to higher
levels. He claimed that there were many instances during the
August constitutional referendum when figures were transposed
so that a high number of votes against the constitution were
recorded as votes in favor. Consequently, PPP had stressed
to its candidates the importance of having witnesses at all
polling stations. (Note: PPP has made this accusation
regarding fraud in the counting of the referendum votes to us
before, however, they gave only a single example (ref C),and
none of the civil society groups that opposed the
constitution have brought evidence of similar claims. Based
on our discussions in the rural areas, we expect that PPP
will have a strong presence at the polling stations, which is
a positive development. End note.)


6. (C) Surapong said he believed fraud disadvantaging PPP's

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candidates would be most likely to take place in the
districts featuring close races. His greatest concern,
however, was the possibility that the Election Commission
(EC) would unfairly disqualify numerous PPP candidates
because of alleged improprieties. He said that, under normal
circumstances, it might be legitimate for approximately 10
percent of the seats to be re-contested in new elections
required by the EC because of irregularities, but he stressed
that the EC should watch and penalize candidates from all
parties, not just those from PPP. Separately, Advisory Board
Chairman Somphong voiced similar concern and said PPP would
fight ardently against any illegitimate attempts to
disqualify the party's candidates. Both Somphong and
Surapong told us that PPP candidates had been thoroughly
briefed on what actions were and were not permissible, and
they expected their candidates would do nothing to justify EC
sanctions. (Comment: We expect candidates from all major
parties to engage in vote-buying and other acts that violate
the spirit if not the letter of election laws. We also note
that, in 2001 -- the last election without a strong incumbent
party -- the ECT found sufficient fraud to require the seats
be recontested in about 15 percent of the constituencies.
End Comment.)

WORRIES ABOUT ISOC AND SONTHI
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7. (C) Surapong and Somphong both expressed concern about the
role the military might play in the coming election, although
both focused on the Internal Security Operations Command
(ISOC) and on Deputy Prime Minister Sonthi Boonyaratglin
(whom Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont has formally assigned
to oversee ISOC while serving as Deputy Prime Minister).
Somphong said that he himself had been irritated when some
military personnel had obtrusively monitored meetings he had
with some local officials. He said he had requested the
assistance of a long-time friend, retired General Watanachai
Chaimuanwong, who is a formally-appointed advisor to the
Prime Minister. Somphong also said that retired General
Ruengroj Mahasaranond, formerly Armed Forces Supreme
Commander, was also trying to assist PPP in these matters.
Somphong said PPP had received assurances that the Army's
role was limited to surveillance, and the Army would not
interfere in other ways. (Note: According to press reports,
however, soldiers recently searched the residence of PPP
Deputy Leader Yongyuth Tiapairath. End Note.)


8. (C) Echoing other remarks we have heard from PPP contacts
(ref B),Surapong said that he believed Army Commander
Anupong Paojinda sincerely hoped the Army would be
politically neutral. Surapong said he saw Anupong as
following in the tradition of General Wimon Wongwanit, whom
Surapong viewed as having helped the Army recover its stature
after its unpopular role in crushing May 1992 demonstrations.
Surapong was uncertain, however, whether either Anupong or
Surayud would intervene if Sonthi were to try to use ISOC
inappropriately.

EMBASSY OBSERVERS
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9. (C) We informed both our PPP interlocutors about Embassy
plans to field observers during the election. We asked where
they would recommend we could most usefully deploy our
observers. Both expressed appreciation for our soliciting
their views, but neither offered specific suggestions,
although Somphong invited us to visit him at the PPP
operations center in Bangkok on election day.

COALITION PARTNERS
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10. (C) Secretary General Surapong said he expected the most
difficult aspect of the coming election process would be the
ensuing formation of a coalition government. He said he
believed recent media stories alleging a commitment by the
Democrat Party, Chart Thai, and the Motherland Party to work
together to form a coalition government, excluding PPP. He

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further assessed that the Motherland Party was confusing
voters by professing loyalty to deposed Prime Minister
Thaksin, attempting thereby to draw voters away from PPP.


11. (C) Advisory Board Chairman Somphong, however, expressed
doubt that other party leaders had already made binding
commitments one way or another. Recalling his brief period
of time spent as Chart Thai's Secretary General years ago, he
said he could attest first-hand to former Chart Thai leader
Banharn Silapa-Archa's untrustworthy nature. As for the
Motherland Party, Somphong said that he had a longstanding
relationship with its leader Suwit Khunkitti, and they spoke
often and amicably. Somphong did believe, however, that one
could conclude at this stage that Matchima Thippathai Party
Leader Prachai Leophairatana -- a well-known foe of Thaksin
-- would not align his party with PPP.

COMMENT
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12. (C) The recent closure of registration for legislative
candidates limits the types of surprises that we might see
before the election, now less than a month away. It is
possible that new developments -- such as further indictments
against deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra -- might
sway some of the minority of Thailand's voters who qualify as
independent-minded. We accept the conventional wisdom that
PPP is on track to win a plurality, however.
ENTWISTLE