NEXT ASEAN SECRETARY GENERAL ON BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 005695 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM KDEM KPAO ASEAN TH BM SUBJECT: NEXT ASEAN SECRETARY GENERAL ON BURMA BANGKOK 00005695 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: ASEAN's incoming Secretary General, Surin Pitsuwan, stated that a regional approach was the best option to resolve the current crisis in Burma. During a November 5 meeting with I/O Assistant Secretary Silverberg and the Ambassador, Surin proposed that ASEAN, China, India, and Japan come together and act as the guarantor of a process for change in Burma. The region preferred to handle its own affairs, he said. But he added that such an approach could include a mechanism that allowed Western countries to intervene if the regional core failed to meet pre-determined benchmarks. Surin conceded that elements of his proposal needed to be further developed, and it would become unnecessary if China were to agree to the UN's current proposal, which would include countries from outside the region. However, he emphasized alternatives should be explored if the Burmese and/or the Chinese rejected the UN proposal. A/S Silverberg and the Ambassador expressed skepticism about his proposal. Surin plans to present this concept to Undersecretary Burns, EAP PDAS Davies, and EAP DAS Marciel on November 13. Surin also presented his priorities for ASEAN, as he prepared to take over as Secretary General of the organization in January 2008. END SUMMARY. -------------- REGION KNOWS BEST -------------- ¶2. (C) On November 5, I/O Assistant Secretary Silverberg, in Bangkok regarding the situation in Burma, and the Ambassador met with the future Secretary General of ASEAN, Surin Pitsuwan. ASEAN should not be sidelined in attempts to resolve the crisis in Burma, stated Surin at the onset of the meeting. He felt this was important for the sake of the institutional strengthening of ASEAN. The U.S. and EU should take a step back and allow ASEAN to work with other regional players such as China, India, and Japan. This approach would explore dialogue at an intimate level, he claimed, rather than the unwieldy grouping proposed by UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari. It would act as a guarantor of the process rather than provide the substance of the process, which would be determined by the Burmese. Surin believed that the Burmese junta might be receptive to this proposal because the 
generals would see themselves as dealing with countries with similar experiences, who would not be inclined to completely marginalize the military. The generals feared the international approach, opined Surin, because it implied outside actors dictating change. ¶3. (C) Surin believed that the Chinese did not want to internationalize the response to the crisis in Burma. However, he felt the Chinese might support an initiative led by ASEAN that focused on a core group anchored in the region rather than New York. The region had a long tradition of non-interference, Surin pointed out. However, an ASEAN-plus approach would provide China the cover it needed to break with this tradition because it would demonstrate that there was an emerging regional consensus for political reconciliation and transition in Burma. Surin did not comment on India's or Japan's likelihood of supporting this proposal. ¶4. (C) Silverberg told Surin that there existed a perception in the West that now was the time to act in Burma, and that countries in Asia had yet to indicate that a regional process would be pro-active. Surin stood his ground and replied that the West could blame ASEAN for not taking a firmer stance against Burma over the past decade, but international dynamics had changed. The Ambassador agreed with the need for ASEAN and other countries in the region to play a role in BANGKOK 00005695 002.2 OF 003 resolving Burma's current crisis. However, he questioned how a regional process would be received by opposition elements inside Burma, who mistrust China and look to the U.S. in particular for support. He also pointed out that Surin's proposal could be perceived as a warmed-over version of the discredited Bangkok Process of several years ago. Surin replied that the answer to their concerns lay in the two-tiered design of his proposal. He explained that the core group would be regional, but that the process would include benchmarks to hold this group accountable. If the regional group failed to meet the agreed upon benchmarks, the Western countries and/or the UN would be able justifiably call them out. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador indicated that endorsement from the National League for Democracy and the leaders of major ethnic groups in Burma would significantly improve any prospects for Surin's proposal. Surin acknowledged that he had not finalized the details of his concept of a regional approach. Silverberg and the Ambassador had valid concerns, he recognized, and he agreed that such a process must demonstrate definitive action and progress in order to be credible in the eyes of the international community and those working for change inside Burma. Surin conceded that if China accepted Gambari's offer to join talks with the UN and players from both within and without the region, his idea for a regional approach led by ASEAN would be unnecessary. He stated that ASEAN continued to wait for China to signal its preferred approach to Burma; meanwhile, ASEAN would publicly support Gambari. -------------- ASEAN UNDER SURIN'S LEADERSHIP -------------- ¶6. (C) Surin also explained his priorities for ASEAN once he takes over as Secretary General on January 1, 2008. He viewed his mandate as the spokesman of ASEAN responsible for strengthening the organization's various initiatives with international institutions. Under this rubric, he identified three communities within ASEAN: security (consisting of the members of the Asian Regional Forum),economic, and socio-cultural. The socio-cultural community would require the most attention, he surmised, as it was essential to creating an identity among the ten ASEAN member countries. Community building would take the form of projects in the areas of health, media, education, and the environment. ¶7. (C) Silverberg mentioned that the U.S. built its sense of community based on shared principles and ethics among its population and asked Surin the basis upon which ASEAN would build its community. Surin answered that certain human rights principles would comprise a part of the sense of identity, but that due to the varied backgrounds of the ten countries, they would have to be careful about identifying common values. He welcomed that the new ASEAN charter contained a human rights mechanism, but stated that now ASEAN must focus on how this mechanism would be put in to practice. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) Surin's proposal for a regional process will resonate within ASEAN, as have similar suggestions made by Thailand and Indonesia. We worry that ASEAN, despite its recent helpful language condemning the crackdown in Burma, has not yet demonstrated a serious commitment to pushing the Burmese regime to address international concerns, and that most individual ASEAN governments are comfortable with China's stance to date toward Burma. It is unclear to us whether BANGKOK 00005695 003.2 OF 003 Surin's proposal reflects primarily a well considered view on how best to bring about change in Burma, or a desire to provide ASEAN (and its Secretary General) with the highest degree of influence and stature. On November 13 Surin is scheduled to meet with Undersecretary Burns, EAP/PDAS Davies, and EAP/DAS Marciel. He plans to present his proposal in these meetings as well. End Comment. ¶9. (U) A/S Silverberg did not have the opportunity to clear this cable. BOYCE