PRE-ELECTION ROUND-UP: THAIS TO RESHUFFLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 004793

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MLS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KDEM TH
SUBJECT: PRE-ELECTION ROUND-UP: THAIS TO RESHUFFLE
GOVERNORS, GENERALS; EU BROUHAHA

REF: CHIANG MAI 143

Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton, reason 1.4 (b),(d)

SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) This month, Thai authorities announce two important
sets of personnel decisions. The Ministry of Interior each
September announces the transfer of governors (who are
appointed MOI officials, not elected) and other local
administration officials. There were rumors that governors
in provinces that did not support the constitution would be
punished in the reshuffle, but this does not appear to be the
case, based on our analysis of the moves announced yesterday.
The next big announcement expected later this month is the
Army reshuffle; junta head GEN Sonthi has reached the
mandatory retirement age (although he will remain as chief of
the COUNCIL for NATIONAL SECURITY until the new government is
installed) and the announcement of his successor is eagerly
awaited. Right now, the front runner appears to be the Army
Chief of STAFF who, while close to GEN Sonthi, was not one of
the coup leaders. In other news, the EU's proposal to bring
monitors for the parliamentary elections appears to have
foundered. The EU's insistence that the RTG sign an MOU
viewed as removing monitors from the scope of Thai law has
provoked a nationalist outcry in the media and some of the
ministries. The EU's efforts to smooth over the controversy
are probably too little and too late. END SUMMARY.

INTERIOR MINISTRY RESHUFFLE
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2. (SBU) The Interior Ministry, which appoints governors to
oversee affairs in Thailand's provinces, announced the
results of its yearly personnel reshuffle on September 4.
The results of the reshuffle had been eagerly anticipated, as
many observers expected the Interior Ministry to punish
governors and vice governors in the 24 provinces where a
majority of voters did not support the constitution in the
August 19 referendum.


3. (SBU) The promotion results demonstrated unfavorable
referendum results did not significantly impact the
gubernatorial careers of Interior Ministry officials. While
four governors from provinces that voted against the
constitution were demoted, eleven such governors and vice
governors were promoted. Notably, the governors in the
northeast provinces of Buriram and Nakhon Ratchasmia, where
the referendum passed despite strong opposition from local
politicians, were neither promoted nor demoted. Similarly,
the governor of Chumphon, which overwhelmingly supported the
new constitution, was actually demoted to a less significant
position in the Ministry.


4. (C) The promotion results are likely more indicative of
ministerial favoritism rather than a result of vindictive
punishment. In Chiang Mai province, for example, where
voters rejected the constitution by a strong margin, Governor
Vichai Srikwan was promoted to head an important election
administration body (reftel). Some ministry officials felt
his promotion was a result of his close connections to
Council for NATIONAL SECURITY (CNS) Chairman General Sonthi
Boonyaratglin. Ministry insiders told us on September 5 that
they believed the reshuffle decisions were a result of turf
battles between senior Interior Ministry officials, and were
not the result of poor performance during the referendum or
interference by the CNS.

ARMY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF RUMORS
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5. (U) Among the most closely watched storylines in recent
weeks has been speculation concerning who will replace CNS
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army (RTA)
Sonthi Boonyaratglin when he retires from the Army on
September 30. According to RTA custom, Sonthi will nominate
his successor. Three senior Army Generals, Assistant Army
Commanders-in-Chief Generals Saprang Kalayanaramitra and

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Anupong Poajinda, and Army Chief of STAFF General Montri
Sungkhasap have emerged as the leading candidates. (Another
contender, CNS Secretary-General and MOD Permsec Winai
Phattayakul, appears to have taken himself out of the
running, with his continued protestations that he does not
want the job.)


6. (C) While the position of Commander-in-Chief of the RTA is
recognized as the most powerful in the Thai military, the
position has taken on added importance after last year's
coup. Some reports indicated that a key factor in General
Sonthi's decision may be loyalty, as some believe that former
Thai Rak Thai elements may have a good chance of a very
strong showing in the upcoming general elections. With the
possibility of PPP electoral success, various reports pointed
to General Sonthi selecting a successor he considers loyal
and with integrity in order to protect the CNS from
retribution from Thaksin supporters if they should win enough
seats to form the next government.


7. (U) Speculation regarding the next Army Commander was
briefly diverted last weekend when General Sonthi reportedly
stated he would not decline a request for him to stay on as
Commander past his retirement date, as others have done
before him, if the government asked him to stay on. The most
recent example is General (RET) Prem Tinsulanonda, who
received a one-year extension in 1980. Prime Minister Surayud
Chulanont quickly squelched the idea, however, saying the
government would not choose that course.


8. (U) General Saprang, the most senior officer of the
leading candidates, initially emerged as the favorite due to
loyalty to General Sonthi and his firm anti-Thaksin
positions. General Saprang's divisive personality and
controversies generated during his tenure as chairman of the
state telecommunications company and the Airports of Thailand
may have worked against him and appear to have presented
Generals Anupong and Montri the opportunity to pull ahead as
frontrunners.


9. (U) General Anupong, former commander of the King's
Guards, was favored recently was commander of the Thai First
Army, a key element in the 2006 coup and is also reportedly
close to General Prem, President of the influential Privy
Council.


10. (C) General Montri, while considered loyal to General
Sonthi, was not part of the CNS and many considered him a
dark horse candidate. Nonetheless, General Montri's
prospects have ascended because, while not seen as the most
adept or powerful of the candidates, a source indicated that
some in the mainstream Army favor him as he is considered to
be professional. General Montri also does not carry the
political baggage of being a coup maker -- considered helpful
to smooth the transition back to democratic rule -- and his
selection would not likely cause a rift within the RTA.
Despite the continually evolving situation, it appears that
General Montri has evolved into a prime candidate with
General Anupong in close contention.

EU ELECTION MONITORS BROUHAHA
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11. (C) The EU proposal to bring election monitors for the
parliamentary elections has run into a perhaps fatal
obstacle. The EU proposed to bring a monitoring mission
weeks ago, and initially got a positive response from Thai
officials. However, the dialog turned sour after the EU
forwarded a generic MOU for the Thai to sign. The Thai side
took umbrage at some of the conditions; we understand, for
example, that the draft included language guaranteeing the
observers access to "all meetings at all levels of election
administration." Some Thai officials took their complaints
public, and media reports further exacerbated what has become
a nationalist backlash against the proposal. Commentators
have questioned why the EU is suddenly so interested in Thai
elections, which they have never observed before, and even
implied that former PM Thaksin, from his London residence, is
somehow manipulating the EU. One legal scholar suggested

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that such an MOU would require approval from the NATIONAL
Legislative Assembly, under the terms of the new
constitution. The EU, belatedly, tried to explain publicly
that the MOU was a draft and could be modified by the Thai
side, but it may be too late to remedy the situation.


12. (C) We understand that the EU and the RTG will meet on
Thursday. At this point, the Thai position is that EU
observers are welcome like anyone else, but the Thai
government will not sign an MOU that they say removes the
observers from the scope of Thai law and enables them to
dictate to the Thai election commission. The EU says that it
cannot send a delegation without an invitation and an MOU.
The EU shows indications that it is ready to give up, which
is unfortunate. The RTG will likely be saddled with the
accusation that it barred foreign observers, and the incident
will add to the list of grievances the RTG and the EU are
holding against each other.




BOYCE