Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BANGKOK5225
2007-10-03 10:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:
DEMOCRAT PARTY LEADER ON ELECTION, GOVERNMENT
VZCZCXRO5179 OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM DE RUEHBK #5225/01 2761007 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 031007Z OCT 07 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9984 INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 7723 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1883 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1436 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3678 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4911 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC RHFJSCC/COMMARFORPAC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 005225
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR PHU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM TH BM
SUBJECT: DEMOCRAT PARTY LEADER ON ELECTION, GOVERNMENT
TURMOIL, BURMA, ECONOMY
REF: A. BANGKOK 5182 (SHUFFLE EXPECTED)
B. BANGKOK 5076 (CHATURON ON ELECTION)
C. BANGKOK 4996 (DP ELECTION OUTLOOK)
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 005225
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SIPDIS
NSC FOR PHU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM TH BM
SUBJECT: DEMOCRAT PARTY LEADER ON ELECTION, GOVERNMENT
TURMOIL, BURMA, ECONOMY
REF: A. BANGKOK 5182 (SHUFFLE EXPECTED)
B. BANGKOK 5076 (CHATURON ON ELECTION)
C. BANGKOK 4996 (DP ELECTION OUTLOOK)
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) Democrat Party Leader Abhisit Vejjajiva told the
Ambassador that his party had a good chance of placing first
in the December election. In an October 2 lunch, Abhisit
said he believed recent turmoil in the government appeared
designed to delay the election, but he believed it would take
place as scheduled. He felt former Army Commander Sonthi
Boonyaratglin joining the cabinet would not meaningfully
affect election processes or results. (Sonthi subsequently
received an appointment as Deputy Prime Minister, while press
reports indicated Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont would take
on responsibility for the Interior Ministry.) Abhisit
discussed possible constitutional reform and amnesty for Thai
Rak Thai party executives. The Ambassador recommended the
Thais take a stronger line on repression in Burma, but
Abhisit was wary that pressure from ASEAN would just increase
Burmese ties with China and India. Abhisit envisioned a
moderate pick-up in economic activity after elections. End
Summary.
2. (SBU) The Ambassador, joined by the DCM and other Embassy
officers, hosted lunch at the EMR for Democrat Party Leader
Abhisit Vejjajiva on October 2. Abhisit was accompanied by
former Ambassador Kasit Piromya, who is rumored to be the
leading DP contender to become Foreign Minister; Korn
Chatikavanij, who is positioned for a cabinet job handling
economic or financial matters; and advisors Anik Amranand and
Isra Sunthornvut.
ELECTION
--------------
3. (C) Abhisit told the Ambassador he believed the upcoming
election would primarily feature a competition between his
Democrat Party (DP) and the People's Power Party (PPP),and
he said the DP had a good chance to win a plurality. Noting
PPP seemed to be laying the groundwork for later complaints
of unfair election processes, Abhisit said this reinforced
his view that PPP had a reasonable chance of placing second
at the polls. Current predictions of a massive PPP victory
in the Northeast (ref B) were unrealistic, Abhisit said,
although PPP's turnout in that region would depend partly on
the performance of certain unproven, newly-established
parties which might be able to take votes away from PPP.
Without providing numerical projections, he projected a
strong DP performance in the North (excepting only Chiang Rai
and Phayao provinces) and the Central region (although
conceding strong competition in Suphan Buri, Sa Kaeo, and
Chachoengsao provinces).
4. (C) If PPP were to win a plurality in the election, the
pro-Thaksin party most likely could form a government,
Abhisit said. He noted that a plurality would provide
legitimacy for PPP and political cover for the opportunists
outside of PPP who would be willing to accept Thaksin's
money. When the Ambassador asked how the military would
react to the prospect of a PPP-led government, Abhisit
indicated he had no basis to believe that brand new Army
Commander Anupong Paojinda would interfere in political
processes (despite Anupong's leading role in the 2006 coup);
however, he said Thai people would "come out into the
streets" to protest against a prospective PPP administration.
5. (C) Commenting on recent cabinet turmoil (ref A),Abhisit
claimed this reflected the efforts of some legislators and
others who feared that allies of Thaksin would return to
power. Abhisit saw the pressure on Prime Minister Surayud as
part of an effort to delay the election, but he believed this
effort would fail, because Surayud, consistent with the
desire of the majority of Thai people, was determined to have
BANGKOK 00005225 002 OF 003
elections soon.
6. (C) Abhisit said that his projections for the election
would remain unaffected by the entry of coup leader and
former Army Commander Sonthi Boonyaratglin into the cabinet,
either as a Deputy Prime Minister or as Interior Minister.
(Note: Later in the day on October 2, Sonthi did receive
appointment as Deputy Prime Minister, and Surayud announced
that he himself would take on the responsibilities of the
Interior Minister. End Note.) Parenthetically, Abhisit said
that if Sonthi were to join the current cabinet, it might be
more difficult for the DP to offer him a position in a
subsequent administration.
7. (C) Abhisit characterized the Election Commission (EC) as
neutral, and he dismissed concerns the EC would unfairly
target PPP candidates, although he conceded the EC members
lacked experience. He regretted that the EC had not yet
delineated the districts for the regional party list system,
but he said he preferred the new electoral system featuring
multi-member election districts. The larger districts would
reduce the impact of money politics, he predicted, help
candidates to focus on national vice strictly local issues,
and force parties to select candidates with broader appeal.
POLITICAL AGENDA
--------------
8. (C) The Ambassador asked Abhisit's view of a possible
amnesty for the former Thai Rak Thai (TRT) executives who had
lost their political rights when the Constitutional Tribunal
dissolved TRT. Abhisit said he could imagine the legislature
granting amnesty after a criminal court determined individual
culpability for the offenses that had led to TRT's
dissolution. After that determination, those who were
uninvolved in improprieties could receive amnesty, Abhisit
suggested.
9. (C) Most political parties seemed to favor constitutional
amendment of some sort after the next election, Abhisit said.
He noted it might be difficult, however, to build a
consensus among the parties on how to proceed. He believed a
sensible approach would be to establish a legislative
committee to work with certain think tanks (e.g., the King
Prajadhipok Institute) to develop options. Abhisit said he
found it difficult to predict the public's mood after the
next election, and he could not estimate a time frame for
constitutional reform. He voiced a personal opinion that the
Senate -- which under the 2007 Constitution will be
partially-elected and partially-appointed -- should be
transformed into a partisan and wholly-elected body, or
stripped of its role in impeachment, or abolished entirely.
BURMA
--------------
10. (C) The Ambassador explained that the RTG could improve
its international standing by taking a stronger line against
repression in Burma. Abhisit remarked that the new ASEAN
Charter might enable ASEAN to become more active, as the
Charter should enable the establishment of a human rights
mechanism and allow ASEAN to operate without requiring
consensus, even to act against a member state that deviates
from the region's norms. Abhisit opposed Burma's expulsion
from ASEAN, though, saying that this would simply reduce
ASEAN's leverage and drive Burma into the arms of China and
India. The DCM asked whether Abhisit believed Thai public
opinion was seized with events in Burma; Abhisit replied that
he did not believe so.
ECONOMY
--------------
11. (C) The Ambassador asked whether Abhisit sensed
substantial Thai interest in domestic investment that would
materialize after elections. Abhisit said he felt there was
only a moderate degree of such interest, but it could be
further stimulated by the installation of a new government
BANGKOK 00005225 003 OF 003
with a clear cut economic plan, and investment could snowball
over time. A positive international response to the
elections would also help the Thai economy, Abhisit said.
The Ambassador suggested that the next administration might
want to resume free trade discussions, and repair the damage
done by the interim administration's issuance of compulsory
licenses for certain pharmaceutical products.
COMMENT
--------------
12. (C) Figures associated with PPP, and even some Democrats,
tend to believe PPP is on track to outperform the DP by a
significant margin (ref B and C). We are wary that Abhisit
may have stuck disingenuously to overly optimistic talking
points during this meeting. However, he seemed sincere in
estimating that the election would most likely take place as
scheduled, and we note that the Democrats are spending funds
on campaign activities, seemingly backing up this perception
with actions. We would consider it a good sign if Prime
Minister Surayud does indeed take on responsibility for the
Interior Ministry, rather than handing this position to one
of the central coup leaders.
BOYCE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR PHU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM TH BM
SUBJECT: DEMOCRAT PARTY LEADER ON ELECTION, GOVERNMENT
TURMOIL, BURMA, ECONOMY
REF: A. BANGKOK 5182 (SHUFFLE EXPECTED)
B. BANGKOK 5076 (CHATURON ON ELECTION)
C. BANGKOK 4996 (DP ELECTION OUTLOOK)
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) Democrat Party Leader Abhisit Vejjajiva told the
Ambassador that his party had a good chance of placing first
in the December election. In an October 2 lunch, Abhisit
said he believed recent turmoil in the government appeared
designed to delay the election, but he believed it would take
place as scheduled. He felt former Army Commander Sonthi
Boonyaratglin joining the cabinet would not meaningfully
affect election processes or results. (Sonthi subsequently
received an appointment as Deputy Prime Minister, while press
reports indicated Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont would take
on responsibility for the Interior Ministry.) Abhisit
discussed possible constitutional reform and amnesty for Thai
Rak Thai party executives. The Ambassador recommended the
Thais take a stronger line on repression in Burma, but
Abhisit was wary that pressure from ASEAN would just increase
Burmese ties with China and India. Abhisit envisioned a
moderate pick-up in economic activity after elections. End
Summary.
2. (SBU) The Ambassador, joined by the DCM and other Embassy
officers, hosted lunch at the EMR for Democrat Party Leader
Abhisit Vejjajiva on October 2. Abhisit was accompanied by
former Ambassador Kasit Piromya, who is rumored to be the
leading DP contender to become Foreign Minister; Korn
Chatikavanij, who is positioned for a cabinet job handling
economic or financial matters; and advisors Anik Amranand and
Isra Sunthornvut.
ELECTION
--------------
3. (C) Abhisit told the Ambassador he believed the upcoming
election would primarily feature a competition between his
Democrat Party (DP) and the People's Power Party (PPP),and
he said the DP had a good chance to win a plurality. Noting
PPP seemed to be laying the groundwork for later complaints
of unfair election processes, Abhisit said this reinforced
his view that PPP had a reasonable chance of placing second
at the polls. Current predictions of a massive PPP victory
in the Northeast (ref B) were unrealistic, Abhisit said,
although PPP's turnout in that region would depend partly on
the performance of certain unproven, newly-established
parties which might be able to take votes away from PPP.
Without providing numerical projections, he projected a
strong DP performance in the North (excepting only Chiang Rai
and Phayao provinces) and the Central region (although
conceding strong competition in Suphan Buri, Sa Kaeo, and
Chachoengsao provinces).
4. (C) If PPP were to win a plurality in the election, the
pro-Thaksin party most likely could form a government,
Abhisit said. He noted that a plurality would provide
legitimacy for PPP and political cover for the opportunists
outside of PPP who would be willing to accept Thaksin's
money. When the Ambassador asked how the military would
react to the prospect of a PPP-led government, Abhisit
indicated he had no basis to believe that brand new Army
Commander Anupong Paojinda would interfere in political
processes (despite Anupong's leading role in the 2006 coup);
however, he said Thai people would "come out into the
streets" to protest against a prospective PPP administration.
5. (C) Commenting on recent cabinet turmoil (ref A),Abhisit
claimed this reflected the efforts of some legislators and
others who feared that allies of Thaksin would return to
power. Abhisit saw the pressure on Prime Minister Surayud as
part of an effort to delay the election, but he believed this
effort would fail, because Surayud, consistent with the
desire of the majority of Thai people, was determined to have
BANGKOK 00005225 002 OF 003
elections soon.
6. (C) Abhisit said that his projections for the election
would remain unaffected by the entry of coup leader and
former Army Commander Sonthi Boonyaratglin into the cabinet,
either as a Deputy Prime Minister or as Interior Minister.
(Note: Later in the day on October 2, Sonthi did receive
appointment as Deputy Prime Minister, and Surayud announced
that he himself would take on the responsibilities of the
Interior Minister. End Note.) Parenthetically, Abhisit said
that if Sonthi were to join the current cabinet, it might be
more difficult for the DP to offer him a position in a
subsequent administration.
7. (C) Abhisit characterized the Election Commission (EC) as
neutral, and he dismissed concerns the EC would unfairly
target PPP candidates, although he conceded the EC members
lacked experience. He regretted that the EC had not yet
delineated the districts for the regional party list system,
but he said he preferred the new electoral system featuring
multi-member election districts. The larger districts would
reduce the impact of money politics, he predicted, help
candidates to focus on national vice strictly local issues,
and force parties to select candidates with broader appeal.
POLITICAL AGENDA
--------------
8. (C) The Ambassador asked Abhisit's view of a possible
amnesty for the former Thai Rak Thai (TRT) executives who had
lost their political rights when the Constitutional Tribunal
dissolved TRT. Abhisit said he could imagine the legislature
granting amnesty after a criminal court determined individual
culpability for the offenses that had led to TRT's
dissolution. After that determination, those who were
uninvolved in improprieties could receive amnesty, Abhisit
suggested.
9. (C) Most political parties seemed to favor constitutional
amendment of some sort after the next election, Abhisit said.
He noted it might be difficult, however, to build a
consensus among the parties on how to proceed. He believed a
sensible approach would be to establish a legislative
committee to work with certain think tanks (e.g., the King
Prajadhipok Institute) to develop options. Abhisit said he
found it difficult to predict the public's mood after the
next election, and he could not estimate a time frame for
constitutional reform. He voiced a personal opinion that the
Senate -- which under the 2007 Constitution will be
partially-elected and partially-appointed -- should be
transformed into a partisan and wholly-elected body, or
stripped of its role in impeachment, or abolished entirely.
BURMA
--------------
10. (C) The Ambassador explained that the RTG could improve
its international standing by taking a stronger line against
repression in Burma. Abhisit remarked that the new ASEAN
Charter might enable ASEAN to become more active, as the
Charter should enable the establishment of a human rights
mechanism and allow ASEAN to operate without requiring
consensus, even to act against a member state that deviates
from the region's norms. Abhisit opposed Burma's expulsion
from ASEAN, though, saying that this would simply reduce
ASEAN's leverage and drive Burma into the arms of China and
India. The DCM asked whether Abhisit believed Thai public
opinion was seized with events in Burma; Abhisit replied that
he did not believe so.
ECONOMY
--------------
11. (C) The Ambassador asked whether Abhisit sensed
substantial Thai interest in domestic investment that would
materialize after elections. Abhisit said he felt there was
only a moderate degree of such interest, but it could be
further stimulated by the installation of a new government
BANGKOK 00005225 003 OF 003
with a clear cut economic plan, and investment could snowball
over time. A positive international response to the
elections would also help the Thai economy, Abhisit said.
The Ambassador suggested that the next administration might
want to resume free trade discussions, and repair the damage
done by the interim administration's issuance of compulsory
licenses for certain pharmaceutical products.
COMMENT
--------------
12. (C) Figures associated with PPP, and even some Democrats,
tend to believe PPP is on track to outperform the DP by a
significant margin (ref B and C). We are wary that Abhisit
may have stuck disingenuously to overly optimistic talking
points during this meeting. However, he seemed sincere in
estimating that the election would most likely take place as
scheduled, and we note that the Democrats are spending funds
on campaign activities, seemingly backing up this perception
with actions. We would consider it a good sign if Prime
Minister Surayud does indeed take on responsibility for the
Interior Ministry, rather than handing this position to one
of the central coup leaders.
BOYCE