Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BANGKOK59
2007-01-04 10:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

JANUARY 4 DIPLOMATIC CORPS BRIEFING ON THE BANGKOK

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM PTER PINR ASEC TH 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8722
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #0059/01 0041038
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041038Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3769
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 3439
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 6505
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 2526
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 8683
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000059 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS
NSC FOR WILDER/MORROW
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM PTER PINR ASEC TH
SUBJECT: JANUARY 4 DIPLOMATIC CORPS BRIEFING ON THE BANGKOK
BOMBINGS

REF: A. BANGKOK 00016 (THAI FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES

BOMBINGS)

B. BANGKOK 3 (WINAI ON BOMBINGS)

C. BANGKOK 2 (BOMBINGS)

D. 06 BANGKOK 7594 (CASE AGAINST THAKSIN)

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RALPH L. BOYCE. REASON 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000059 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS NSC FOR WILDER/MORROW PACOM FOR FPA HUSO E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM PTER PINR ASEC TH SUBJECT: JANUARY 4 DIPLOMATIC CORPS BRIEFING ON THE BANGKOK BOMBINGS REF: A. BANGKOK 00016 (THAI FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES BOMBINGS) ¶B. BANGKOK 3 (WINAI ON BOMBINGS) ¶C. BANGKOK 2 (BOMBINGS) ¶D. 06 BANGKOK 7594 (CASE AGAINST THAKSIN) Classified By: AMBASSADOR RALPH L. BOYCE. REASON 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) Summary. In a January 4 briefing for the diplomatic corps, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Permanent Secretary Krit Garnjarna-Goonchorn reiterated Prime Minister Surayud's public comments laying blame for the December 31 bomb attacks in Bangkok on "people who lost their political benefits." Although providing no new evidence from the ongoing investigation, Army Generals Anupong Paojinda and Saprang Kalayanamitra provided their own analysis why southern separatists were probably not behind the attacks. The Ambassador urged the RTG to conduct a fair, rigorous investigation and to provide any evidence in the case to interested embassies as soon as possible. GEN Anupong categorically denied that the government would either halt efforts to lift martial law in Bangkok or consider reinstating it in the future. While Krit stated that the bomb blasts would have no effect on the government's commitment to a new constitution and elections "in the shortest possible time frame," GEN Anupong suggested that the timetable should be accelerated. Following the briefing, Krit provided some interesting background on why the police--who are in charge of the investigation--were not present at the briefing. Septel will detail the Ambassador's private conversations with Krit and Anupong on martial law and democracy. End Summary. NO NEW BOMBSHELLS -------------- ¶2. (C) On January 4, the Ambassador attended a briefing provided by Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Permanent Secretary Krit Garnjarna-Goonchorn and Royal Thai Army (RTA) SIPDIS Assistant CINCs Anupong Paojinda and Saprang Kalayanamitra for the diplomatic corps on the December 31 bomb attacks in Bangkok. Permsec Krit provided the main points of the presentation, expressing condolences for the nine foreigners injured in the blast and pledging improved security in the capital for foreign diplomats, residents and tourists. In a very carefully worded statement,
Krit pointed out that the investigation into the blasts continues, but asked the assembled diplomats to refer to Prime Minister Surayud's recent public statements (ref C) blaming perpetrators harboring ill will to the country. Krit explained that the PM was referring to groups who "lost out politically." Links to the southern separatist movement were "rather unlikely." According to Krit, Surayud "is trying to provide analysis devoid of political bias." Any further analysis is likely to cross into "speculation" but, Krit added, "the Army may have information that I do not." ¶3. (C) Krit outlined the expansion of security efforts underway in Bangkok at the airport, embassies and tourist sites. The Ministry of Interior has been instructed to boost security in the provinces as well. The government is focusing on improving intelligence collection, expanding the number of closed circuit cameras in Bangkok and implementing a public tip-line for suspicious activity. According to Krit, all security activities are being coordinated under the Army-led Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC). Krit explained that, while future attacks cannot be ruled out, the RTG is trying to implement the lessons learned after the 2005 London bombings and urge people to "get on with their daily lives." ¶4. (C) Despite this boost in security, Krit maintained that the interim government remains focused on its national reconciliation and democracy efforts. The bomb attacks "will not derail" these efforts, and Krit reiterated the government's intention to produce a new constitution and hold free and fair elections "in the shortest time possible." BANGKOK 00000059 002 OF 003 MARTIAL LAW AND DEMOCRACY -------------- ¶5. (C) While Generals Anupong and Saprang--who are also leading members of the Council on National Security (CNS)--did not provide prepared statements, they dominated the question and answer session that followed. In response to a question on the status of martial law in the capital, GEN Anupong admitted that the government's order lifting martial law in Bangkok and much of the country had not yet taken effect, but explained that the government had no intention to stop the process or call for a new imposition of martial law in the capital. According to Anupong, those areas that will remain under martial law, even after this order is signed by the King, will be subject to regular review. Krit added that the timeline for a return to democracy is enshrined in the interim constitution. The government will make an effort to accelerate the timetable, but, "at a minimum" will keep to this timeline. Anupong said that the timetable should be accelerated. WHODUNNIT? -------------- ¶6. (C) Several diplomats asked for further information on the details of the attacks, evidence collected and Surayud's assertion that a southern separatist link was unlikely. The Ambassador pressed for the government to conduct a rigorous investigation under the law, and to provide resulting evidence to interested embassies as soon as possible. Anupong stressed that the investigation remains ongoing and will focus on evidence and be conducted "under the law." He also confirmed that the RTG had intelligence warning of a possible "incident" in Bangkok before the end of the year, but this information lacked details on the location, timing and nature of this event. Saprang echoed this information, saying that government officials were surprised that the perpetrators of the attacks would focus on a holiday like New Year's. Saprang said that security officials expected a "disruptive" event, not bomb attacks, and were caught off guard. ¶7. (C) While failing to provide any new evidence disproving a southern link, Saprang and Anupong both provided their arguments against separatist involvement. Anupong admitted that officials are not positive that southern militants were not involved in the attacks. However, the timing of the bombings, during an Islamic holiday (Note: the Eid Al-Adha fell on December 31 this year. End Note) and the nature of the devices used--smaller and less lethal than those in the South--supports this conclusion, he said. According to Anupong, the December 31 bombs were completely different from those used in the South. Moreover, the attacks in Bangkok were not likely to benefit the separatists. Just the opposite, according to Anupong. Insurgent attacks in Bangkok would inspire nationwide outrage. ¶8. (C) Saprang agreed, emphasizing that, in his view, there is no link between the December 31 attacks and the South. According to Saprang, the separatists in the South believe that they have the advantage, because the population is living in a state of fear. Expanding their attacks to Bangkok would only invite a backlash; it would be counterproductive. Moreover, if the southern militants did conduct the Bangkok attacks it would be to their advantage to take credit for this operation, and they have not done so. (Comment: Saprang did not further explain the inherent contradiction between these two thoughts. End Comment.) In Saprang's view, this reinforces his conclusion that the perpetrators of the attacks are trying to discredit the government and not related to the restive South. According to Saprang, the masterminds behind the bombings intended to block the government's efforts to return to democracy. Saprang asserted that the attacks were an attempt to discredit the current government and to erode public support for Surayud. BACKGROUND ON THE BRIEFING BANGKOK 00000059 003 OF 003 -------------- ¶9. (C) Following the briefing, the Ambassador met privately with Permsec Krit and asked why, if the investigation was "under the law," there were no police representatives present. Krit did not directly answer the question, but explained that the government's initial plan was to have Krit and CNS Secretary General Winai Phattiyakul conduct the briefing. Winai, however, was traveling upcountry and unable to attend, but did not want to delay the briefing. When MFA officials asked CNS Chairman and Army commander Sonthi Boonyaratglin who should attend the briefing, Sonthi suggested GEN Saprang. When GEN Anupong learned that Saprang--among the most outspoken and personally anti-Thaksin figures in the Army--would be briefing the diplomatic corps, Anupong insisted he attend as well, to serve as the "antidote" to Saprang. Krit went on to explain that, shortly before the briefing, he and the two generals had sat down to prepare their points. Saprang, according to Krit, was very emotional in denying any suggestions of a southern separatist connection to the bombings and convinced that Thaksin supporters were behind the blasts. Just before entering the briefing auditorium, Saprang began to calm down and even asked Anupong to "reel him in" if he got carried away. Finally, Krit told the Ambassador that a senior Thai official had told him that former PM Chavalit Yongchaiyuth had, in fact, been paid off by Thaksin in order to destabilize the government. COMMENT -------------- )- ¶10. (C) Krit and Anupong's comments further committing the government to adhere to the democracy timeline were welcome. In fact, Anupong's outspoken call for an acceleration of the timetable to elections was surprising and hints at the diversity of opinion within the CNS. While the lack of new details supporting Surayud's assertion that political figures, and not southern separatists, were behind the attacks was disappointing (if expected),Saprang and Anupong both made some good points in favor of this theory. However valid these points may be, they further underscore how hard it will be for the CNS to take a dispassionate view of the ensuing investigation. BOYCE

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -