LOCAL NGOS TELL A/S SILVERBERG THEY SUPPORT USG

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM KDEM KPAO TH BM
SUBJECT: LOCAL NGOS TELL A/S SILVERBERG THEY SUPPORT USG
POLICY ON BURMA

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Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Five prominent organizations working on Burma-related
issues in Thailand expressed their support for USG policy on
Burma and offered ideas for next steps during a November 5
meeting with I/O Assistant Secretary Silverberg and the
Ambassador. Overall, the group felt that targeted sanctions
against junta members and their cohorts were an effective
tool to pressure the GOB. They confirmed reports of Burmese
opposition leaders and monks fleeing to Thailand, although
they emphasized that the issue of Burmese seeking refugee
status here was an ongoing matter that desperately needed
increased support. Finally, they presented their views on
the possible roles ASEAN and the UN could play in realizing
national reconciliation in Burma. END SUMMARY.

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SANCTIONS KEY TO PRESSURING GOB
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2. (C) In a small gathering at the Ambassador's residence on
November 5, the Ambassador and I/O Assistant Secretary
Silverberg, in Bangkok to address the situation in Burma, met
with a cross section of NGOs based in Thailand and working on
Burma. The group included Charm Tong from the Shan Women's
Action Network (SWAN),Aung Zaw from the news journal
Irrawaddy, Sann Aung from the National Coalition Government
of the Union of Burma (NCGUB),Jack Dunford from the Thai
Burma Border Consortium (TBBC),and Sunai Phasuk from Human
Rights Watch.


3. (C) There was a consensus among the assembled group that
U.S. sanctions were an effective mechanism to get at the
Burmese junta. The U.S.'s recent announcement of targeted
sanctions in particular resonated throughout the Burmese
leadership and their supporters, our contacts agreed. Aung
Zaw stated that despite attempts to appear unmoved by the new
sanctions, the junta's business partners are feeling
pressure. He claimed notorious Than Shwe insider Tay Za was
to convene a meeting in Bangkok with his associates to
address the problems created for their companies by the most
recent round of U.S. sanctions.


4. (C) Sann Aung championed increased U.S. sanctions on
Burma, and proposed that we coordinate our efforts with the
EU and Australia, who have also announced sanctions in recent
weeks. Aung Zaw agreed that sanctions would be even more
effective if those countries imposing them had a united
voice. In response to Silverberg's asking how best to target
expanded sanctions, Sann Aung suggested we examine the
business dealings of the state-owned Myanmar Oil and Energy
Enterprise and Myanmar Gem Enterprise. He added that the
U.S. needed to prevent these businesses and their executives
from being able to conduct financial transactions, both
official and personal. Charm Tong interjected that, in
addition to Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia also sheltered
assets of the GOB and Burmese elites, although she provided
no further details.


5. (C) Aung Zaw scoffed at recent announcements by the French
and Burmese Foreign Ministers, which called for economic

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incentives for the junta. Zaw recalled a famous quote from a
former Burmese Foreign Minister that epitomized why Aung Zaw
believed the GOB did not care about incentives: "Do not give
us bananas, we are not monkeys."

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BURMESE REFUGEES IN THAILAND ONGOING PROBLEM
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6. (C) Charm Tong related that in recent weeks numerous monks
had entered Thailand from Shan State. These monks were
native to the Shan State, and many had been caught up in the
1996 massive relocation of the Shan population.
Subsequently, they had traveled to Rangoon and Mandalay to
further their education, only to return to the Shan State
after the September protests in those cities. Charm Tong
reported that the GOB regularly checked monasteries in Shan
State to determine which monks had returned as instructed and
which had failed to show up. This form of intimidation had
caused many monks to flee to Thailand, stated Charm Tong,
where they had tried to blend in with the migrant worker
population. She expected monks to continue coming out of
Burma for the foreseeable future.


7. (C) Aung Zaw recounted how, following the 1988 protests in
Burma, more than 10,000 refugees, including himself, had fled
to Thailand. He stated that there were not as many people
fleeing the recent crackdown. This was because it was more
difficult to get out of Burma now, due to the increased
number of armed checkpoints and decreased presence of Karen
National Union (KNU) strongholds along the border, which had
been safe havens for fleeing activists in 1988. Dunford
emphasized that many people who came to Thailand after the
1988 crackdown did not come to seek refugee status, but
rather to regroup with the intention of returning to Burma to
continue their fight.


8. (C) While he recognized the importance of assistance to
recently arrived political activists from Burma, Sunai
highlighted the fact that the refugee issue was not new in
Thailand. This was an ongoing problem that included
thousands of Burmese, particularly from the country's ethnic
minorities, entering Thailand as humanitarian and economic
refugees. Dunford agreed, and emphasized that what the
Burmese military did to protesters in Rangoon in September
has long been routine practice in the border regions. The
military acted with impunity he stated. Dunford noted that
refugee support organizations such as TBBC faced a financial
crisis at the moment. As international attention focused on
events inside Burma, many governments had explored how to
increase their economic support to Burmese opposition and
humanitarian groups. While Dunford appreciated such
considerations, he warned that the refugee organizations
operating on the border were in desperate need of increased
funding as well.

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ROLE OF UN AND ASEAN
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9. (C) In response to the group's conclusion that the U.S.
needed to coordinate its actions with other countries,
Silverberg asked under what umbrella we would come together.
Aung Zaw cited the UN as a good place to start. Silverberg
expressed concern that while visits from various UN

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representatives were positive overall, it appeared the junta
used the promise of future visits to extract concessions from
Gambari. Sunai agreed, and stated that the junta put on a
show whenever Gambari visited Burma. He added that if the UN
Secretary General had a personal representative permanently

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based in Rangoon, the international community, through the
auspices of the UN, could focus on a much broader spectrum of
issues.


10. (C) Several participants also voiced the need for ASEAN
to take a more prominent role in pushing the junta to
undertake meaningful reform. The Ambassador mentioned that
ASEAN made a strong statement in New York in September, but
he wondered what the group thought about the progress within
the ASEAN framework. Sunai stated that ASEAN needed to be
prodded to be more than a talk shop. Since departing from
New York, most ASEAN officials had returned to business as
usual with Burma. If at the November ASEAN Summit the
leaders were to say nothing more than that Burma's behavior
is unacceptable, Sunai continued, they would have essentially
not done anything new since their New York statements.
Adding that it was difficult to mobilize ASEAN as a whole,
Sunai recommended the U.S. focus on bilateral relations with
key countries such as Indonesia and Vietnam.

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COMMENT
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11. (C) A/S Silverberg's interlocutors represent some of the
best informed and most credible figures from the NGO
community in Thailand who focus on Burma. They seemed
sincere in welcoming our sanctions, but we noted an overall
tone of pessimism on their part. They seemed particularly
skeptical that ASEAN would mobilize effectively to support
real change in Burma in the near term. End Comment.


12. (U) A/S Silverberg did not have the opportunity to clear
this cable.
BOYCE