THAI MFA FOCUSING ON PROSPECTS OF DIALOGUE IN BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 005392

SIPDIS

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NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM KDEM KPAO TH BM
SUBJECT: THAI MFA FOCUSING ON PROSPECTS OF DIALOGUE IN BURMA

REF: A. A. BANGKOK 5367


B. B. BANGKOK 5315

C. C. BANGKOK 5314

D. D. BANGKOK 5234

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Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Thailand views the GOB offer to open a dialogue with
Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) as a promising avenue to begin
reconciliation in Burma, but prefers to follow the lead of
the UN according to an MFA working-level official. Moreover,
he believes that ASEAN and Thailand's relationship with the
GOB has become less close since the removal of Khin Nyunt.
The result is that the Thais feel whatever influence they do
have with the GOB must be focused on UN supported efforts.
END SUMMARY.

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UN SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD
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2. (C) The RTG viewed the UN as the central and most
important actor in resolving the current crisis in Burma and
putting Burma on the road to democracy, stated Thai MFA
Director in the Department of East Asian Affairs Kallayana
Vipattipumiprates in a meeting with us on October 11. (Note:
Rangoon PolOff participated in this meeting as part of his
consultations in Bangkok.) Kallayana began the meeting by
informing us that UN Special Envoy Gambari spoke with Thai
Foreign Minister Nitya Pibulsonggram just prior to the UNSC
meeting on October 5. Gambari informed Nitya that he was
"cautiously optimistic" about the prospects for dialogue
between the GOB and ASSK, and presented himself as "a ladder
for ASSK to climb up and Than Shwe to climb down."


3. (C) Kallayana emphasized that the Thais believed any
tactic used with the GOB must take into account whether or
not the GOB would find such an approach palatable. Dialogue
could be considered to be acceptable to both the GOB and the
opposition, he opined, and it was the UN that should take the
lead in creating such an opportunity. The Thais believed
that Gambari's efforts should be viewed as part of a long
term process to resolve the situation in Burma, not a
one-time cure-all event.


4. (C) Dialogue would complement Burma's 'Roadmap to
Democracy', according to Kallayana, and could influence the
drafting of the constitution. It would also help maintain
the momentum pushing for change, with the possibility of a
referendum on the constitution occurring as early as 2009, he
predicted. He described the regime's newly-appointed liaison
Aung Kyi as flexible and pragmatic and someone who had
experience working with foreigners due to his involvement
with the ILO over the issue of forced labor. Perhaps more
importantly, Kallayana continued, Aung Kyi was one of only a
handful of officers trusted by both Than Shwe and Maung Aye.


5. (C) Kallayana stated that a real dialogue should include
major stakeholders, including the NLD and the ethnic minority
groups, but he doubted the GOB would allow others to join the
discussion. Furthermore, Kallayana thought the other
stakeholders may not accept ASSK as their sole
representative, further weakening the effectiveness of any
such dialogue. Nonetheless, he stated that the RTG would not
push for anything else but would instead focus on the role of
the UN.


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THAI VIEW OF BURMA BECOMING NUANCED?
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6. (C) While Kallayana was quick to describe the current
crisis in Burma as an internal matter and the recent protests
as isolated, he also conceded that the Burmese leadership
could not ignore the demands for change expressed by
thousands of its citizens in the streets in recent weeks. He
did not believe that such protests would continue in the near
future, though he thought the momentum they created to push
for change in Burma should continue.


7. (C) Kallayana claimed that ever since former Burmese Prime
Minister Khin Nyunt left office, ASEAN in general and
Thailand in particular have not had as close a relationship
with the GOB. This impeded the RTG's ability to influence
the situation in Burma, Kallayana told us, which is why they
were looking to the UN to lead Burma out of the current
crisis. "With other countries in ASEAN we can just pick up
the phone to talk to each other, but we can no longer do that
with Burma." Kallayana foresaw that the RTG's policy to rely
on the UN to bring change to Burma would continue through the
duration of the current Thai government. However, he held
out the possibility that this policy could change after the
Thai elections on December 23, and the formation of a new
government early in 2008.


8. (C) Despite the general provincial outlook of the Burmese
leadership, Kallayana believes that the events of last
September affected how they approached the international
community, especially the UN. With this in mind, he believed
that the USG should remain in close contact with the RTG
about Burma, suggesting that it would be productive for us to
coordinate our messages. While he acknowledged that our
messages would not always be the same, a concerted effort
would prevent the GOB from trying to play us off against each
other.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) Kallayana spent more than six and a half years at the
Thai Embassy in Rangoon, and he remains one of the RTG's
foremost experts on Burmese relations. Although his personal
overview of the state of play within ASEAN differs from that
of his boss, MFA Permanent Secretary Virasakdi (reftel A).
His willingness to offer his own candid views on the
situation in Burma and the corresponding Thai response as
well as his repeated reference to the December 23 elections
suggests that, at least among career MFA officers, there is
interest in changing Thailand's completely hands-off approach
to Burma.
BOYCE