FURTHER REACTION TO BANGKOK BOMBS: SURAYUD

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000055

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2017
TAGS: PTER PGOV PINS ASEC KJUS KCRM TH
SUBJECT: FURTHER REACTION TO BANGKOK BOMBS: SURAYUD
BACKPEDALS

REF: A. BANGKOK 16 (NITYA ON BOMBINGS)

B. BANGKOK 15 (BOMBINGS ASCRIBED)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S/NF) Prime Minister Surayud publicly backed away from
his January 1 assertion that opposition political figures had
orchestrated the December 31 bombings. A leading Army
General continued to implicate former Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra, however, and promised "harsh measures" against
promoters of chaos. Former Prime Minister Chavalit denied
involvement in the bombings and said the authorities should
be making arrests if they had evidence indicating who the
culprits were. A Bangkok-based intelligence official
speculated about the possible culprits and said the best way
to restore stability would be through holding elections to
install a more legitimate government. End Summary.

SURAYUD BACKPEDALS...
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2. (C) In public remarks on January 3, Prime Minister Surayud
Chulanont moderated his January 1 claim that the bombing was
likely orchestrated by political figures who had been
disadvantaged by the coup (ref B). Surayud said he had made
assumptions based on the modus operandi of the bombers. "We
cannot pin down exactly any group of individuals who did it,"
he said. "I haven't had any evidence or information."
(Comment: Surayud loses face by acknowledging his earlier
remarks represented a rush to judgment, but, given that the
media is not giving him a free pass, it is better to
acknowledge the error now than to prolong the agony. End
Comment.)

... BUT SAPRANG REMAINS FIRM
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3. (SBU) On the other hand, General Saprang Kanlayanamit,
Assistant Secretary General of the Council for National
Security (CNS),in January 3 public remarks, maintained that
the former regime had organized the December 31 bombings in
order to discredit the government. Saprang announced that
the CNS's Special Operations Center would clamp down on those
causing chaos in the country. He said the government had so
far been lenient in dealing with those who had become
"persona non grata" (read: Thaksin Shinawatra and cohorts),
but the authorities would now employ "harsh measures."

CHAVALIT LASHES OUT
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4. (C) Former Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh -- alleged
privately by Foreign Minister Nitya Pibulsonggram (ref A) and
others as having a hand in the bombings -- publicly denied
involvement. Chavalit labeled as "gross incompetence"
Saprang Kanlayanamit's failure to arrest the culprits if he
had incriminating information, as Saprang had claimed.
Chavalit denied also a rumor that Thaksin had provided him
with 1.5 billion Baht (over 40 million USD) in order to
undermine the CNS and Surayud's administration.

INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL OFFERS VIEWS
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5. (S/NF) A high-ranking Bangkok-based intelligence official
from a friendly country on January 4 offered his perspective
on the December 31 bombings. This official, with many years'
service in Thailand, admitted uncertainty about the culpable
group, but leaned toward believing the perpetrators were
domestic political actors rather than southern separatists.
He doubted Thaksin's personal involvement, however, noting
that Thaksin might instigate violence if pushed into a
corner, but his situation had not yet become sufficiently
dire to spur Thaksin to take such steps.


6. (S/NF) The official considered it plausible that Chavalit
or his associates might be involved. (Comment: Chavalit,
while currently aligned with Thaksin, also has interests
distinct from the former Prime Minister's and should not be
seen simply as Thaksin's tool. End Comment.) He also

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believed one of the more likely scenarios was that
disaffected members of the CNS -- those he termed "minority
shareholders" -- orchestrated the bombings to gain greater
power, or perhaps to pave the way for a second coup d'etat
against Surayud and the current CNS leaders. The September
19 coup required very little manpower, the official noted,
and this fact might well inspire an ambitious figure to
launch a new putsch.


7. (S/NF) The official worried aloud about the possibility of
continuing violence, as various actors might seek to
discredit or destabilize the government in order to seize
power for themselves. The best way to restore stability, he
opined, would be for the Thais to hold elections and install
a government with greater legitimacy.
BOYCE