THAILAND CABINET CRISIS: AND THEN THERE WERE NONE?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 005284 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2017 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TH SUBJECT: THAILAND CABINET CRISIS: AND THEN THERE WERE NONE? REF: A. IIR 6 895 0004 08 (GEN SONTHI RETIRES) ¶B. BANGKOK 5182 (CABINET SHUFFLE EXPECTED) ¶C. BANGKOK 5077 (CABINET RESIGNATIONS) ¶D. BANGKOK 2424 (PAD LEADERS OPPOSED DECEMBER ELECTIONS) ¶E. BANGKOK 2327 (PRASONG EXPANDS ON SURAYUD/SONTHI RIFT) Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Prime Minister has made minimal changes to his cabinet in response to a string of ministerial resignations. He will do double duty as interior minister, and retired GEN Sonthi has left the Council for National Security to serve as Deputy Prime Minister in charge of security issues. Hard-core anti-Thaksin elements in the legislature and NGO community continue to conspire to delay the December elections, to buy more time to combat the influence of former PM Thaksin, but they do not appear to be succeeding. PM Surayud has affirmed the government's commitment to hold the elections this year. With the cabinet changes, PM Surayud has, at least formally, greater control over the security forces and the bureaucracy. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) Prime Minister Surayud has made minimal changes in his cabinet in response to the resignations of several ministers (ref B). GEN Sonthi has left the Council for National Security (CNS) and taken a position as Deputy Prime Minister, with responsibilities for the security issues (ref A). Sonthi told the press that, with his retirement as Army Chief, the CNS chief position no longer had any meaning for him. Surayud himself will take over the Interior Ministry. Other ministries will be covered by remaining members of the cabinet. ¶3. (C) For the past two weeks, the interim Thai cabinet has been under a relentless attack apparently orchestrated by hard-line anti-Thaksin elements dissatisfied with the government's performance. These factions have long complained that the government was not taking tough enough measures to ensure former PM Thaksin could not return to power. After initial uncertainty about the exact nature of the conspiracy afoot (ref B),there is now a general and probably correct view that members of the National Legislative Assembly and of the People's Alliance for Democracy are the chief conspirators (refs D,E); elements of the military that were sidelined during the recent reshuffle may also be playing a role. Their goal: to create enough chaos in the government to derail the scheduled December elections, and buy more time to reduce the influence of the former PM. PM STICKS TO DECEMBER ELECTION DATE -------------- ¶4. (C) Prime Minister Surayud has once again rejected any discussion of delaying the elections. Making his point strongly, he met with the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) on October 4; following the meeting, the PM and ECT Chair confirmed to the press that December 23 was the best date for the poll. The ECT asked for the government's assistance in stemming vote-buying. ¶5. (U) Note: According to the new constitution, the vote must be held within 90 days of the promulgation of the organic laws on the election. The laws were passed by the NLA last week, and submitted to the PM's office on October 2. The PM's office forwarded the legislation on October 3, and we have confirmed that it is at the palace awaiting signature. Once signed by the King, the laws are published in the Royal Gazette, and that starts the 90 day clock ticking. The laws should be published by mid- to late-October. End note. ¶6. (C) In addition to Surayud's statement, a wide range of journalists and academics have spoken out in favor of the December election date. In addition to citing the public's desire to vote for their representatives, they also point out that, given the 90-day deadline in the constitution, the elections could only slip a few weeks at most, hardly worth the cost of the delay. Several constitutional law experts have preemptively rejected the idea of any serious grounds for a constitutional challenge to the organic laws -- one of the last tactics available to proponents of delaying the BANGKOK 00005284 002 OF 002 vote. ¶7. (C) Political parties are split on the question of the election date. The Democrats told us that they favored a vote in December, (even though a fortune teller has predicted that they would do better if the vote were held in 2008). The pro-Thaksin People's Power Party (the reincarnation of Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai) also supports voting this year. Some of the smaller, newer parties have called for a delay, but their arguments are not getting much traction. NOT OVER YET -------------- ¶8. (C) Surayud has so far weathered the assault on his government, but he is not out of the woods yet. A total of five ministers/deputy ministers were forced to resign (so far) following revelations that they held shares in excess of the legally-prescribed limit. The National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC),which launched the initial accusations against the ministers, is continuing to investigate cabinet members' holdings. Yesterday, the NCCC raised questions about Foreign Minister Nitya. FM Nitya's explanation is that, while he does hold shares in a company in excess of the 5 percent limit, his shares are worth less than USD 1000, and the company has not actually functioned for over ten years. (Comment: If this is true, it hardly seems like something that merits an ethics investigation. End comment.) ¶9. (C) Surayud himself may face further ethics criticisms next week. NLA members, led by coup plotter and Surayud critic Prasong Soonsiri (ref E),are seeking to hold a session to question the PM about the ethical lapses of this ministers, and also to grill him about a questionable land deal of his own. (The PM owns a piece of land in a national park. The legal status of this land is somewhat murky, and the subject has been raised intermittently during the past year.) The NLA Chairman has attempted to stem the revolt in his ranks; this week, he made a public appeal to Surayud not to resign, pointing out that there was no clear constitutional mechanism to replace him any more. The interim constitution, which gave the CNS the power to replace the PM, had been replaced by the 2007 Constitution, which specified that the PM had to be elected by the Parliament from among its members. As there was no real Parliament yet, this eminent constitutional scholar warned of complications if the PM stepped down. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) The hard-line anti-Thaksin faction seems intent on a war of attrition against the more moderate Prime Minister and his cabinet. The prime minister seems to be weathering the assault with a reasonable degree of equanimity. There is no clear constitutional mechanism to fire him, and he appears quite determined not to quit. He appears equally determined to stick to the December election schedule. His opponents can make him (and us) miserable, but they do not appear to have a winning strategy to delay the elections and replace the current cabinet with more vehemently anti-Thaksin activists. ¶11. (C) Surayud's decision to take over the Interior Ministry is, on the whole, the best available option. With the diminished role of the CNS, and Sonthi in the deputy PM position, the changes of the past weeks have in some ways strengthened the PM's hand, giving him clearer authority over the security forces and the bureaucracy. BOYCE