FORMER THAI RAK THAI CARETAKER SEES GOOD PROSPECTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 005076

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM TH
SUBJECT: FORMER THAI RAK THAI CARETAKER SEES GOOD PROSPECTS
FOR PPP

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Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Former Thai Rak Thai caretaker Chaturon Chaiseng told
the Ambassador that the pro-Thaksin People's Power Party
(PPP) was on track to win a plurality in coming elections --
200 or more of the 480 seats in the House of Representatives.
Chaturon said the military, which in recent months has been
preoccupied with its annual reshuffle, was well aware of
PPP's strength and gathering momentum; he expressed concern
that the military might take action before or during the next
election to subvert PPP. He appeared to view the appointment
of Army Commander Anupong Paojinda as a relatively positive
development, however. Chaturon expected that the next
legislature would seek to amend the 2007 constitution and
would consider whether to grant amnesty to Thai Rak Thai
executives who have been stripped of their political rights
by the Constitutional Tribunal's May ruling. End Summary.

STAYING IN THE BACKGROUND
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2. (C) The Ambassador met on September 21 with Chaturon
Chaiseng, who served as acting Party Leader of Thai Rak Thai
(TRT) from the time of the 2006 coup d'etat until the party's
dissolution by the Constitutional Tribunal in May 2007.
Chaturon said he was now affiliated with the People's Power
Party (PPP),the principal pro-Thaksin TRT successor party,
but he had to take a low-profile and informal role because he
was among the former TRT executive board members banned from
holding office for a five-year period.


3. (C) The Ambassador asked whether Chaturon, who had joined
the Thai communist movement in the 1970s, found it difficult
to deal with PPP Party Leader Samak Sundaravej, who (at that
same time) had encouraged the security forces to use extreme
prejudice in their anti-communist efforts. Chaturon
acknowledged he was not on particularly good terms with
Samak; the two had only met once in recent months.
Nevertheless, Chaturon said he believed even a blunt,
opinionated, confrontational figure like Samak could serve
the country better than some of the politicians who claimed
to be democratic but supported the 2006 coup. Chaturon
recounted that he found it frustrating, however, that Samak
seemed less interested than Chaturon in building PPP as a
party focused on policies rather than personalities and
superficial appeal.


4. (C) Chaturon appeared generally dismayed with other
leading figures in PPP, such as Yongyuth Tiyapairat, Chalerm
Yubamroong, and (in the background) Newin Chidchob. Chaturon
also described deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra as
active in formulating the party's strategy. Thaksin believed
that support for PPP reflected Thaksin's personal appeal to
the masses, and he felt the results of the August
constitutional referendum -- in which 42 percent of the
population rejected the new charter -- indicated he had
significant political momentum.


5. (C) The referendum results had convinced many politicians
from TRT areas that it would difficult for them to win
election if they had to run against PPP candidates, Chaturon
said. Thus, more former TRT legislators who had previously
lined up with PPP's potential rivals were beginning to switch
their allegiance to PPP.

PROJECTIONS
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6. (C) Chaturon offered the following projections for PPP's
performance in the coming elections:

NORTHEAST: PPP should win a minimum of 120 of the 135
constituency-based House seats in the Northeast. In this
region, PPP's performance would be weakest in Nakhon
Ratchasima, a province with 16 representatives, where former

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TRT Deputy Leader Suwat Liptapanlop retained influence and
was backing a rival party. Chaturon observed that loyalists
of TRT defector Phinij Jarusombat, based in Nong Khai, were
deserting Phinij and joining PPP.

NORTH: PPP should win at least 50 of the 77
constituency-based House seats in the North. Chaturon
conceded that the Democrat Party (DP) was making inroads in
Tak and Kampheng Phet provinces, where the DP had had
influence in previous years. He also said PPP might not do
well in Mae Hong Son province, primarily because of the heavy
military presence there (and the military's adversarial view
of PPP).

CENTRAL AND EAST: Chaturon said PPP could win 20-30 of the 96
constituency-based seats in central and eastern Thailand;
this was an offhand estimate, as he was not aware of a
detailed study of this area.

BANGKOK: Chaturon conservatively said PPP might win between
zero and five of the 36 constituency-based seats in the
capital. PPP might win in outlying areas such as Bangkapi,
but he said other estimates we have heard (that PPP might win
up to half the seats from Bangkok) struck him as too
optimistic. However, he added that the government had
abandoned its most potent strategy to turn middle and upper
class opinion against PPP when it stopped pursuing lese
majeste charges against Thaksin.

SOUTH: PPP would not win any seats in the South (56 seats),
Chaturon conceded; he expected the region to remain the DP's
stronghold.


7. (C) The above estimates did not take into account the 80
legislative seats apportioned to candidates on regional party
lists. Chaturon acknowledged an unexpectedly strong PPP
performance in Bangkok, or in the central or eastern regions,
could provide PPP with the 241 seats needed to hold an
absolute majority and form a single-party government.
However, he believed it more likely that that PPP would fall
short of a majority. With all other parties currently
inclined against joining PPP in a coalition, he considered it
most likely that PPP would resign itself to being in
opposition -- albeit as the most powerful opposition party in
Thai history.

MILITARY
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8. (C) Chaturon worried that the prospect of a strong PPP
plurality would energize the military. He was unsure what
sorts of actions the military might undertake in response,
before or during the election. Some might prove effective,
such as threatening or monitoring PPP's canvassers while
facilitating the operations of PPP's rivals'. He worried the
Election Commission might act in a partisan manner, as most
provincial EC officials simultaneously held government
positions. Chaturon also raised the prospect that PPP Party
Leader Samak could be jailed. (Samak currently is the
subject of a corruption investigation, but he seemed
unconcerned when the Ambassador raised the matter in an
August 30 meeting.)


9. (C) Others steps the military might take could be
counterproductive; citing public reports that the authorities
might impose martial law in some northeastern provinces where
it was not in effect, Chaturon said this move would further
anger voters who had already signaled their displeasure with
the government by rejecting the constitution. He added that
efforts to deploy soldiers in villages in order to "educate"
the population on political matters had proven ineffective;
often, the villagers wound up "educating" the soldiers.
(Nevertheless, Chaturon said the military was no longer
divided between pro- and anti-Thaksin elements; the Council
for National Security had effectively unified the military
and aligned it against PPP.)


10. (C) Chaturon saw the appointment of Anupong Paojinda as

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the new Army Commander as a relatively positive sign.
Despite Anupong having participated in the coup, Chaturon
characterized him as "not very aggressive" and generally
disposed against military involvement in politics -- "at
least publicly." Chaturon said there was some chance that,
under Anupong, the military might exert less influence in the
political realm, but he noted Anupong was selected by Prime
Minister Surayud and more senior figures (most likely an
allusion to Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda).
Chaturon implied that, regardless of Anupong's inclinations,
he would have to mobilize the military to defend his patrons'
interests, if necessary. Noting that the military had up
until this point been preoccupied with the annual reshuffle
of senior officers, Chaturon predicted that the senior
officers would focus increasingly on the predicament
generated by PPP's popularity.

AMNESTY
--------------


11. (C) The coup leaders had blundered in issuing a decree
which enabled the Constitutional Tribunal to strip the entire
TRT executive board of its political rights, Chaturon
claimed. He said that most military figures appeared
politically inept and would not be able to tap major
financiers to establish political parties capable of
competing effectively with PPP. The Army's interests would
have been better served if former TRT politicians (e.g.,
Somsak Thepsutin, Suwat Liptapanlop) were left free to
participate in the political process. This would have given
them the incentive to work for and fund parties able to draw
support away from PPP.


12. (C) Chaturon admitted he had a high personal stake in the
matter. He related that Thaksin had told many associates
that he (Thaksin) would have backed Chaturon to lead TRT's
principal successor party, if Chaturon had not been stripped
of his political rights.


13. (C) While hoping the next parliament would provide some
form of amnesty for former TRT executives, Chaturon believed
PPP Party Leader Samak had erred in publicly advocating this
step in August. Many senior politicians not currently
aligned with PPP also favored an amnesty, and it would have
been easier to make progress toward this goal if Samak had
worked with other former TRT figures outside of PPP to build
a consensus rather than taking ownership of the issue at such
an early stage.

LONG-TERM OUTLOOK
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14. (C) After the election, Thailand would return to a
political system characterized by weak coalition governments,
Chaturon lamented. He said PPP and other parties would
likely work together to amend the 2007 constitution, which
provided for a political system designed principally to
prevent Thaksin from returning to power.

COMMENT
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15. (C) Chaturon's assessment of the political map is
consistent with that of other contacts. There are widespread
assumptions that the military will not allow PPP to form the
next government and will take active steps to keep the
party's representation in the parliament as low as possible,
but it is unclear whether those assumptions can be
substantiated. We will continue to monitor whether the
military or other authorities are mobilizing to prevent PPP
from getting anything close to a majority in the election.
BOYCE