THAIS PREPARED TO SIGN CHARTER, DISCUSS BURMA AT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 005801 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM KDEM KPAO ASEAN TH BM SUBJECT: THAIS PREPARED TO SIGN CHARTER, DISCUSS BURMA AT ASEAN SUMMIT REF: BANGKOK 5455 BANGKOK 00005801 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission James F. Entwistle, reason 1.4 ( b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 7, Thailand's National Legislative Assembly (NLA) cleared the way for Prime Minister Surayud to sign the ASEAN Charter at the ASEAN Summit scheduled for November 18-22 in Singapore. While the Charter passed on the first reading, the NLA did not approve the blueprint for realizing the ASEAN Economic Community - also due to be signed at the Summit - on the first reading. The NLA sent the blueprint back to committee for further review and will give it a second reading either November 14 or 15. However, these documents are not linked, and Thailand would be able to proceed with signing the Charter even if the NLA fails to approve the blueprint. MFA working level contacts confirmed that the RTG was prepared to focus on Burma at the Singapore Summit, and even planned to send their foremost MFA experts on Burma to support the RTG ASEAN team. Post obtained a copy of the final draft of the ASEAN Charter (not yet publicly released),as adopted by the High Level Task Force on October 20 in Vientiane, and forwarded it to EAP/MLS. END SUMMARY. -------------- THAILAND TO SIGN ASEAN CHARTER -------------- ¶2. (C) Despite speculation to the contrary from fellow ASEAN members in recent weeks, Prime Minister Surayud received approval November 7 from the NLA, during the legislature's first reading of the agreement, to sign the ASEAN Charter during the November 18-22 Summit. Thailand's August 2007 constitution stipulates that the legislature must approve international treaties for signature and determine who within the RTG is authorized to sign the treaty (reftel). A working level MFA contact present at the reading described the NLA's discussion of the Charter as positive and noted that legislators spent only one hour debating it before voting 107 in favor of granting signing approval to the PM with one abstention. ¶3. (C) Therefore, there are no additional obstacles that would prevent PM Surayud from joining his fellow ASEAN leaders in signing the Charter in Singapore next week. Once Thailand becomes a signatory to the Charter, the agreement will return to the NLA for ratification. The Charter would not be considered a binding document until it is ratified by the NLA and enacted into law. According to our MFA contact, each ASEAN member country has one year from the date of signature to ratify the Charter. At this point, there is no indication that the ASEAN Charter would face any opposition in the ratification process. Yet it remains to be seen whether the current Thai government will ratify it, or if the Thais will wait for the new legislature to be formed in early ¶2008. -------------- CHARTER HAS NO SURPRISES -------------- ¶4. (C) Kanita Sapphaisal, an MFA officer deeply involved in the drafting of the ASEAN Charter for the past two years, told us in a November 8 meeting that the new Charter did not fundamentally change ASEAN as an institution. Rather, it formalized relationships between the member countries and confirmed areas that the institution already addressed. In BANGKOK 00005801 002.2 OF 003 fact, she mentioned in a resigned manner, the charter essentially continued ASEAN's tradition of reliance on consultation and consensus. Kanita added that during the final round of negotiations in Vientiane October 18-20, the drafters changed very little in the Charter and only worked out minor, technical details. ¶5. (C) When asked if recent events in Burma had had any effect on the final negotiations, Kanita replied that Burma had been a non-issue in Vientiane. She clarified that observation, however, by noting that participants had agreed Burma was to be discussed at the November Summit in Singapore. ¶6. (C) The real accomplishment of the Charter, remarked Kanita, was the inclusion of a human rights component. Following up on our October 15 meeting with Thai MFA Deputy Director General for ASEAN Affairs Manasvi Srisodapol, we asked Kanita if the Vientiane negotiations had made any progress in clarifying how the human rights component would function in practice (reftel). Kanita conceded that the final draft of the Charter made no explicit references to enforcement or funding, but recommended the formation of a commission that would address those points at a future date. -------------- NLA STALLED ON ECONOMIC BLUEPRINT -------------- ¶7. (U) The same day the NLA approved the ASEAN Charter for signature, it sent back to committee the blueprint for realizing the ASEAN Economic Community. This document, which laid the foundation for the creation of an ASEAN economic block by 2015, is also scheduled to be signed at the Singapore Summit. According to press reports, the NLA felt the blueprint had too many far-reaching implications for Thailand's economy and trade. It will come before the NLA again November 14 or 15 and if not passed during this second reading, would not be approved in time for PM Surayud to sign it at the Summit. However, Kanita noted that the economic blueprint and the ASEAN Charter are not linked, which meant that the NLA's failure to authorize the blueprint in time for the Summit did not affect the PM's ability to sign the Charter. -------------- RTG SENDING BURMA TEAM TO SUMMIT -------------- ¶8. (C) Thailand expected Burma to loom large during Summit deliberations, MFA Burma Desk Officer Jirusaya Birananda told us on November 9. As a result, the MFA planned to send at least two of its Burma experts to attend the ASEAN Summit, Jirusaya and Kallayana Vipattipumiprates, the Director of the Department of East Asian Affairs' Division that includes Burma. Jirusaya and Kallayana would support the MFA ASEAN Division representatives in discussions about Burma expected to take place at the highest levels during the Summit. ¶9. (C) In addition, Jirusaya described a tactic to confront Burma that Kallayana was working on to be introduced at the Summit. Based on a three step approach, Kallayana's plan has ASEAN leaders presenting Burmese officials with each country's views on the situation in Burma. The Burmese would then have an opportunity to present the GOB's outlook on the most constructive role for the UN and ASEAN. Finally, Kallayana proposed that ASEAN introduce the concept of economic and humanitarian assistance to Burma from the region, with each ASEAN member contributing what they deemed BANGKOK 00005801 003.2 OF 003 most appropriate. According to Jirusaya, this three step approach could act as an opening for discussions between Burma and the rest of ASEAN. It was in keeping with the 'ASEAN way' because it indirectly addressed Burma's problems without being politically confrontational. ¶10. (C) Jirusaya stated that the Thais had already discussed this idea with and received support from their counterparts at the Singapore MFA. However, she admitted that the Thais had yet to insert the idea into the Summit agenda and could not be certain that they would be able to receive the authority from the RTG to do so in time for next week's gathering. Nevertheless, she emphasized that this approach was meant to complement the efforts of UN Special Envoy to Burma Ibrahim Gambari as Thailand held firm in their belief that the UN should maintain the lead in resolving the crisis in Burma. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) The signing of the ASEAN Charter on the 40th anniversary of the organization will be the centerpiece of the upcoming Summit. The Thai MFA worked hard to successfully ensure that the RTG would be able to sign it on time. Kallayana and Jirusaya have more than ten years combined experience working in Burma, and they are the MFA's biggest proponents of forward-leaning efforts to address the current crisis there. Although the two career diplomats are committed to the cause, they are held back by the RTG's overall reluctance to place pressure on its neighbor and by the 'ASEAN way' of consultation and consensus. Kallayana's three step proposal represents an effort to work around these trepidations, though it is unclear to us whether the RTG will ultimately support this approach or whether it would even have much impact on the Burmese delegation. BOYCE