Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BANGKOK4981
2007-09-17 09:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH FORMER PM BANHARN

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KDEM TH 
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RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4839
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 004981 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH FORMER PM BANHARN
SILAPA-ARCHA

REF: BANGKOK 4905 (FOR THE MOTHERLAND)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 004981

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH FORMER PM BANHARN
SILAPA-ARCHA

REF: BANGKOK 4905 (FOR THE MOTHERLAND)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a September 14 meeting with the Ambassador, former
Prime Minister Banharn Silapa-Archa predicted that loyalists
of deposed Prime Minister Thaksin would not be able to form a
government after the next elections unless they were to win
an absolute majority. Banharn cited assurances he had
received from politicians forming new parties that they would
not support the People's Power Party, which represents
Thaksin's interests. Banharn said Democrat Party Leader
Abhisit Vejjajiva had the necessary skills to become Prime
Minister, despite his relative inexperience. He speculated
that current Army Commander General Sonthi Boonyaratglin
could become Deputy Prime Minister and/or Defense Minister in
the next government; the Ambassador said this appointment
would send the wrong signal. Banharn was clearly energized
and appeared in his element, amid uncertainty and
fast-breaking political machinations. End Summary.

EX-TRT OFFICIALS CONSOLIDATE
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador called on Chart Thai Party Leader
Banharn Silapa-Archa at Chart Thai headquarters on September

14. (Note: Banharn, who was Prime Minister from 1995-1996,
remains active in party politics and is currently an
important ally of the Democrat Party. Chart Thai appears
likely to represent a key swing vote when it comes time to
form the next government. End Note.) Banharn appeared
energized as he noted the fast pace of his fellow
politicians' maneuvers.


3. (C) Banharn reviewed the consolidation of former Thai Rak
Thai officials into a manageable number of blocs. On
September 11, several important figures merged to form a
party to be called "For the Motherland" (reftel). Then, on
September 13, Suwat Liptapanlop and Somkid Jatusripitak --
both of whom remain ineligible to hold political office
because of the Constitutional Tribunal's dissolution of TRT
-- agreed to combine forces and create a new party,
tentatively called "Thai Unity/Developing Nation." Banharn
noted that this unwieldy amalgamation of the names of Somkid
and Suwat's groups reflected politicians' unwillingness to
appear to sacrifice the symbols of their personal status,
even as they scrambled clumsily to negotiate new arrangements
in an effort to preserve their relevance.

ASSESSING PPP
--------------


4. (C) The two aforementioned groupings, along with the
People's Power Party (PPP),appear to provide political space

for most of the prominent figures formerly associated with
TRT. Banharn confirmed the conventional view that PPP
clearly represented Thaksin; he said Thaksin, in designating
Samak Sundaravej as PPP Party Leader, had chosen a capable
figure, but Samak was blunt in his manner, and this could get
him into trouble. Samak also remained vulnerable to
corruption charges currently being investigated by the Asset
Examination Commission (AEC). Banharn said he did not want
to speak ill of Samak, whom he considered a friend, but he
felt Samak, in supporting Thaksin, was going down the wrong
path.


5. (C) Banharn said he did not believe PPP could expect to
receive the support of the same 42 percent of the country
that had voted to reject the Constitution in the August
referendum. He noted that Thaksin loyalists had made
significant efforts to rally opposition to the charter, with
the government and Council for National Security doing much
less to generate support. During the election, on the other
hand, other parties would be competing more fiercely with
Thaksin's forces. With his assets and his family's liberty

BANGKOK 00004981 002 OF 002


at stake, Thaksin would fight aggressively, Banharn
predicted, saying he would do the same were he in Thaksin's
place.


6. (C) The Ambassador asked what Banharn expected in the
event that PPP were to win a plurality in the coming
election. Banharn asserted with great confidence that, so
long as PPP did not win an absolute majority, it would be
unable to form a government, because no other parties would
join in support of Thaksin. He said he had received
assurances to this effect from key former TRT figures in the
other groups, including Surakiart Suthirathai, Suwat
Liptapanlop, and Suwit Khunkitti. Clearly reflecting a view
that the coming contest had more at stake than just the
personal interests of politicians, Banharn said that if these
politicians were to go back on their word, he would consider
them "inhuman."

ABHISIT AS PM
--------------


7. (C) Banharn expressed a reasonable degree of confidence in
Democrat Party Leader Abhisit Vejjajiva's capability to
function as Prime Minister. (Abhisit, who recently turned
43, is frequently criticized as too young for the job.)
Banharn admitted that Abhisit lacked experience, but -- aside
from himself, Banharn half-joked -- there were few people in
the arena who appeared more qualified. Whoever would become
the next Prime Minister would face numerous difficulties,
Banharn said.

SONTHI IN THE CABINET
--------------


8. (C) With General Sonthi Boonyaratglin continuing to
publicly vacillate about possibly running for elected office,
the Ambassador asked Banharn's view of Sonthi and his
political future. Banharn predicted that Sonthi would likely
end up Minister of Defense, and possibly also Deputy Prime
Minister, after the formation of the next government. The
Ambassador said Sonthi's appointment to the cabinet would be
a negative development, as it would make it appear the 2006
coup d'etat was motivated at least in part by Sonthi's
political ambitions.

CONSTITION AND ELECTION
--------------


9. (C) Banharn said he believed the Election Commission would
act impartially. He worried, however, that the
election-related "organic" laws currently under debate in the
parliament would prove overly strict, and, as Party Leader,
he could be vulnerable to legal charges arising from the
actions of subordinates. Banharn noted that the 2007
Constitution and the system of governance it had established
seemed designed principally to prevent Thaksin's return to
power; these would likely require modification by the next
parliament.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Banharn's seemed to concede that PPP is likely to
place first in the coming election; this is the current
conventional wisdom in political circles. The other parties'
current game plan is not to overtake PPP but to maintain
sufficient cohesion and discipline that PPP will prove unable
to form a government, despite a plurality. While Banharn
seemed to find some credibility in assurances that former TRT
figures would not return to Thaksin's side, we believe that
few unbreakable commitments have been made, and top-level
negotiations will continue to be characterized by
equivocation, mistrust, and back-stabbing, up to and beyond
the day of the vote.
BOYCE

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