PRC POLITICAL OFFICER IN BANGKOK DISCUSSES BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 005585

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM TH CH BM
SUBJECT: PRC POLITICAL OFFICER IN BANGKOK DISCUSSES BURMA

REF: A. BEIJING 6075

B. COPE-GREENBERG 9/21/07 E-MAIL

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor David R. Greenberg, reason 1.
4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) A Chinese diplomat posted in Bangkok viewed
Singapore's strong public line on Burma as unwise and doubted
that Burma would be marginalized at the upcoming ASEAN
Summit. He saw little possibility that Indonesia could exert
meaningful influence on the Burmese regime. The diplomat
suggested that the USG should have further bilateral talks
with Burma in China and should offer positive incentives to
the Burmese government. He indicated PRC Embassy officers
did not maintain contact with Burmese exiles in Thailand. He
said that, in accordance with the recent Chinese Communist
Party's decision to take on more responsibilities in foreign
affairs, the PRC government would spend the next year
evaluating its ability to influence international events.
End Summary.

DISCUSSING BURMA AND ASEAN
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2. (C) We met on October 26 with Yao Wen, the Director
(second highest ranking officer) of the Political and Press
Affairs Section of the PRC Embassy in Bangkok. Much of the
conversation focused on the situation in Burma. Yao, who
appears to follow regional affairs closely, claimed not to
have received a readout of UN Special Envoy Gambari's
consultations in China.


3. (C) Yao -- whom we believe aimed to represent his
headquarters' views -- seemed dismayed by Singapore's
willingness to condemn openly the recent Burmese crackdown.
Singaporean officials ought to have considered the effect of
their condemnation on the Burmese regime, which had become
embittered toward ASEAN, Yao said. When we asked how the
crackdown might affect the upcoming ASEAN Summit, Yao said
that ASEAN nations needed Burma's participation in order to
bestow full legitimacy on the ASEAN Charter. Yao seemed
unable to envision other ASEAN nations excluding Burma from
signing the Charter or taking other steps to marginalize
Burma's status within the organization.


4. (C) Noting Yao's prior posting at the PRC Embassy in
Jakarta, we asked whether he felt that Indonesia, as ASEAN's
largest country, might play a special role in pressing the
Burmese regime. Yao doubted Indonesia's ability to assume a
position of leadership on Burma, citing limited leverage over
the Burmese. (Yao seemed to assess leverage as flowing
principally from economic interaction.) When we asked
whether the PRC government nevertheless would like to be able
to deflect international pressure relating to Burma from the
PRC toward an ASEAN country, Yao indicated he believed China
had little to gain by Indonesia's adopting a higher profile
on Burma.

CONTACT WITH BURMESE EXILES
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5. (C) We asked whether the PRC Embassy in Bangkok was in
contact with any Burmese exile groups. Without explicitly
denying such contacts, Yao claimed he was personally unaware
of meetings between exiles and PRC Embassy officers. He
noted many exiles viewed the PRC negatively, and he and his
colleagues were inconvenienced by mid-day demonstrations at
the PRC Embassy by opponents of the Burmese regime.

VIEW OF USG POLICY
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6. (C) Yao asked us to clarify whether the USG preferred
stability or change in Burma. We disputed the premise of his
question, explaining that the current repressive climate in
Burma did not represent stability. Democratization in Burma
would be more conducive to stability, we said; we added it
also would result in fewer headaches for the PRC. Yao
replied that he considered the situation in Burma to have
stabilized somewhat in recent days, with the lifting of the
government's curfew. He saw the recent meeting between Aung
San Suu Kyi and Labor Minister Aung Kyi -- as well as the

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Burmese acceptance of an upcoming visit by UN Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights Pinheiro -- as good signs. Yao
remarked that, as a neighboring country, China worried about
a potential influx of refugees in the event of (increased)
turmoil within Burma; the PRC also bore responsibility for
protecting a large number of Chinese citizens in the country.


7. (C) Yao said the USG appeared to have used only "sticks"
in its recent dealings with Burma; he advised the USG would
be more successful if American diplomacy included positive
incentives. Consistent with an earlier message to the USG
from MFA officials in Beijing (ref A),Yao urged that the USG
hold a second bilateral meeting in China with Burmese
officials. Such a meeting would help reassure the Burmese
and allow them to feel less isolated, Yao said, thereby
enabling progress on shared objectives. Drawing on previous
guidance from EAP/MLS (ref B),we replied that the Burmese
regime's actions after the first meeting in Beijing offered
little encouragement for further talks.

PRC'S BURMA POLICY IN CONTEXT OF PARTY CONGRESS
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8. (C) Referring to the outcome of China's recent Communist
Party Congress, Yao emphasized Secretary General Hu Jintao's
newly-espoused view that China was ready to take on more
international responsibility. Yao said the PRC would spend
the next year examining how it might expand its international
role. The key, said Yao, would be understanding the extent
of China's capacity to influence other nations. Yao conveyed
a low degree of confidence that his government could easily
shape the course of events in Burma.

BOYCE