Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BANGKOK5036
2007-09-20 09:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:
THAI FOREIGN MINISTER ON APEC, UNGA, ELECTIONS,
VZCZCXRO3017 OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM DE RUEHBK #5036/01 2630959 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 200959Z SEP 07 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9727 INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4864 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 7691 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1412 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0290 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3637 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1860 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5174 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI RHFJSCC/COMMARFORPAC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 005036
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR PHU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM KDEM KPKO MASS UNGA TH
LA, BM, SU
SUBJECT: THAI FOREIGN MINISTER ON APEC, UNGA, ELECTIONS,
BURMA, REFUGEES, DARFUR
REF: A. BANGKOK 4996 (DEMOCRAT PARTY UPDATE)
B. BANGKOK 3648 (THAI TROOPS FOR DARFUR)
C. BANGKOK 3528 (ACTIVISTS AGAINST ISA)
D. 06 BANGKOK 5706 (SUFFICIENCY ECONOMY)
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 005036
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR PHU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM KDEM KPKO MASS UNGA TH
LA, BM, SU
SUBJECT: THAI FOREIGN MINISTER ON APEC, UNGA, ELECTIONS,
BURMA, REFUGEES, DARFUR
REF: A. BANGKOK 4996 (DEMOCRAT PARTY UPDATE)
B. BANGKOK 3648 (THAI TROOPS FOR DARFUR)
C. BANGKOK 3528 (ACTIVISTS AGAINST ISA)
D. 06 BANGKOK 5706 (SUFFICIENCY ECONOMY)
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) Thai FM Nitya Pibulsonggram spoke favorably of recent
U.S.-Thai interactions at the APEC summit and previewed some
RTG plans for the upcoming UNGA session. He said he would
welcome the opportunity to meet with U/S Burns on the margins
of UNGA, and indicated that he would make a side trip to
Washington to meet with U.S. legislators. In a September 19
lunch hosted by the Ambassador, Nitya said all signals that
he discerned indicated the next election would take place on
December 23, per PM Surayud's public commitment. He said the
RTG intended to maintain martial law in many Northeast
provinces where martial law was not in effect prior to the
coup, barring quick passage of an Internal Security Act.
Nitya said extreme actions by the Burmese government could
prompt a review of Thai policy toward Burma, but no such
review was currently planned. He assured the Ambassador the
RTG would not deport Hmong refugees to Laos and expressed
concern about the inflow of North Korean refugees to
Thailand. Nitya noted the UN had not yet replied to the
RTG's offer of troops for Darfur. He also noted the MFA
regretted changes to the Constitution that require a wider
range of treaties to receive legislative ratification. End
Summary.
APEC AND UNGA
--------------
2. (SBU) The Ambassador hosted Foreign Minister Nitya
Pibulsonggram for lunch at the EMR on September 19. The DCM
and American Department Director General Nongnuth
Phetcharatana also attended.
3. (C) The Ambassador asked about Prime Minister Surayud's
interaction with President Bush at the APEC summit in
Australia. Nitya, who had participated in the President's
pull-aside in Sydney, characterized the discussion as "pretty
good." President Bush had registered his concern about
Thailand remaining on track to restore elected governance;
the President also emphasized his and the First Lady's
concern about the repressive climate in Burma. Nitya
expressed gratitude for the President's invitation for ASEAN
leaders to gather in Texas but added that it was difficult to
find a date convenient for all likely participants. This
effort was complicated by the possibility of a new Thai
government being formed in early 2008. The Singaporeans are
working for a January date that PM Surayud could attend.
Nongnuth interjected (correctly) that the Department had
advised the ASEANs in Washington that a February or March
date was more likely.
4. (C) Nitya explained he would depart Thailand on September
20, stopping in Germany en route to the UNGA session. At the
UNGA, the Thais would emphasize their imminent return to
democracy and, partly as a result of that, the prospect of
Thailand resuming a more significant role in regional
affairs. The RTG would emphasize its concern about climate
change but offer no specific proposals to address it. PM
Surayud Chulanont would also mention the King's concept of
"sufficiency economy" (ref D) in his UNGA speech, although
Nitya remarked that the King did not feel the concept
required greater international attention. PM Surayud also
planned a talk at the Asia Society.
5. (C) Nitya said he would welcome a meeting with U/S Burns
on the margins of UNGA. The Ambassador passed to the FM an
BANGKOK 00005036 002 OF 004
invitation for a USAID-sponsored anti-trafficking event in
New York on September 24. Nongnuth said the short notice
would probably prevent the FM's participation but the RTG
would try to send someone else. Nitya planned to make a
one-day visit to DC, during which he would not seek executive
branch appointments but would try to meet with Senators
Biden, Lugar, Webb, and Bond, and Congressmen Lantos and
Rangel.
ELECTIONS AND REFLECTIONS ON THE COUP
--------------
6. (C) The Ambassador asked Nitya's expectation about the
upcoming elections, and specifically whether the election
date might be delayed, as some Thai legislators wanted.
Nitya said all references he had seen to the elections in
internal RTG documents indicated they would take place on
December 23, per PM Surayud's public commitment.
7. (C) Nitya expressed dismay with the press coverage of the
one-year anniversary of the coup, much of which has
criticized the effectiveness of the interim administration.
Nitya stressed that the interim's administration goal had
always been to ensure a transition from the severe political
crisis that pre-dated the coup to an improved democratic
system with greater checks and balances to prevent a
resurgence of Thaksin-style authoritarian tendencies. Nitya
felt the administration had accomplished this difficult task
but was being given little credit for it.
8. (C) Nitya also confirmed earlier rumors that the
accusations of acts of lese majeste by Thaksin (one of the
major public justifications for the coup) had been dropped,
at the quiet suggestion of unnamed figures at the Palace.
Nitya added that he felt confident that Thaksin and his
loyalists were not responsible for spreading a video clip
(available on the internet) that showed the Crown Prince and
his wife, who was in a state of semi-dress, at a party.
Nitya declined to specify whom he believed responsible for
spreading the video clip, however.
MARTIAL LAW IN MOST OF N.E. UNTIL ELECTION
--------------
9. (C) Reflecting on the widespread rejection of the
constitution in the Northeast during the August referendum,
Nitya said that the RTG was intent on keeping martial law in
effect in most northeastern provinces at least until the date
of the election. The only way martial law would be lifted
there sooner would be if the legislature were to pass an
Internal Security Act (ISA). Many in the military were
pushing for the current parliament to pass the ISA, and Nitya
said that the draft had evolved in positive ways after
initial public criticism (ref C). He remained uncertain
whether the legislature would pass the ISA before its term
expired, however.
10. (C) Nitya estimated that the pro-Thaksin People's Power
Party (PPP) might do less well in the Northeast -- the region
most supportive of Thaksin -- than many political observers
expect. He did not indicate whether he believed there was a
direct relationship between the retention of martial law and
the PPP turnout in the next election. Consistent with
current conventional wisdom, he doubted PPP could win an
absolute majority.
BURMA
--------------
11. (C) Nitya related that PM Surayud had informed President
Bush at APEC that ASEAN influence on Burma had diminished,
because of the increasing weight the Burmese accord to their
relations with China and India. He said he had lobbied his
Burmese counterpart to support the ASEAN Charter's provisions
BANGKOK 00005036 003 OF 004
lauding democratic principles, and the Burmese reluctantly
agreed that all ASEAN countries could commit to aspiring for
democratic governance.
12. (C) Commenting on the current state of affairs in Burma,
Nitya said the RTG was not inclined to review or revise its
Burma policy but might be forced to do so if the GOB were to
"start shooting monks" engaged in anti-regime activities.
Nitya argued that some small progress had taken place with
the National Convention. "It's not nearly as much as anyone
wants, but it's there." The Ambassador demurred and reviewed
for the FM USG concern about the current situation in Burma.
REFUGEES -- HMONG AND NORTH KOREAN
--------------
13. (C) The Ambassador raised USG concern for the safety of
Hmong refugees in Thailand. Nitya assured the Ambassador
that, despite some rumors to the contrary, the RTG would not
deport Hmong back to Laos without a screening process. The
Ambassador welcomed this assurance and urged the
establishment of a credible screening mechanism for all the
Hmong currently seeeking refugee status. It was not
necessary for the UN to play the key role in this screening,
the Ambassador said, so long as the process was credible and
accessible to those who might have a legitimate claim. Nitya
confirmed that the RTG was considering how to set up a
process that did not rely on the UN. Nitya added that the
Hmong issue should be seen in the context of the overall
Thai-Lao relationship, which he considered "very good." He
cited Thai construction of a third bridge to Laos and also
said the two countries were making progress on border
demarcation.
14. (C) Nitya considered the inflow of North Korean refugees
into Thailand problematic. He said he wished there was a way
that North Koreans could make their way to South Korea
without having to come through Thailand. The Ambassador
acknowledged Thai assistance in processing North Korea
refugees and urged that this continue, even though he
recognized RTG concerns that more North Koreans might be
drawn to Thailand by the prospect of resettlement.
NEXT FOREIGN MINISTER
--------------
15. (C) The Ambassador asked Nitya whom he thought might
succeed him as Foreign Minister. Nitya confirmed the report
of another source (ref A),that the main contenders were
former Deputy Foreign Minister Sukhumbhand Paribatra and
former Ambassador to the U.S. Kasit Piromya, both of whom
were currently associated with the Democrat Party.
THAI TROOPS FOR DARFUR
--------------
16. (C) Nitya noted that the UN had not yet responded to
Thailand's offer to provide troops for deployment in Darfur.
(Ref C reported that the RTG was awaiting a UN response.)
TREATY RATIFICATION
--------------
17. (C) Nitya admitted that MFA officials were disappointed
with provisions of the new Constitution (primarily in Article
190) that establish a new role for the legislature in
approving treaties. (Note: Under the 1997 Constitution, the
legislature only had a role in approving a treaty that
"provides for a change in the Thai territories or the
jurisdiction of the State or requires the enactment of an Act
for its implementation..." Article 190 of the 2007
Constitution requires the legislature's approval for a much
wider range of treaties. This strengthening of the
legislature's role likely stems from controversy over
BANGKOK 00005036 004 OF 004
trade-related agreements that were under negotiation in
recent years. End note.)
COMMENT
--------------
18. (C) Nitya is correct that the interim administration's
principal mission was to pave the way for democratic
elections after Thaksin's ouster, but, as messy as the
pre-coup political crisis had become, it would be unrealistic
to expect that the Thai people would be happy with twelve
months of mediocre governance. We welcome Nitya's
reassurance that the RTG is preparing for elections on
December 23, but we note that, until the King issues the
relevant decree, some Thais who prefer later elections may
agitate for a delay.
19. (C) Regarding a possible encounter with U/S Burns on the
margins of UNGA, we think that would be a good occasion to
discuss not just the return to elected civilian government,
but the wider foreign policy agenda.
BOYCE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR PHU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM KDEM KPKO MASS UNGA TH
LA, BM, SU
SUBJECT: THAI FOREIGN MINISTER ON APEC, UNGA, ELECTIONS,
BURMA, REFUGEES, DARFUR
REF: A. BANGKOK 4996 (DEMOCRAT PARTY UPDATE)
B. BANGKOK 3648 (THAI TROOPS FOR DARFUR)
C. BANGKOK 3528 (ACTIVISTS AGAINST ISA)
D. 06 BANGKOK 5706 (SUFFICIENCY ECONOMY)
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) Thai FM Nitya Pibulsonggram spoke favorably of recent
U.S.-Thai interactions at the APEC summit and previewed some
RTG plans for the upcoming UNGA session. He said he would
welcome the opportunity to meet with U/S Burns on the margins
of UNGA, and indicated that he would make a side trip to
Washington to meet with U.S. legislators. In a September 19
lunch hosted by the Ambassador, Nitya said all signals that
he discerned indicated the next election would take place on
December 23, per PM Surayud's public commitment. He said the
RTG intended to maintain martial law in many Northeast
provinces where martial law was not in effect prior to the
coup, barring quick passage of an Internal Security Act.
Nitya said extreme actions by the Burmese government could
prompt a review of Thai policy toward Burma, but no such
review was currently planned. He assured the Ambassador the
RTG would not deport Hmong refugees to Laos and expressed
concern about the inflow of North Korean refugees to
Thailand. Nitya noted the UN had not yet replied to the
RTG's offer of troops for Darfur. He also noted the MFA
regretted changes to the Constitution that require a wider
range of treaties to receive legislative ratification. End
Summary.
APEC AND UNGA
--------------
2. (SBU) The Ambassador hosted Foreign Minister Nitya
Pibulsonggram for lunch at the EMR on September 19. The DCM
and American Department Director General Nongnuth
Phetcharatana also attended.
3. (C) The Ambassador asked about Prime Minister Surayud's
interaction with President Bush at the APEC summit in
Australia. Nitya, who had participated in the President's
pull-aside in Sydney, characterized the discussion as "pretty
good." President Bush had registered his concern about
Thailand remaining on track to restore elected governance;
the President also emphasized his and the First Lady's
concern about the repressive climate in Burma. Nitya
expressed gratitude for the President's invitation for ASEAN
leaders to gather in Texas but added that it was difficult to
find a date convenient for all likely participants. This
effort was complicated by the possibility of a new Thai
government being formed in early 2008. The Singaporeans are
working for a January date that PM Surayud could attend.
Nongnuth interjected (correctly) that the Department had
advised the ASEANs in Washington that a February or March
date was more likely.
4. (C) Nitya explained he would depart Thailand on September
20, stopping in Germany en route to the UNGA session. At the
UNGA, the Thais would emphasize their imminent return to
democracy and, partly as a result of that, the prospect of
Thailand resuming a more significant role in regional
affairs. The RTG would emphasize its concern about climate
change but offer no specific proposals to address it. PM
Surayud Chulanont would also mention the King's concept of
"sufficiency economy" (ref D) in his UNGA speech, although
Nitya remarked that the King did not feel the concept
required greater international attention. PM Surayud also
planned a talk at the Asia Society.
5. (C) Nitya said he would welcome a meeting with U/S Burns
on the margins of UNGA. The Ambassador passed to the FM an
BANGKOK 00005036 002 OF 004
invitation for a USAID-sponsored anti-trafficking event in
New York on September 24. Nongnuth said the short notice
would probably prevent the FM's participation but the RTG
would try to send someone else. Nitya planned to make a
one-day visit to DC, during which he would not seek executive
branch appointments but would try to meet with Senators
Biden, Lugar, Webb, and Bond, and Congressmen Lantos and
Rangel.
ELECTIONS AND REFLECTIONS ON THE COUP
--------------
6. (C) The Ambassador asked Nitya's expectation about the
upcoming elections, and specifically whether the election
date might be delayed, as some Thai legislators wanted.
Nitya said all references he had seen to the elections in
internal RTG documents indicated they would take place on
December 23, per PM Surayud's public commitment.
7. (C) Nitya expressed dismay with the press coverage of the
one-year anniversary of the coup, much of which has
criticized the effectiveness of the interim administration.
Nitya stressed that the interim's administration goal had
always been to ensure a transition from the severe political
crisis that pre-dated the coup to an improved democratic
system with greater checks and balances to prevent a
resurgence of Thaksin-style authoritarian tendencies. Nitya
felt the administration had accomplished this difficult task
but was being given little credit for it.
8. (C) Nitya also confirmed earlier rumors that the
accusations of acts of lese majeste by Thaksin (one of the
major public justifications for the coup) had been dropped,
at the quiet suggestion of unnamed figures at the Palace.
Nitya added that he felt confident that Thaksin and his
loyalists were not responsible for spreading a video clip
(available on the internet) that showed the Crown Prince and
his wife, who was in a state of semi-dress, at a party.
Nitya declined to specify whom he believed responsible for
spreading the video clip, however.
MARTIAL LAW IN MOST OF N.E. UNTIL ELECTION
--------------
9. (C) Reflecting on the widespread rejection of the
constitution in the Northeast during the August referendum,
Nitya said that the RTG was intent on keeping martial law in
effect in most northeastern provinces at least until the date
of the election. The only way martial law would be lifted
there sooner would be if the legislature were to pass an
Internal Security Act (ISA). Many in the military were
pushing for the current parliament to pass the ISA, and Nitya
said that the draft had evolved in positive ways after
initial public criticism (ref C). He remained uncertain
whether the legislature would pass the ISA before its term
expired, however.
10. (C) Nitya estimated that the pro-Thaksin People's Power
Party (PPP) might do less well in the Northeast -- the region
most supportive of Thaksin -- than many political observers
expect. He did not indicate whether he believed there was a
direct relationship between the retention of martial law and
the PPP turnout in the next election. Consistent with
current conventional wisdom, he doubted PPP could win an
absolute majority.
BURMA
--------------
11. (C) Nitya related that PM Surayud had informed President
Bush at APEC that ASEAN influence on Burma had diminished,
because of the increasing weight the Burmese accord to their
relations with China and India. He said he had lobbied his
Burmese counterpart to support the ASEAN Charter's provisions
BANGKOK 00005036 003 OF 004
lauding democratic principles, and the Burmese reluctantly
agreed that all ASEAN countries could commit to aspiring for
democratic governance.
12. (C) Commenting on the current state of affairs in Burma,
Nitya said the RTG was not inclined to review or revise its
Burma policy but might be forced to do so if the GOB were to
"start shooting monks" engaged in anti-regime activities.
Nitya argued that some small progress had taken place with
the National Convention. "It's not nearly as much as anyone
wants, but it's there." The Ambassador demurred and reviewed
for the FM USG concern about the current situation in Burma.
REFUGEES -- HMONG AND NORTH KOREAN
--------------
13. (C) The Ambassador raised USG concern for the safety of
Hmong refugees in Thailand. Nitya assured the Ambassador
that, despite some rumors to the contrary, the RTG would not
deport Hmong back to Laos without a screening process. The
Ambassador welcomed this assurance and urged the
establishment of a credible screening mechanism for all the
Hmong currently seeeking refugee status. It was not
necessary for the UN to play the key role in this screening,
the Ambassador said, so long as the process was credible and
accessible to those who might have a legitimate claim. Nitya
confirmed that the RTG was considering how to set up a
process that did not rely on the UN. Nitya added that the
Hmong issue should be seen in the context of the overall
Thai-Lao relationship, which he considered "very good." He
cited Thai construction of a third bridge to Laos and also
said the two countries were making progress on border
demarcation.
14. (C) Nitya considered the inflow of North Korean refugees
into Thailand problematic. He said he wished there was a way
that North Koreans could make their way to South Korea
without having to come through Thailand. The Ambassador
acknowledged Thai assistance in processing North Korea
refugees and urged that this continue, even though he
recognized RTG concerns that more North Koreans might be
drawn to Thailand by the prospect of resettlement.
NEXT FOREIGN MINISTER
--------------
15. (C) The Ambassador asked Nitya whom he thought might
succeed him as Foreign Minister. Nitya confirmed the report
of another source (ref A),that the main contenders were
former Deputy Foreign Minister Sukhumbhand Paribatra and
former Ambassador to the U.S. Kasit Piromya, both of whom
were currently associated with the Democrat Party.
THAI TROOPS FOR DARFUR
--------------
16. (C) Nitya noted that the UN had not yet responded to
Thailand's offer to provide troops for deployment in Darfur.
(Ref C reported that the RTG was awaiting a UN response.)
TREATY RATIFICATION
--------------
17. (C) Nitya admitted that MFA officials were disappointed
with provisions of the new Constitution (primarily in Article
190) that establish a new role for the legislature in
approving treaties. (Note: Under the 1997 Constitution, the
legislature only had a role in approving a treaty that
"provides for a change in the Thai territories or the
jurisdiction of the State or requires the enactment of an Act
for its implementation..." Article 190 of the 2007
Constitution requires the legislature's approval for a much
wider range of treaties. This strengthening of the
legislature's role likely stems from controversy over
BANGKOK 00005036 004 OF 004
trade-related agreements that were under negotiation in
recent years. End note.)
COMMENT
--------------
18. (C) Nitya is correct that the interim administration's
principal mission was to pave the way for democratic
elections after Thaksin's ouster, but, as messy as the
pre-coup political crisis had become, it would be unrealistic
to expect that the Thai people would be happy with twelve
months of mediocre governance. We welcome Nitya's
reassurance that the RTG is preparing for elections on
December 23, but we note that, until the King issues the
relevant decree, some Thais who prefer later elections may
agitate for a delay.
19. (C) Regarding a possible encounter with U/S Burns on the
margins of UNGA, we think that would be a good occasion to
discuss not just the return to elected civilian government,
but the wider foreign policy agenda.
BOYCE