SOUTHERN THAILAND: DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GENERALS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 005827 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR MLS, NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2017 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH SUBJECT: SOUTHERN THAILAND: DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GENERALS REF: A. A. BANGKOK 05696 (NEW COMMANDER PLEDGES TO KEEP ARMY OUT OF POLITICS) ¶B. B. BANGKOK 05435 (SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: INSIDE THE ARM'S RAID OPERATIONS) ¶C. C. BANGKOK 04217 (GOOD POLICY POOR IMPLIMENTATION) ¶D. D. BANGKOGK 04168 (LEADING ACADEMIC EXPERTS SEE SOME IMPROVEMENT) ¶E. E. BANGKOK 03813 (SECURITY FORCES MOVING FORWARD AS SECTARIAN TENSIONS SIMMER) BANGKOK 00005827 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission James F. Entwistle, reason 1.4 ( b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In early November, poloff attended a dinner with senior Thai military and police officials involved in security operations in Thailand's deep south. The officials were remarkably candid about some of their shortcomings for dealing with the South, including real coordination between police and military units. Although the Commander of the Royal Thai Army (RTA) has been working on new tactics for the South, we saw no evidence of a new strategy to deal with the on-going insurgency. End summary. ¶2. (C) On 4 and 5 November, poloff accompanied representatives from DoD/Force Protection Detachment (FPD) to a meeting/dinner in Phuket hosted by an advisor to the Governor of Phuket. The dinner was part of a ceremony to turn three blast suppression blankets over to regional Royal Thai Police (RTP) units, and to discuss issues related to the protection of DoD personnel during ship visits. Thai attendees included the Royal Thai Army (RTA) 4th Army Region Commander, Lieutenant General Wirot Buajaroon, Region 8 Police Commissioner, Police Lieutenant General Tanee Tawitsri, and the Executive Director of the Phuket Airport, Mr. Pornchai Eua-aree. The Commander of the Royal Thai Navy 3rd Fleet, Admiral Supot Prueksa, attended the ceremony only. ¶3. (C) The dinner was a drawn-out, amiable affair. Wirot, Tanee, and Pornchai appeared to know each other well, and Tanee and Wirot appeared to be in agreement on most issues. (Note: When asked about his relationship with the Royal Thai Army, General Tanee said that on anything involving militants or the insurgency, he reports to General Wirot. This is noteworthy given the animosity that exists between the RTP and RTA, and reflects the RTP's working relationship with the Regional Internal Security Operations Command, headed by Wirot (see para 7). End note.) Emphasizing the Need for Coordination ¶4. (C) While discussing insurgent attacks in southern Thailand, Wirot and Tanee agreed that a major problem they had in actual counterinsurgency operations in southern Thailand was a lack of coordination between the police and the army. When an incident occurs, both police and military units rush to the scene without understanding their duties and responsibilities. According to the Generals, this confusion was the result of the police and the army conducting separate command post exercises. They said rehearsals are never conducted--units do war gaming in their respective war rooms with terrain models, but when a real incident occurs, there is considerable confusion over who has what responsibility. They emphasized it would be beneficial to have both the police and military train together on situations similar to what is happening in the South. Tanee commented that some police officers in the past had been trained in crisis management, but they were stationed in Bangkok instead of the three southern border provinces. Police officers in the South actually tasked with counterinsurgency operations have no knowledge of crisis management. (Note: We have been informed repeatedly by both army and police personnel that the overarching objective for security forces when responding to an incident seems to be "a race to see who gets the credit." If an IED is found, multiple units rush to the scene, fail to control the crowds, and disregard standard operating procedures for managing the scene and rendering the IED safe. Militants capitalize on the ensuing confusion, detonating the device when it would create the highest number of casualties. End note.) BANGKOK 00005827 002.2 OF 003 ... And A New Strategy ¶5. (C) The discussion regarding problems with police/military joint operations gave rise to questions about press reports describing a new strategy for southern Thailand. According to the reports, RTA chief General Anupong is overhauling army operations as part of a new strategy for the South, with each of the four Army Regions being given responsibility for dealing with the insurgency in one of the four provinces plagued by the on-going violence. General Wirot would not allow himself to be pinned down on whether there was a new strategy for dealing with the southern turmoil. His simple response was that his goal was to separate the militants from the general population, and that the army was now more aggressive. According to Wirot, the press articles were incorrect in how they characterized the deployment of personnel from other army regions to the South. The 4th Army Region is still in charge, with the 4th Army Region commander the highest element in the chain of command. Wirot said "regardless where they come from, police, tahan pran (rangers),3rd, 4th, 1st or 2nd Army, when they come to the South, they all work for me, I am in command of all forces in the South." According to Wirot, the current battalions in the South are spread too thin and he is short of command staff, so personnel from other army regions are deploying battalions to the South in support of Region 4 operations. The idea is to give each Army region an area of operations (AO) for supplying battalions and to maintain continuity of command. In preparation for deployments, unit commanders at all levels (battalion, company, platoon and squad) are sent to their AOs in order to talk to the units they will replace and get familiar with their future operations. (Note: General Tanee was silent during Wirot,s depiction of the chain of command in the south. End note.) ¶6. (C) Wirot said AOs for the Army Regions in the deep south are: AO 1, Narathiwat Province: 1st Army Region AO 2, Pattani Province: 2nd Army Region AO 3, Yala Province: 3rd Army Region AO 4, Four districts of Songkhla Province (Chana, Tepha, Na Thawi, and Saba Yoi): 4th Army Region ¶7. (C) In an attempt to get Wirot to explain the relationship between civilian and military leaders on issues affecting the insurgency in the South, poloff questioned Wirot on the command structure of the regional Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC),the organization responsible for resolving the conflict in the South. (Note: The ISOC is a national level organization, dominated by the military, mandated with resolving internal security challenges. There are four regional ISOCs subordinate to the national level ISOC, and corresponding to the four army area region commands. End note.) Wirot said he was the director of the regional ISOC in the South. At the provincial and district levels, police, military, and civilians work together as equals to resolve security issues. The military, however, is in charge of conducting operations and responding to incidents. He described provincial and district levels of the ISOC as "task forces" with the provincial governor as the senior civilian involved. Police Perspective ¶8. (C) General Tanee was slightly more candid about strategy and tactics. He acknowledged shortcomings in the police response to the violence, acknowledging that they cannot just keep suspected militants away from the South. According to Tanee, one of his biggest problems is obtaining enough evidence to prosecute suspected militants. If someone confesses, he said, they can bring charges. However, when suspects realize there is no evidence, they recant their story. In the tactical sweep and arrest operations, according to Tanee, the army leads the way by going in and grabbing the suspects. The police are then expected to go in, collect evidence, and do an investigation. The problem is that by the time the police go in, the crime scene is no BANGKOK 00005827 003.2 OF 003 longer intact and the evidence is often destroyed. In high profile cases, the media also enters and confuses things. Information Sharing ¶9. (C) The Generals did not acknowledge any problem with information sharing between army and police units. General Wirot said intelligence from units at all levels conducting operations in the three southern provinces is disseminated through three dimensions: lower levels in the chain of command to upper levels, upper levels to lower levels, and among adjacent or related units. Further, intelligence received at any level of chain of command will be disseminated to all the units involved in any related operation or situation. ¶10. (C) Comment: Revelations that police and military units are less than well coordinated at operational and tactical levels while conducting operations and responding to incidents were not surprising and confirmed our impression from previous encounters with junior level officers. The senior leaders at the meeting were open about their problems - particularly after repeated Thai attempts to put the infrastructure in place to allow for better coordination between security forces involved in the South. Wirot was not able to clarify his strategy for dealing with the southern violence. Although new RTA Commander in Chief General Anupong Paochinda has been actively working to roll out a new southern strategy, we saw no sign of it here. BOYCE