FOREIGN MINISTER ON IRAQ, MARTIAL LAW, THAKSIN,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000524

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM KDEM ECON ETRD EINV IZ
BM, LA, TH
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ON IRAQ, MARTIAL LAW, THAKSIN,
ASEAN, HMONG, DRUGS

REF: A. BANGKOK 505 (READOUTS OF SUMMMITS)

B. BANGKOK 430 (THAKSIN IN SINGAPORE)

C. BANGKOK 360 (HMONG DEADLOCK)

D. BANGKOK 270 (HMONG DEMARCHE RESPONSE)

E. BANGKOK 179 (MEETING WITH SURAYUD)

F. STATE 3592 (IRAQ POLICY)

G. 06 BANGKOK 7355 (COMPULSORY LICENSE)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) The Ambassador provided Foreign Minister Nitya
Pibulsonggram with background on the USG's new strategy in
Iraq. In a one-hour January 25 call on Nitya at MFA, he
urged the Foreign Minister to ensure the RTG lifts martial
law as soon as possible; Nitya said the RTG intended to do
so, but the USG had to recognize the situation in Thailand
had not returned to normal. Nitya said he was not worried
that former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra had hired U.S.
public relations and public policy advocacy firms, but he
expressed concern about possible perceptions that the RTG
treated Singapore unfairly following Thaksin's visit to the
city state. Nitya spoke enthusiastically about efforts to
draft an ASEAN Charter and assessed the recent ASEAN Summit
and East Asia Summit as successful. He said international
concern over Burma would best be handled under Chapter VIII
of the UN Charter, rather than Chapter VII. The Ambassador,
citing reports that the Thai would issue compulsory licenses
for several medications produced by Abbott Laboratories and
European pharmaceutical firms, urged Nitya to ensure
appropriate consultations with the affected companies.
Responding to the Ambassador's expression of concern over the
fate of certain detained Hmong refugees, Nitya indicated the
RTG was being asked to hand the Hmong over to the Lao
government in approximately one week; the Lao were preparing
a "welcoming ceremony" and insisted that all Hmong in the
group of 152 be returned. End Summary.

IRAQ
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2. (SBU) The Ambassador called on Foreign Minister Nitya at
MFA on January 25. Noting President Bush's remarks on the
war in Iraq during the State of the Union address, the
Ambassador drew on ref F to provide Nitya with background on
the USG's new strategy in Iraq. Nitya offered no substantive
reply.

MARTIAL LAW
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3. (C) The USG remained concerned about the persistence of
martial law, the Ambassador said. Although we understood
that the cabinet would soon forward to the palace a draft
royal command lifting martial law in parts of Thailand, it
would be important to return Thailand to the pre-coup status
quo ante. The Ambassador showed Nitya maps produced by the
Embassy (and e-mailed to EAP/MLS) which indicated the status
quo ante and the effect of the draft royal command. Nitya
showed a degree of surprise when viewing the extensive
terrain that would remain under martial law.


4. (C) Nitya assured the Ambassador that the RTG fully
intended to lift martial law. The draft royal command's
references to certain administrative areas (see ref E on
these "nomenclature irregularities") had to be corrected, as
any imperfections would lead to the document being returned
by the palace for corrections. Even with martial law, Nitya
asserted, people were basically free. To illustrate, he said
that he himself was "bashed" in the press on a daily basis --
"I'm getting tired of it," he sniffed. Nevertheless, Nitya
asked that the Ambassador acknowledge that the situation in
Thailand had not returned to normal, as Thaksin was traveling
throughout the region and publicly criticizing the
government, while within Thailand, "undercurrents" remained.
(Arsonists in the Northeast were regularly burning
schoolhouses, one of Nitya's senior aides pointed out.)


5. (C) Acknowledging the assurance that the RTG intended to

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restore civil liberties as conditions allowed, the Ambassador
nevertheless reminded Nitya that, in November, Prime Minister
Surayud had promised President Bush in Hanoi that he would
lift martial law upon returning to Bangkok. It was vital to
follow through on this commitment.

THAKSIN AND SINGAPORE
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6. (C) The Ambassador noted local journalists' suspicions
that Nitya wanted this meeting in order to press the
Ambassador over Thaksin's hiring of U.S. public policy
advocate firm Barbour Griffith and Rogers, LLC, as well as
public relations firm Edelman. Nitya said Thaksin was paying
these firms a "mind-boggling" sum, but he (Nitya) understood
well the distinction between the USG and private U.S. firms.
Nitya said there was "no onus on you at all," and the MFA
would not raise the issue.


7. (C) Nitya did express concern, however, about a possible
international perception that Thailand had unjustly
confronted the Government of Singapore after Thaksin visited
that country, met with a government official there, and
provided CNN journalist with an interview (ref B). Nitya
said it seemed inappropriate for a Singaporean official to
meet with Thaksin when, although not indicted, he was
implicated in matters currently under investigation.
However, Nitya noted parenthetically that his exchanges with
Singaporean Foreign Minister Yeo on the matter had been civil
and relatively informal.


8. (C) The Ambassador said that the Singaporeans clearly had
been stung by Thailand's criticism and limited retaliation
(ref B). Singapore had a highly capable diplomatic corps,
and would defend its reputation. The Ambassador refrained
from assessing how western governments might view the
Thailand-Singapore spat, despite repeated queries from Nitya.

ASEAN, EAS SUMMIT MEETING, AND BURMA
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9. (C) The Ambassador requested Nitya's view of the recent
ASEAN Summit and East Asia Summit meetings in Cebu (ref A).
Nitya characterized the meetings as "very good." He said the
EAS had covered a wide range of topics, including health,
emergency response, political and security affairs. Much
concern had been expressed over nuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula. Nitya favored further discussion of how ASEAN
could develop a role in future crises.


10. (C) Nitya welcomed ASEAN efforts to draft a charter, as
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
provided an insufficient basis to guide ASEAN's functioning
as an organization. He foresaw the charter's preparation in
a year's time, lauding the involvement of eminent figures
from the region. The charter would provide a legally binding
framework. It would address how ASEAN would make decisions
(up to this point, decisions have only been taken by
consensus) and establish modalities for dealing with
noncompliance. The charter also should provide guidelines
for financial support of the organization, with a fair and
transparent formula. This may require a two-tier structure,
Nitya said, with all member states contributing equally to
the secretariat, while member states could base funding for
specific projects on the ability to pay. The secretariat
might evolve substantially, perhaps along the lines of the
UN, with member states providing permanent representatives to
ASEAN.


11. (C) The Ambassador asked whether international concerns
over Burma were influencing ASEAN's approach to its
prospective charter. Nitya said that was not the case.
Burma seemed willing to listen to Thai concerns. The Thai
believed that concerns over Burma could be best handled under
Chapter VIII (regional arrangements) of the U.N Charter,
rather than Chapter VII (threats to peace). Nitya remarked
that he was pleased Indonesia had a seat on the UNSC at this
time, as participating in the debate over Burma in that
Council would force the GOI to decide aspects of its Burma
policy which heretofore had been left vague.


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COMPULSORY LICENSES
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12. (C) The Ambassador raised reports that the RTG intended
to issue compulsory licenses for certain prescription drugs.
(Although the RTG has not announced the targeted drugs, our
contacts inform us the three are Abbott Laboratories'
Kaletra, Sanofi-Aventis' Plavix, and Roche's Saquinavir.)
The Ambassador acknowledged that the issuance of compulsory
licenses was not contrary to WTO rules, but he urged that the
RTG provide the companies affected by such decisions with
ample notice and engage them in consultations. Brusque
decisions to break pharmaceutical firms' patents could raise
questions about the RTG's policy formulation process. Nitya,
who appeared out of the loop on this matter, offered no
substantive response, simply noting parenthetically that
sentiment in the U.S. congress appeared increasingly less
favorable toward pharmaceutical firms. (Ref G provides
background on the RTG's November 2006 issuance of a
compulsory license for a Merck's Efavirenz.)

HMONG REFUGEES
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13. (C) The Ambassador expressed concern for the welfare of
152 Hmong currently in the Thai province of Nong Khai (ref C
and D). UNHCR has accorded refugee status to many in the
group, and some would face potentially life-threatening
problems if deported to Laos. The Ambassador, noting the
Thai have never to our knowledge refouled persons with
refugee status, urged that the Thai afford similar protection
to this group.


14. (C) Nitya said the RTG had "around one week" to resolve
this issue. "It will be a bilateral deal," he said. The Lao
had promised an "open, festive" welcoming ceremony, at which
the Hmong would be "embraced with open arms." Nevertheless,
the RTG still had to decide what to do. The Lao had certain
views of the modalities -- for example, Nitya said, the GOL
wanted all 152 returned as a group. Despite indicating
meaningful momentum toward deportation, Nitya promised to
"take note of your concern," and he signaled a degree of
receptivity to western governments' offers to resettle Hmong
from the Nong Khai group.

COMMENT
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15. (C) Nitya offered nothing new on martial law; we will
continue to press the issue with our RTG interlocutors. We
appreciate Nitya's understanding that Thaksin's hiring U.S.
firms to promote his image or agenda will not necessarily
affect USG policy, but we worry that pundits may be less able
to draw relevant distinctions. Nitya's comments about
ongoing Thai-Lao discussions on the fate of the Nong Khai
Hmong raise concerns, but we note that MFA is not the key
player on this issue; the NSC has more influence, and NSC
Secretary General Prakit Prachonpachanuk recently seemed to

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indicate to the Ambassador that the RTG would not deport the
Hmong group.
BOYCE