NEW COMMANDER PLEGES TO KEEP ARMY OUT OF POLITICS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 005694

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC KDEM MOPS TH
SUBJECT: NEW COMMANDER PLEGES TO KEEP ARMY OUT OF POLITICS

REF: A. BANGKOK 5647


B. BANGKOK 5600

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. In a four-eyes lunch I hosted for Royal Thai
Army (RTA) Commander in Chief General Anupong Paochinda, I
pressed for the Army not to interfere in the coming election.
Anupong promised to keep the Army out of politics and
predicted that the Democrats would form a government as a
minority party. Anupong described a new strategy for the
southern insurgency involving troops stationed in villages in
an attempt to break the nexus of support between villagers
and the insurgents. Anupong said he does not personally like
the Burmese military leaders and will minimize RTA ties with
the Burmese as much as possible in accordance with RTG
policy. After the heavy-handed, often-clumsy leadership of
General Sonthi, Anupong appears to be an Army leader
committed to a more professional military. End Summary.

ANUPONG'S POLITICAL FORECAST
--------------


2. (C) Anupong, who was relaxed and forthcoming, came to the
Residence for lunch on November 6. This was our first one on
one meeting since he took over command of the RTA. In
response to my inquiry about the upcoming election, Anupong
frankly predicted that the People's Power Party (PPP) would
likely win the most seats in the next parliament, though
achieving a majority of 241 seats was doubtful. According to
Thai political tradition, PPP would have the opportunity to
form the next government. It was unlikely, however, that
other parties would join PPP as this would result in
political conflict, Anupong predicted. As it was improbable
that the PPP would succeed in forming a government, Anupong
anticipated the Democrats would form a weak, unstable
coalition with an assertive PPP in the opposition. Anupong
asked if the international community would accept a minority
party forming a government. I replied that it would as long
as the election was free and fair and the will of the Thai
people was respected in forming the government. I noted that
minority parties had formed five governments in Thailand
since 1975.


3. (C) Anupong described a circumstance, though unlikely,
where the PPP won a majority of at least 241 seats and formed
the next government. I asked how the military would react to
that, and Anupong was resolute in insisting that the military
would stay out of politics and allow elected representatives
to form the next government. That said, he really did not
want to contemplate a PPP majority.


4. (C) Anupong commented that the character of Thai political
parties often reflects their financial backers; however, the
Democrats were mostly lawyers and not necessarily good
politicians. The Democrats' lack of success in expanding
their base over the past year had been a missed opportunity.
Anupong said it was too bad that the Democrats just could not
seem to connect with the rural masses.


5. (C) I asked about reports of documents produced by the
Council for National Security (Ref B) discussing the
strategies to discredit the pro-Thaksin People's Power Party
(PPP). Anupong admitted the military had drafted these
documents while General Sonthi Boonyaratglin was Army
commander. The intent had been to highlight the corruption
and harm to the nation brought on by Thai Rak Thai. Anupong
explained that, after the royal decree establishing the
election date, the Election Commission of Thailand had begun
to enforce campaign regulations. Therefore, the activities
described in the documents were no longer required.

RELATIONS WITH THAKSIN
--------------


6. (C) I queried Anupong about reports in Thai circles that
he had been friends with former PM Thaksin. (Note: Anupong
and Thaksin were pre-cadet class 10 classmates at the Thai
military prep school. End note.) Anupong said the two were
in different classrooms at the pre-cadet school. Therefore,
they knew each other only peripherally. As the former PM had

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taken the use of money in politics to a new level, Anupong
said he believes Thaksin had been bad for the country.
Furthermore, Anupong said he disagreed with Thaksin's posture
towards the palace. (Note. Anupong reportedly is favored by
the Queen and served on the King's and Queen's Guards. End
note.)

NO CONFLICT WITH GENERAL SAPRANG
--------------


7. (C) Anupong maintained that he had good relations with
General Saprang Kalayanaramitra, now Deputy Permanent
Secretary at the Ministry of Defense. Saprang was like an

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elder brother and did not resent Anupong's selection for the
top position in the Army, Anupong explained. During the
lead-up to the decision on who would replace General Sonthi,
Anupong said he had recommended to Saprang that he maintain a
lower profile but Saprang ignored his advice. Anupong said
he then approached Saprang's wife to ask her to try to
convince Saprang to calm down; she declined, however.
Anupong claimed that Saprang was too close to the People's
Alliance for Democracy (PAD); the military and the PAD should
not be so close. Despite his firebrand image, Saprang was a
personally nice person, Anupong commented.

A NEW SOUTHERN STRATEGY
--------------


8. (C) I asked Anupong about reports that he was implementing
a new strategy for the Southern insurgency. Anupong replied
that the Army's strategy had been tactically flawed.
Previously, troops would only leave their bases during
daylight and villages would receive a patrol perhaps once per
week. This permitted easy support for the Runda Kumpulan
Kecil (RKK) insurgents. Villagers would create hiding places
for weapons and inform RKK members of the location. The RKK
insurgent would then carry out an attack and replace the
weapons in the hiding place. Security forces had been unable
to identify or capture the operatives when they responded,
Anupong said.


9. (C) Anupong stated that the new strategy was to locate
security forces in the villages. In order to position forces
in the villages, Anupong has ordered the four Army regions to
deploy more troops to the South and to send the Chief of
Staff from each regional Army command to the South for better
coordination. The three aspects of the new strategy are
military action against insurgents, arresting and bringing
charges against those suspected of being insurgents, and
education and economic development.


10. (C) I raised with Anupong reports that Fourth Army had
blocked individuals suspected of being involved with the
insurgency from returning to their homes in the South (Ref
A). Would this strategy backfire by forcing individuals to
remain away from family and income sources, possibly
elevating the risk spreading the insurgency, I asked.
Anupong said this order had only recently come to his
knowledge. After learning of the order, he had forcefully
reminded Lieutenant General Wiroj Buacharoon, the Fourth Army
commander, that he was the Army commander-in-chief and told
Wiroj to rescind the order. Anupong had told Wiroj that the
order would likely make the insurgency worse and create an
international image problem.

PETCHABUN HMONG
--------------


11. (C) I told Anupong that we were very concerned about
persistent reports that the RTA plans to repatriate Lao Hmong
in the Huay Nam Khaw camp in Petchabun. A transparent
screening process for those with a legitimate fear of return
due to violence and political persecution was essential.
Anupong said he understood our concerns and committed to
address the issue.

NO RESPECT FOR THE BURMESE REGIME
--------------


12. (C) I told Anupong that we believe that in the current
climate the Thai military should keep contact with the

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Burmese military to an absolute minimum. Anupong said he has
been to Burma to meet the leaders of the regime but he
personally does not like them. Some examples of the
deceitful behavior include the Burmese junta leaders cheating
at golf and trying to get their guests drunk while drinking
soft drinks disguised as alcohol, Anupong said. The RTA
would follow Thai government policy on Burma as a matter of
protocol, but as commander, he would work to insure that RTA
contact with the regime was kept to a minimum, Anupong
explained.

COMMENT
--------------


13. (C) After the lack of vision and ill-considered
decision-making demonstrated by General Sonthi, Anupong seems
to offer a fresh perspective, despite his leadership role in
the coup. He appears receptive to our message on free and
fair elections. With his ties to the Palace and apparent
support among the Army ranks, Anupong may have the leverage
necessary to succeed in keeping the military out of politics.
However, as illustrated by his not knowing about the Fourth
Army order on the South, he will need to demonstrate the
ability to control regional Army commanders throughout the
country. While Anupong appears a professional soldier, the
Thai military remains deeply tangled in political affairs
after seizing power last year. It may not be easy for
Anupong, even if he is sincerely committed, to get the
military out of politics or to affect change within the RTA.

BOYCE